THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

THE MODERN MOVEMENT IN THE ENGLISH CHURCH

By the Editor

THE Fourteenth Conference of Modern Churchmen was held at Birmingham, 22nd—29th August, 1927. Although Birmingham was a new *venue,* the Conference, notwithstanding the absence of some for whose support we had looked, was very well attended. Some twelve hundred persons listened to the Presidential Address delivered by the Dean of St. Paul's. The Conference owed much to the presence of the Bishop of Birmingham and to the ready helpfulness of the authorities of Woodbroke Settlement and Kingsmead and West Hill Colleges, Selly Oak, for the congenial conditions enjoyed. The ancient universities of Oxford and Cambridge have a peculiar power of attraction largely derived from the past; our new *venue* derived its charm from the present. Members of the Conference had the cheering experience of being in daily contact with the many-sided philanthropic activities of the Cadbury family, and of observing how the Spirit of Christ in its love and wisdom can humanize the rigours of modern industrial enterprise and make it the means of character-building amid healthy, happy and inspiring conditions. To learn of the experimental work being done in the realm of Christian education in the Selly Oak Colleges, world-wide in its outlook and influence, was equally cheering.

The subject of the Conference was *The Modern Movement in the English Church.* The purpose of the papers was to present in positive, popular manner the causes, history, aims, affinities and potential contributions of that movement. After the Presidential Address on *The Spiritual Nature of the Christian Religion* the scheme of the papers ran as follows :—

I. Causes and History of the Modern Movement.

(1) *History of the Modern Movement.* Rev. J. S. Boys-Smith, M.A.
(2) *Intellectual Causes of the Modern Movement.* Rev. Alfred Fawkes.
(3) *Roman Catholic Modernism.* The Ven. Archdeacon A. L. Lilley.

II. The Aims of the Modern Movement.

(1) *To secure a Synthesis of Christianity and the Modern Outlook.* Professor W. R. Matthews, D.D.
(2) *To stress Christian Faith as necessarily transcending Modern Knowledge, yet in harmony with it.* The Rev. Canon Streeter, F.B.A.
(3) *To re-interpret and re-formulate Christian doctrinal and liturgical formularies.* The Rev. Professor Bethune-Baker, D.D.

III. The Affinities of the Modern Movement.

(1) *With Catholicism.* The Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D.
(2) *With Evangelical Protestantism.* The Rev. J. P. Hodges, M.A.
(3) *With Agnosticism.* The Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

IV. Actual and Potential Contributions of the Modern Movement.

(1) *The Modern Movement and the Reunion of Christendom.* Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D.
(2) *The Modern Movement and Foreign Missions.* Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I.
(3) *The Modern Movement and Theological Study and Teaching.* Rev. Prebendary J. R. Wilkinson, M.A.

V. The Modern Movement and National Education.

(1) *The Pressing Need of a Christian Basis for National Education.* R. B. Henderson, M.A., Headmaster of Alleyn's School, Dulwich.
(2) *Practical Proposals in the face of existing difficulties.* Rev. E. J. Martin, D.D.
(3) *The Extension and Development of the Modern Movement.* Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A., B.D.

During the Conference four addresses were given at Evensong: (1) *The Scholar-Saints of Antioch* by the Rev. Leonard Patterson, D.D.; *F. D. Maurice* by the Rev. Harold Mulliner, M.A.; *Professor F. J. A. Hort* by Sir Arthur Hort, Bart., M.A.; *Hastings Rashdall* by the Rev. P. J. Kirkby, M.A., D.Sc., sometime Fellow of New College, Oxford. The concluding sermon in the Cathedral was delivered by the Bishop of Birmingham. All these, with the Conference papers, are published in this number of the *Modern Churchman*.

The Conference discussions were helpful, but not, for the most part, brilliant. The speech which attracted most attention was delivered by Professor Timothy Tingfang Lew, Ph.D., D.D., Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Yenching University, Peking. Dr. Lew, who spoke as a visitor, not as a member, dealt with certain aspects of the present situation of the Christian Movement in China and of the help that the Modernist Movement could contribute to it. In the course of his speech he said:

"The Christian movement in China, taken as a whole, and with notable exceptions which only prove the rule, is characterised by six distinct features. (1) An infallible Bible, taken as a whole, literally. (2) Different

sets of inflexible dogmas, ranging from the Thirty-nine Articles down to whatever may be found in the doctrinal statement of the Holy Rollers. We have all kinds of dogmatic teachings, and they are all inflexible, from the point of view of those who propagate them in China. (3) Deep-seated divisions. Christian work is carried on in China in Protestant bodies by over a hundred and thirty different organisations or denominations. We have about eight or nine different branches of Presbyterianism, just as many types of Methodism, and so on and so forth. So you can find 'a Chinese-American-Dutch-Reformed Christian,' and many other kinds. (4) It is a Christian movement which has now an alien cultural background. Christianity has been superimposed upon Chinese life, almost totally ignoring the culture of the Chinese people. The culture of five thousand years counts for nothing in the eyes at least of some missionaries. I use the word *some* advisedly, I do not say all; there are others who are quite different. (5) Military protection. It is a very interesting thing that the Gospel of Love is being preached in China by means of the Gospel of Force. The unequal treaties sanction many rights of foreigners in China, including the right of the Christian missionaries to preach the Gospel. (6) Finally, a very important characteristic which for lack of a good term I would call 'involuntary humanism.' Christianity has been in China a force for social good. It has established hospitals, dispensaries, educational institutions, and many organisations and efforts which are working for social betterment. But I question—or I would say it is still a historical fact to be verified—whether the missionaries started out with a clear conception of the application of the Gospel of Love in human redemption in this world and not only the other world, or whether this development of human service in China under Christian auspices was a by-product, an inevitable result of the Christian heart responding to the pressing needs of the people over there.

With these six characteristics of the Christian movement in China, what has been the result? It has been something like this. The infallible Bible has been taught and accepted in a strictly literal way. Many different kinds of views have been set forth before the Chinese Christian, and many Christians have been brought to accept the Bible and the whole Bible literally. There are many Christians who have memorized a large part of the Bible. I used to be able to recite the four Gospels and several Epistles. But beyond memorizing the text, the real benefits that Christians get out of the Bible are not taught by others but come from direct understanding through prayer.

Many Chinese Christians have been constrained to defend these inflexible dogmas. That, of course, leads to denominationalism, and denominationalism is being developed in China. Chinese Christians are constrained to accept that, but in their hearts they do not want denominationalism.

Concerning Christian unity, I said what I had to say in an address delivered at Lausanne two Sundays ago; it may be published later, and anyone who cares to know what Chinese Christians are thinking about Church unity will find it there.

Military protection has done a great deal of harm to the Christian movement. It has helped the weaker brethren in the Roman Church to go so far that in some places people really identify injustice with the Roman Church in China, and the Protestant Churches have not been free from that charge.

As to involuntary humanism, that has been the salvation of the Christian

movement in China, because people may fail to see God and Christ through an infallible Bible and inflexible dogma; these things may blur the picture of Christ. But the good work, the evidence of Christians loving one another, and loving those whom they even do not know, has been a convincing testimony that there is value in Christianity.

Something has happened in China in the last ten or fifteen years which has created a situation which is very acute, and for which I am pleading for your contribution to help. There has been going on in China for the last decade a great intellectual revolution. That movement emphasizes three things: (1) a new way of studying China's past; (2) a whole-hearted welcoming of things foreign of all sorts, from Kantian Philosophy and Einstein's Relativity down to the Charleston dance. Everything foreign is welcome. (3) A reconstruction of Chinese culture out of the new results of the study of our own past and the present of our neighbours. From these combined we hope to reconstruct a new culture for a new nation in China. The platform for this movement is the revaluation of all values. What the speaker said last night interested me very much, because it is precisely those two things—the experimental method and optimism with regard to human nature—which are the characteristics of this great movement that is going on sweeping through China like wildfire.

The Christian Church, which has been characterised by those six points I have mentioned, is placed in a position of great difficulty in relation to this Chinese Renaissance movement.

One of the important results of the Chinese Renaissance movement is this, that it has popularised the historical method of studying things of the past. The historical method is not new, it has been practised in China for three hundred years, and it is a very interesting study, the development of the scientific method of treating historical data. But very few of the missionaries in China know anything about it at all, and they have carefully saved poor Chinese Christians from 'falling into the snares of this historical method,' and have tried to give them 'a very safe way' of studying the Scriptures. The historical method is now being applied to the study of the Chinese classics of Confucius. Nothing is sacred until it is proved to be so, and the works of Moffatt and Driver are becoming reference books of some Chinese non-Christian scholars to-day. Those who can read English are comparing notes of the result of Chinese historical methods with the historical methods which have been employed in the West for studying Holy Scripture.

Twenty years from now you will find a generation of Chinese students from Universities, Colleges, and even Secondary Schools, who have been brought up in the historical method of studying the Chinese Scriptures, confronted with the Christianity that refuses to look into or allow any historical method to be introduced. So you know what a crisis we are going to face.

In regard to inflexible dogma, we are facing an experimental test of everything. For example, early marriage, marriage arranged by parents, and other problems are being put to the test of that experimental method, and are found to be not for the social good. Old traditions and teachings must stand or fall by the experimental test. Of course, inflexible dogma does not allow this; you have to accept it, or you suffer the consequences, which are quite severe. The reasonable souls who are seeking for spiritual help are deserting the Church. The second generation of Christians is going away from the Church seeking spiritual consolation and help in science and in other ways.

As to the divisions of the Christian Church. We are confronted with a great movement of nationalism that cries for national unity, and it casts a suspicious eye on anything that may contribute to national disunity. People have asked very pointedly, 'Will not a Christianity divided into so many groups—Christians who cannot agree even among themselves—will not such division introduce discord and disunity into our body politic in the future, rather than help to unify us? We have enough causes of division and we cannot afford to have another one.' This is the cry of national unity, and unless Christianity is really united in China, Christianity is going to have a very hard time.

As to the military protection, the Chinese Christians are against it. They are trying to overcome everything that disfigures the image of Christ, which is love and the bond of love, which believes not in forcing others to accept His views, but in dying for them, and with that love convince them. Unless Christianity will help the Chinese legitimate nationalist aspiration, and unless the Christians in the West can do away with unequal treaties, and treat China on an equal basis, on a Christian basis, then Christianity will have to face a very serious crisis, as it is facing it now, and it will be increasingly difficult for missionaries to preach their Gospel.

With regard to the question of alien cultural background, there is a movement going on in the Chinese Church known as the Movement for an Indigenous Church. Its platform is to re-interpret Christianity in terms of the spiritual inheritance of the Chinese race. It is going to be a very difficult task, not the task of one person, or of a group of persons, but of many persons. The younger Chinese Christians who have seen the vision have put their heart and soul into this tremendous task. It is their hope that the Christians in the West will not put any obstacles in the way of their doing that; nor allow their old dogmas, their old cultural backgrounds, to interfere with the earnest seekers in China for the true vision of Christ's teaching for modern China.

Finally, as to involuntary humanism, we hope that the Christians in the West will continue to support those missionaries who are engaged in this philanthropic, educational work; for, in whatever you may fail in China, missionaries will always be able in future to point to this Christian work of helpfulness, of social service, of educational, medical, and philanthropic enterprise, which will plainly stand there as a monument to the great religion which we all believe.

I have come from the Lausanne Conference with greater desire and appreciation for the necessity of unity, but I have also come away with this conviction, that if unity is pressing and precious and desirable in China, liberty is more precious. We cannot have lasting unity until that unity has Christ as the centre, for Christ is the Truth, and truth gives us a liberty that is not limited.

In brief, the contribution your Modern Churchmen's Movement can make to the Christian Movement in China is to fight valiantly to preserve this liberty—liberty of interpretation, liberty of experimentalism, and liberty to follow the Spirit of God that is constantly leading us into the fuller understanding of God's Eternal Truth."

There is no need to dwell on the profound significance of the speech of this Chinese Christian scholar. It proclaims the tremendous importance of the ideals and labours of English Modernists for the Orient. If Modernism prevails in England, as it most assuredly will, if Modernists devote themselves with heart and soul and mind to the Modernist cause, it is not Eng-

land alone but the vast mission fields of the East which will benefit by its victory. This at any rate is clear that the Christianity of the East must become a Modernist Christianity, or it will dwindle and die.

The Conference which came this year between the Lausanne Conference of Faith and Order and the Meeting of the British Association at Leeds was well reported in the press. The *Church Times* did not omit the opportunity offered to sneer at English Modernism, and was joined in its attack by *Christian Life,* the Unitarian weekly, each of which cited the other with approbation. English Modernists have much in common, both with Anglo-Catholics and Unitarians, and are happy to have provided an opportunity for bringing these extremes closer together. English Modernists share with Anglo-Catholics their reverence for the spiritual character of the Church, their regard for historic continuity in faith and order, their love of liturgical beauty hallowed by the sacred associations of the past, their desire for Christian reunion, their recognition of the value of sacraments and symbols in Christian worship. On the other hand English Modernists are unable to agree with Anglo-Catholic doctrinal rigidity and ecclesiastical exclusiveness, and are compelled to stand with the English Reformers in their opposition to superstitious doctrines and practices which insult the rational and moral consciousness and breed scepticism.

English Modernists share with Unitarians their reverence for scientific truth and their championship of freedom in research and teaching, but recognize that it is only love which can direct both to a right use; they share also their views as to the fallibility of ecclesiastical and Biblical authority: they are also in agreement with them in many of those matters in which modern Biblical scholarship has led to the reformulation of traditional doctrines. On the other hand English Modernists are opposed to certain characteristics of Unitarianism. Modernists do not like the terms Trinitarian and Unitarian as descriptive of the Christian doctrine of God, but, if compelled to choose, they must choose the Trinitarian, with its threefold presentation of God as Transcendent, Incarnate, Immanent, or God in Creation, in Christ, in Conscience, as preserving more values in its doctrine of God than the *older* Unitarian theology. We stress the adjective *older,* for many modern Unitarians appear to have departed from the older Unitarian theology in this matter. English Modernists differ also from Unitarianism by believing in and teaching the Incarnation; this they regard not as a single isolated incident in human history, but as a process which brings the Incarnation into closest relation with the cosmic process and reveals its aim and ideal. Here we are inclined to believe that Unitarianism is also becoming Modernist. There is another important matter in which we are compelled to emphasize the difference between the Unitarian and the Modernist. The Unitarian does not worship Jesus Christ. The Modernist, true to a Christian practice which goes back at least to the proto-martyr St. Stephen, does worship Him. The Unitarian does not worship Him, because he holds that it is unlawful to worship a man, for the child of God may only worship God. The Modernist worships Him, but not as a man. What the Modernist worships is the Supreme Unveiling of the Divine Nature in Jesus.

For the Modernist, the Christian Religion is essentially Christocentric. By the term Christocentric the Modernist does not mean that the teaching of Jesus is not capable of great expansion and adaptation; it is capable even of providing that by which it can be transcended in certain of its

aspects. Nor does the Modernist mean that there are not elements in the teaching of Jesus which were the reflections of the limited and erroneous ideas of His age and locality, *e.g.* the relation between disease and demons, the apocalyptic *mise-en-scène,* and so on, but that the fundamental truth of His essential teaching and of His personality is a fact of supreme and eternal significance for humanity. The Modernist not only believes that there was a Supreme Unveiling of the Divine Nature made to humanity in Jesus, but that through His Spirit this Divine Unveiling is still proceeding. The Modernist would find it hard, indeed impossible, to be a Christian if he lost this conviction. We have not been at all keen to stress these differences between English Modernists and English Unitarians; we would far rather stress what we have in common, but in the presence of innuendoes which hint that Modernists are Unitarians in everything but name, and that they would not even mind assuming the name but for certain material inconveniences connected with doing so, it becomes a duty on the part of Modernists to indicate that this is not the case. The assumption that the Unitarian, having discovered Christian truth in its most perfect form several centuries ago, has now the satisfaction of seeing the belated Trinitarian, disguised as a Modernist, making exactly the same discovery is a travesty of the facts. The Unitarians, under the leadership of great minds like Martineau and saints like James Drummond, have moved far from their traditional camp; and English Trinitarians—a much larger body with less freedom of movement and a great deal more baggage—have also moved far, but also much more slowly, from their traditional camp. Both, no doubt, with many others, will meet on a higher plane of Christian truth in perhaps some not far distant future, if only they keep on moving under the leadership of the Divine Spirit of Truth and Love.

The Birmingham Conference left in the minds of many, who are not shallow optimists, the firm conviction that the Modernist cause is growing steadily stronger not merely in the number of its professed adherents, nor even in the remarkable extent to which the more thoughtful of Anglo-Catholics and Evangelicals are becoming permeated by Modernist methods and ideas, but by the ability of Modernists themselves to put their point of view clearly, strongly, confidently, and with that moderation which would rather persuade than confute.

The Fifteenth Modern Churchmen's Conference is privileged to be meeting next year at Girton College, Cambridge, on September 17th to 24th, when the important subject of Christianity and History will be discussed.

THE SPIRITUAL NATURE OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION

By the Very Rev. W. R. Inge, C.V.O., D.D., F.B.A., Dean of St. Paul's.

WE are living at the end of perhaps the most extraordinary epoch in human history, a period of social, political, economic and intellectual change to which I think there is no parallel. It has been marked especially by two characteristics —the advance of applied science and a vast increase of wealth and population. These developments have given the age a somewhat materialistic tone, for there has been no corresponding advance either in art or in the spiritual life. Western society has been considerably dislocated, *déraciné*; many are complaining that 'we see not our tokens; there is not one prophet more.' As might be expected, we hear some crying out, 'We want a new religion'; others, 'We want the old religion'; and a third party, 'We want no religion at all.'

To the first I would reply with Troeltsch, 'It is folly to believe that for an epoch so deeply rooted in Christianity and in the religious forces of antiquity which are allied to it there can ever be a new religion. It will stand or fall with the religion it has. The great problem of its existence will be whether it can conserve for itself this religious power, and transmit it with its entire spiritual content to the great new nations now entering the horizon of the world.' To the second, that though there is a most true sense in which Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, yet we cannot go back to any past period of history. Christianity, when it was in its first vigour, looked forward—think, for example, of the Fourth Gospel. Revivals are shallow things; they are strong only when they disguise a new inspiration as antiquarianism, and strive to restore something that never existed. He who really looks back fares like Lot's wife; the deserts of theology are strewn with these melancholy monuments. As for the fool who says in his heart, 'There is no God,' let him go to Moscow; it will prepare him for the worst that may befall him in another life.

But we must remember Bengel's words: *Conversio fit ad Dominum ut Spiritum.* The Kingdom of Heaven is like a householder who brings out of his treasure things new and old; not so much some things that are new and other things that are old, as new things that were old before the world was, and old things that still bear new fruits and flowers. There is no Scripture against pouring the old wine into new bottles.

What is Christianity? It is the title of a well-known book by Harnack, which has been vigorously attacked, from the other wing of Liberalism, by Loisy. Sabatier finds in Christianity the Religion of the Spirit, in sharp antithesis to the Religions of Authority, of which the Roman Church is the type. Heiler, who has left that Church to become a Protestant Modernist, writes a great book on Catholicism without mentioning Sabatier. Others have protested that to oppose 'Authority' to 'the Spirit' is a false antithesis. A spiritual faith, they say, may well rest on authority. We in this Society believe in a Spirit who divideth to every man severally as He will; we are glad to learn from each other, and there is no dull uniformity about our opinions.

But what do we mean by Christianity? We must try to be clear about the answer to this question. Nor can we hope to answer it without a very broad view of the course of history during the last two thousand years. It is not easy to disentangle the essential from the accidental, because religion, like some chemical substances, is never found pure, and no great Church presents, or could present, the pure gold without much alloy. The subjective convictions of the individual must affect his judgment as to what the religion of Christ was meant to be and ought to be. A man can only try to state the truth as he sees it, as fairly and temperately as possible.

The oldest civilizations seem to have been closely connected with nature-worship, and to have been independent theocracies. The great epoch of revelation, the coming of the world-religions, occupies the millennium which ends with Mohammed. Within these thousand years all the great universal and spiritual religions came into being; and, be it noted, they all had their birth in Asia. Leaving out of account Islam, which was from the first bound up with the racial expansion of the Arabs, the swarming of a nation from the arid peninsula which could no longer

support them, we see in the parallel histories of Buddhism and Christianity a great spiritual revelation which was unable to maintain itself in the country of its origin, where the vested interest of the existing religions was too strong to permit it to conquer, but which gained signal triumphs in other lands. But in neither case was the victory won by the revelation as it fell from the lips of its founder. Both religions were changed almost beyond recognition, strengthening themselves by an organization quite foreign to the designs of the founder, and by concessions to popular superstitions and priestly encroachments which were utterly alien to the spirit of the revelation. If we look at what has happened to Buddhism, where our minds are not distorted by prejudice, we may be able to realise more clearly the parallel degradation which has overtaken Christianity.

There may be a few of us here who doubt whether an universal and spiritual religion can be found in the teaching of the earthly Christ. I cannot argue the question here; but I am personally convinced that we know a great deal about Jesus of Nazareth; that the main character of His revelation stands out strong and clear, and that it is, in broad outline, very much what we have all been taught to believe. He placed Himself in the succession of the great prophets; He spoke as a prophet, lived as a prophet, suffered and died as a prophet. Traditional orthodoxy has indeed gone partly astray in supposing that He came to reveal the mysteries of His own nature. He came, like a true prophet, to reveal the nature and counsels of God the Father. He certainly attached His followers to His own person in utter trust and loyalty, and He claimed their devotion; but it was as one sent by God, in an unique sense, that He spoke and acted.

It is plain that His personal religion (if we may so speak of Him) was based on a vivid and continual realization of the presence of God, finding its natural expression in long silent prayer and meditation. Though He preached in the synagogues, we do not hear of His frequenting, for His devotions, buildings dedicated to public worship. He preferred a hill-top. He practised and preached complete trust in God, and was the first teacher to forbid worry and anxiety as having the

nature of sin. His moral teaching was founded on what in modern times has been called a transvaluation of all values. 'What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul?' And yet, to make every kind of prudential bargain with God impossible, 'He that wisheth to save his soul shall lose it.' The man who lives for acquisition is called, not 'Thou thief,' as some social reformers would call him, but 'Thou fool.'

The law of love is only part of the intense *inwardness* which Matthew Arnold rightly singled out as 'the method of Jesus.' We have to contrast this attitude with the trend of contemporary Judaism in order to realise the magnitude of the change. What God forbids in the first instance is not murder and adultery, but hatred and every impure inclination; what He values is not the cold-blooded Stoic benevolence, but warm-hearted affection. What He forbids is the self-centred life, whether it takes the form of covetousness, of hard selfishness, or of pride. In order to leave no room for compromise, He proclaims that we cannot serve God and Mammon, that the impure in heart cannot see God, and that there can be no light in an eye that is not 'single' or sincere. The same insistence on an uncompromising choice is at the root of the stern maxims about being willing to sacrifice an eye or hand, the willingness to part with our possessions, and to renounce family ties. It is not that these things are wrong in themselves, but that whatever comes between the soul and God must be abandoned. This is quite different from the asceticism of other religions and philosophies, the aim of which, when all is said and done, is to make the inner man invulnerable. Though Stoicism has deeply affected Christian ethics, there is a very complete difference between the two systems. The religion of love does not allow us to be independent in the Stoical sense; nor does it allow us to think even of God as the Greeks thought of the Olympians —'the gods who lead an easy life.'

The Gospel is a religion of moral redemption, not of social reform. Social legislation lies simply outside the range of Christ's teaching. These things are left by Him to the law of love. Indiscriminate charity seems to be recommended instead of wise measures of improvement; but we must not take these

precepts unintelligently, and we must remember, as Harnack says, that when we read the Gospels we are in the East.

In His attitude to the constituted religious authorities, Christ was not only independent, but almost iconoclastic. I do not believe that He railed against the Scribes and Pharisees as the Fourth Gospel, written fully seventy years later, describes. But there is no doubt whatever that He regarded the yoke of the Law, as interpreted by the leaders of the Jewish Church, with scorn and indignation. There is no doubt that His Gospel was a message of liberation, sweeping away at one stroke the whole mass of non-moral ceremonial obligation. There is no doubt that He proclaimed a divorce between religion and the temporal power. He not only sets aside the sacred Mosaic tradition: 'Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time . . . but I say unto you . . .'—something very different. It is quite plain what He meant when He said, 'Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.' He meant that if all the machinery and plant of the Jewish Church, with its priests and worship and hallowed sanctuary, were abolished, in a very short time the dynamic of the Gospel which He came to preach could restore it all again, or perhaps rather build in its place a temple not made with hands, in the hearts of men. It was hardly worth while to garble a saying which was enough to horrify every 'good churchman' in Jerusalem!

He founded no organization; no one after reading the Gospels could say, 'Here is the code of a new religion.' He evidently allowed His hearers to believe that the little flock would not have to wait long before the Kingdom of God should come in power. I do not attach such weight as some scholars do to these seeming predictions. 'The day of the Lord is at hand' is common form for all Jewish prophets. But it is significant that nothing resembling the foundation of a Church, nothing suggesting the probability of a long history for His community, can be traced back to what seem to be His authentic sayings. Apocalyptism was the first mould into which the metal flowed. The vessel soon burst; but the historical Christ did not dash the hopes of His simple-minded patriots.

Thus the original Gospel was the religion of the Spirit in its highest, simplest, and purest form, with an extraneous element

in Jewish Messianism. This was the first Christianity, and we cannot tell how long it would have survived as a reform-movement in Judaism. It is curious to observe the germs of a Christian Caliphate at Jerusalem, in the family of the Founder, represented by James, the Lord's brother. But St. Paul made the greatest of all the changes which Christianity has undergone by transplanting it to Europe. Within a few years after the end of our Lord's ministry it had entered decisively the circle of Hellenistic culture, and began to compete for the conquest of the Graeco-Roman world. St. Paul understood the Gospel of Christ very well indeed. His personal religion was a Christ-mysticism which enabled him to conceive of the Incarnation as persisting under another form. This was the right and indeed the only manner of treating the brief Galilean ministry as a living, inexhaustible, ever-fruitful energy. But St. Paul was a Jew of the Dispersion, a Pharisee, no doubt, but not as the Pharisees of Judaea. He was converted to the Christianity of Stephen, not to that of James the Lord's brother. He began and half finished the structure of the Logos-Christology which was soon to displace the Messianism which Greeks and Romans could never understand, and which was from every point of view quite inadequate. He founded Churches, which were in some ways less like the synagogues than like the contemporary associations in the Hellenistic world which gathered round a cult-hero. It is true that the Church never made terms with the tolerant *theocrasia* of the time, under which the same persons might seek edification by initiation into the rites of Isis, Serapis and Mithra. Christ, unlike these gods and goddesses, was a historical character. The Christians, in spite of the malevolence of the Jews, always felt themselves nearer to Judaism than to Paganism. But he who speaks in Greek thinks in Greek. It was inevitable that the unethical sacramentalism which had long been the bane of Greek religion should take root also within the Church. In the Fourth Gospel we see a great attempt to counteract these tendencies; but even in this noble and long misunderstood dramatic poem we have a Christ who 'prays not for the world,' but only for those whom He has 'taken out of the world.' The love of mankind is being somewhat narrowed into love of the brotherhood, that is, of our fellow Christians.

Persecution seldom destroys a religion, but it narrows and hardens it. The institution is strengthened to resist attack and to secure internal unity. Inevitably, as zeal cools and the glorious vision fades into the light of common day, the institution begins to strangle the revelation which it was framed to protect. To the prophet succeeds the priest. These evils had been prepared for during the persecutions, which nevertheless kept the Church morally pure by driving away the half-hearted; after the great victory under Constantine, which was much rather a victory of the Church over the Empire than a victory of Christianity over Paganism, the Church rapidly lost almost everything that could recall the original Gospel.

It was unfortunate that Christianity crystallized at the time when one civilization was dying, and another was not yet born. Troeltsch is quite right in saying that the Catholic Church is the last great creative achievement of classical antiquity, which in fact died in bringing it into the world. But it was, we may say, an old man's child. The third century was a period without hope. The general tone of the literature is either pessimistic or, as in the philosophy of Plotinus, it cuts itself off entirely from history and events in time. None looked forward, except with dread; all looked back, or gazed only on timeless realities. The Christians were indeed engaged on a great constructive work, and were partly conscious that the flowing tide was with them; but they did not contrive to preserve or to resuscitate the spirit of free inquiry, the bold and fearless curiosity, which had been the glory of Greece. As Tyrrell says, 'the idea that vital points of faith could have been hidden from the apostolic eye, and revealed only to later centuries; that the appeal was to the future, not to the past, would have been reputed blasphemous by the Fathers and early Councils. In faith, the Church was perfect from the first and immutable. . . . Orthodoxy holds that whatever the ante-Nicene Church said, the Nicene faith is what it always meant.' Thus the Spirit, which, as Christ promised, was to say unto the disciples many things which they could not bear while He was with them, was put into fetters and condemned to endless self-repetition. It was not long before the Dark Ages descended upon Western Europe (not at all to the same degree upon Eastern Europe, which however sank into

almost complete intellectual stagnation), and the Roman Church stepped almost without a struggle into the inheritance of the dead Empire.

Sabatier and many other writers have described the de-christianizing of Christianity in the so-called ages of faith. Catholicism offered the Mediterranean nations all that they required—a philosophy, a mythology, a mystery-cult, asceticism, a system of public and private morals, faith-healing, charity organization, and a subordinate but luxuriant polytheism. When Mithra and other rivals were once fairly beaten and stamped upon, this policy of accommodation almost ceased, and the Church hardened and petrified. Thus Catholicism is no thought-out system, but a congeries of acquisitions collected under stress of competition. While Catholicism was struggling for supremacy, its principle was to find room for everything which met a popular demand, except impure rites and black magic. But its other principle, to tolerate no revolts, ended by binding it in chains of its own forging. I have no wish to deliver an anti-Roman polemic; when speaking as a historian one ought to try to understand instead of judging. For the political philosopher, the Roman Church is perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in history, the solitary survivor of so many autocracies, a Caesarism without a territory and without an army, a relic of the Middle Ages still erect and powerful in the modern world, an absolutely unique structure, defying alike all the constituent forces of modern civilization—nationality, democracy, socialism, humanism, and science. Its worst side is the political, in which its record is utterly detestable; its best side is its wonderful traditional system of mind-cure, developed empirically through the gathered experience of the confessional. Catholicism, apart from its imperialism, is best understood as an *art*. Its methods are those of an art-teacher. The pupil wishes to acquire an art —in this case, a type of character which he admires. The Church will show him how it is done, will prescribe rules to be observed during training, and will at last deliver the goods. When the course is completed, the pupil will be a trained and skilled Catholic, and all retreat will be cut off (as he probably wished it should be) as effectually as by a physical mutilation. Nor is the course made too rigorous for those who are content

with much less than perfection. The layman is practically allowed to take what suits him, and merely to abstain from contradicting the rest.

The religion of the Spirit may live under the shelter of such a system, but only a cramped and hothouse life. The Church allows the mystic to draw inspiration from his own well—allows it grudgingly, indeed, but without inquisitorial examination. Some very Christ-like characters have been fostered by the Roman Church. For Christ Himself, though utterly indifferent to what we may call the Catholicism of Jerusalem, did not attack the sacerdotal system with the truculence of a militant Protestant; he merely left it on one side as a thing with which He had no concern, except when He saw its tyranny injuring the souls of others. The Roman Catholic saint is of course utterly incapable of the fearless independence of Christ and St. Paul; he grovels before authority in a manner which in any other sphere would be utterly degrading; but as long as he is studying the art of holiness according to the accepted rules, his growth is not much hampered by authority, which is the authority of a long-tried empirical method. Roman apologists are able to point out the absurdity of speaking of an unspiritual religion in the lives of some of their most loyal and obedient saints.

But in spite of the saints, who constitute the true Apostolic Succession which never failed even in the times of deepest corruption, the apostasy of the Great Church was so flagrant that the revolt called the Reformation was bound to come. We have to consider whether this movement, which Harnack regards as the greatest and the most pregnant for good in the whole of history, but which other critics have judged very differently, was really a revival of the religion of the Spirit. In my opinion it was so, but it has hardly even yet become conscious of its own principles. Its triumphs, I believe, are in the future.

What is the essence of Protestantism? Harnack sums it up as follows: 'Protestantism reckons upon the Gospel being something so simple, so divine, and therefore so truly human, as to be most certain of being understood when it is left entirely free, and also so as to produce essentially the same experiences and convictions in individual souls.' This is somewhat vague, and only partially true. We have to distinguish between early

Protestantism and its modern forms, between Lutheranism and Calvinism, and between the two great Protestant Churches on the one side and the step-children of the Reformation, the despised and often persecuted sects, on the other. The type of Christianity which we regard as the Religion of the Spirit, and which we hope to see victorious in the future, owes more to the sects than to Luther or Calvin, and is entering into union with the spiritual side of the Renaissance tradition, which had less to do than is often supposed with the birth of Protestantism, and with which the great Reformed Churches were in very imperfect sympathy.

Still, the mere fact of Protestantism being a reformation and a revolution—for it was both—against a Church stifled by externality and unethical legalism, brought it near to the original Gospel, and would have brought it nearer still if the sixteenth century emancipators had been as fearless as Christ Himself. The Reformation was not, as it believed itself to be, a return to primitive Christianity, nor to the religion of the Hebrews; but in many ways it stood for the same principles as the original Gospel. It put an ethical ideal in the place of ceremonial duties. It insisted on inward conviction, instead of being content with acceptance and obedience. It proclaimed the freedom of the individual conscience, and the right of immediate access to God, without the aid of any earthly mediators. So far are Harnack and Herrmann from being right when they say that 'Mysticism is Catholic piety,' that we may rather agree with Troeltsch that in Protestantism mysticism for the first time stands on its own feet, and has become the dominant principle in Christianity. We are accustomed to say that the greatest change in religion in our time has been the shifting of the centre of gravity from authority to experience. No doubt the old supports of authority have given way far more completely in Protestantism than in Romanism, and for this reason those who desire the protection of a religious authority—a refuge in a storm, or an anodyne in pain—are more and more seeking what they want within the Catholic fold. But in being driven back upon religious experience—upon the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*—Protestantism is being forced to recognize and stand by its own fundamental principles. It is coming to feel once more that faith is its own

evidence, and that we may walk safely by the help of the Light that lighteth every man as it comes into the world. This is the religion of the Spirit, and the religion of the New Testament. There is much else in modern Protestantism, as there is much else in every concrete religion; much that links pure mysticism, which knows no time or place and is everywhere and always much the same, with the political and social circumstances of the time and with the chief currents of secular thought. Even so the Gospel was entangled for a time with Jewish nationalism and apocalyptism. There are dangers in this increasing sympathy with modern ideas, the danger above all that the Church, instead of standing forward as a living witness against the frivolity and secularity of the age, may itself be infected by them. But in Protestant countries the Church can enter into the life of the age in a very different way from strict Catholicism, which stands by the old idea of authority and, as Troeltsch says, is felt to be an intrusion into the modern world of a foreign body of anomalous character. It is strange to read the complacent confessions of persons who have joined that communion. 'From the time that I became a Catholic,' wrote Newman, 'of course I had no further history of my religious opinions to narrate.' 'I cease to be an individual,' said F. W. Faber; 'I seem to fall into my own place quietly and without disturbance, and the noiseless path of childlike obedience offers a calm and peaceful prospect of spiritual growth.' A living Roman Catholic man of letters, Mr. Belloc, defines faith as 'the acceptance of a truth and the refusal to entertain the opposite to that truth, although proof is absent. . . . The religion of the Catholic is essentially the acceptance of the religion of others.' To a Liberal, such utterances, if not blasphemy against the Spirit of Wisdom and Understanding, sound like the boasting of the emasculated that they are free from the solicitations of sex.

The great question is, 'What is the seat of authority in religion?' To this there are four possible answers. The seat of authority may be the Church, the Bible, human reason, or mystical inspiration. All Christians agree that some authority attaches to each of the four; the question is, which should come first? Hooker, omitting the last as a separate source, lays down

the following rule: 'What Scripture doth plainly deliver, to that the first place both of credit and obedience is due; the next whereunto is whatsoever any man can necessarily conclude by force of reason; after these, the voice of the Church succeedeth.' Laud pronounces that all four are necessary—'no one of these doeth it alone'; and he distinguishes between the testimony of the Holy Spirit within us and the work of the natural reason.

These four fall into two classes. The Church and the Bible are external and historical authorities; reason and illumination are internal and autonomous guides. The new Protestantism has got rid of the idea of a Church-directed civilization, and so can rest on science and mysticism. But this was not the character of the older Protestantism, except among the sectaries. Luther's reform was at first a mere modification of Catholicism, in which the Catholic formulation of the problems was retained, while a different answer was given. The main question at first was about the assurance of salvation. Calvinism, working upon this problem, came to the doctrine of predestination, which Lutheranism, rather than sacrifice the justice and mercifulness of God, watered down. Protestantism at first desired to reform the Church as a whole, not to set up Churches of its own. It was not evolutionary; in fact, the conception of the Church as the seat of authority gives more elasticity than reliance on the written word can admit. It has been possible to graft a doctrine of development upon Catholicism, while no such doctrine could take root in Protestantism until extreme bibliolatry was discarded. Goethe even thought that 'the Reformation turned back the advance of quiet culture.' The wars and conflicts of religion brought the Renaissance to an untimely end. They gave us nearly two centuries more of mediaevalism—a period terminated only by the struggles for freedom at the end of the seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The humanization of justice and the abolition of trials for witchcraft are the work of the period of illumination, as the Germans call it. The *Aufklärung* was an aftermath of the Renaissance, rather than of the Reformation. The two movements, of which the former is full of power and promise, are now beginning to work together, and there is no reason why they should not work together har-

moniously in the future. That is what I hope for Protestantism. But in the sixteenth century Luther was no friend of humanism; Zwingli, it is true, adopted a more Liberal attitude.

I have traced elsewhere the continuity of the spiritual tradition in the Church. Mysticism is an independent and sometimes a lawless spirit; all hierarchies are afraid of it. But it is only by frequent return to the fresh springs of inspiration that any Church can escape falling into coldness, externality, and petrifaction. How independent such believers may be of all institutional forms, even of sacraments, has been proved once for all by the Quakers; but the small numbers of that Society also indicate that purely mystical faith does not make much appeal to the majority. 'Epaississez-moi la religion,' said Madame de Stäel. She liked her soup rather thick, with slabs of dogma and cultus floating about in it. We must take human nature as it is, or rather as we may hope to see it; but it is useless to expect any great increase in the demand for pure spirituality. It is no small part of the success of Roman Catholicism that it cherishes no illusions about human nature. All we can do is to keep the channels of divine inspiration open, so that the life-giving stream may flow without impediment; that the pure water of the divine spring will become rather turbid we must expect, for so it has always been.

'Faith,' said John Wesley, 'is the eye of the soul whereby the believer sees Him who is invisible. It is not an opinion, neither any number of opinions put together, be they ever so true. It is the vision of the soul, the power by which spiritual things are apprehended, just as material things are ascertained by the physical senses.' Those who so regard Faith will find allies in unexpected places. The Church for them will be, in the beautiful words of our liturgy, 'the blessed company of all faithful people.' The real unity of Christendom, as Phillips Brooks said, 'is not to be found in identity of organization, or in identity of dogma. Both of these have been dreamed of, and have failed; but in the unity of spiritual consecration to a common Lord.'

Professor Peabody, from whom I have taken this quotation, points out in a very telling note how well Bernard Shaw's St. Joan shows the tragedy of a conflict between Church authority

and individual inspiration. Given a deliverance of external infallibility to which experience must submit, and the verdict of the Inquisition was inevitable. Given a conscious practice of the presence of God among the decisions of daily life, and Joan could not yield. There was only one way out; Joan had to be burned and then canonized!

For us Liberals the danger is different. Dr. Johnson says of Addison: 'He thinks justly, but he thinks faintly.' There are many scholars among us who think justly but faintly. 'He who professes to view all the religions in impartial detachment,' says Otto, 'will never understand any of them.' The danger of the religion of the Spirit is that it is so ready to cool, and then what have we left? Not even the traditional dogmas and rites which do keep up a certain warmth in the soul, and a habit of obedience which is no little safeguard. We have to remember every day that true spiritual Christianity is not only the highest type of religion, but the most difficult. Most Christians have found it too difficult; the function of the priest is to prevent the message of the prophet from being entirely lost by leakage. To put it very plainly, the spiritual Christian needs to be a very earnest and good man, living under strict self-discipline and testing all his thoughts, words and actions by the obedience of Christ. If he fails to do this, he will be a dilettante; and the Kingdom of God on earth is not to be brought nearer by dilettantes.

THE INTELLECTUAL CAUSES OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT

By the Rev. J. S. Boys Smith, M.A., Chaplain of St. John's College, Cambridge.

THE 'Modern Movement' in the English Church, upon its intellectual side, is the response which thought within the Church has made, and is still making, to the intellectual changes and discoveries of the last century and a quarter. I say expressly the *response* to those changes. New discoveries and advances in thought are sure always to produce their effects; and these effects are commonly both powerful and disturbing to existing habits or assumptions. Yet, though such changes, if they are securely based, can seldom be permanently resisted, the effect which they immediately produce upon some system of thought with which they conflict may be rather to provoke opposition and reaction than to win acceptance. And so it was in the case of the intellectual changes which we have to consider. But the Modern Movement in the Church is essentially a movement to recognize these changes, to understand them, and to respond to the challenge which they so obviously make. Any section or school within the Church which seriously makes this attempt is within the sphere of the Modern Movement; indeed it is just this ready response to, and intelligent acceptance of, the advances in knowledge and the changing habits of thought, and not any settled body of doctrine, which constitutes the essential character of the movement. The story of the causes which produced it is, in a great measure, the story of a conflict between a relatively settled set of convictions and conceptions and the novel and conflicting conceptions to which the progress of discovery gave birth; and then of the gradual permeation of the old ways of thought by the new. It was a disturbing process, and it is not yet at an end, nor ever can be. But these new ideas must not be regarded as merely the causes of the Modern Movement. They are also the manifestations of its spirit and method. For the effort of the movement has been to come to terms with

them by understanding them, welcoming them, and adopting them. In other words, the story of the Modern Movement itself is the story of the acceptance and progress of the new ways of thought *within* the Church.

The changes in thought and in knowledge, to which this movement is the response, date back, of course, a long way. But it is specially with the period of the last century and a quarter that we are concerned. For it was during that period that the changes were most rapid and extensive; and it was during that period also that their full impact upon the theological and religious thought of the Church was felt. It was an age of immense changes, succeeding one another with extreme rapidity. And especially it was a period in which the range of knowledge was enormously extended, both through space and through time; an extension made possible, in a great degree, by the development of mechanical and technical appliances, which is so characteristic and influential a feature of the century.

In illustration, it is only necessary to recall how, at the beginning of the period, it was generally accepted that the true age of the world and of man was that which could be calculated from the chronology implicitly contained in the Biblical narratives. The estimates varied; but the famous estimate, based upon the calculations of Usher in the seventeenth century, is typical; its established reputation was further secured by its incorporation in the margin of the Authorized Version. But to-day, instead of reckoning the age of the earth at about six thousand years, we are told that it should more probably be reckoned at one or more thousand millions of years. And yet, for all this extension of its age, it is not the centre of the universe, as was commonly supposed, but, in respect of its bulk at least, but an insignificant speck in the vastness of the heavens. And man, though further discovery seems to put back his origin ever further into the remoteness of the past, is still the result of an age-long process of development from the simplest forms of life. Indeed, a glance at the table of dates in a work on ancient history will show that, long before the supposed date of the creation, there were old and highly developed civilizations, the history of which can still be written with some fulness. And the range of knowledge has been extended, not only backwards

through time, but also outwards, and no less remarkably inwards, through space. Outwards, to the endless distances of space, and the almost unimaginable distance of the stars, the material nature of which can yet in some degree be ascertained; inwards, to the equally unimaginable smallness of the constituents of matter. And then has come the vast accumulation of facts and evidence in almost every branch of study. As, for example, in history, not only of the very remote past, but of such ages as that of the rise of Christianity, which is now better understood and more open to observation than it has been at any intervening period. As, again, in every branch of the natural sciences—in physics, geology, chemistry, biology; each of them being extended and developed to an almost incredible extent, and all within the limits of rather more or rather less than a century. And by exploration, travel and observation other races and civilzations, undreamed of even a comparatively short while ago, and other religions, before either quite unknown or hopelessly misunderstood, have been made accessible to study and intelligent appreciation.

And with the vast increase of the extent of knowledge, both as its cause and as its result, has gone a modification of its methods. The ideal has been that of experiment and observation, exact measurement, critical examination of sources, and comparative study of results obtained; the development, in fact, of all those elements of method which we sum up under the comprehensive term 'scientific.' And not least in importance has been what is broadly described as the historical method, which has both made possible the extension of knowledge which the century has witnessed, and in its turn been promoted by it. Under this term must be included, not only the method of history in the more ordinary sense, but that whole method of enquiry which is devoted to the search for origins, the tracing of developments, in a word to the understanding of the world as a movement or process, whether of progress or the reverse. Its ruling conceptions are the complementary ones of change and continuity. The terms 'historical' and 'scientific'—it is perhaps a remarkable combination—express the two most characteristic features of the thought of the period which called forth the Modern Movement in the Church.

It is perhaps the accumulation and classification of material for which the period is most remarkable, rather than for the construction of a coherent theory of life; it was an age of rapid change. But its philosophy, its theology, and (not least) its literature are enough to show that such accumulation did not stand alone.

All this vast extension of knowledge, with its rapid advance, its discoveries, its change of method, its variety, and its mistakes, came to confront the relatively settled and coherent, but necessarily limited, world-view accepted by religion. The view of the world within which religious values and beliefs had come to be grouped, and in the light of which they were interpreted, was naturally not in accord with the new discoveries, since it was constructed before they were made. Many of its elements had existed with little change for long periods. Its theological formularies dated back some two or three, some fourteen or fifteen, centuries; and its Scriptures, upon the basis of which these formularies, and the ideas which they enshrined, were supposed to rest, dated, some from eighteen, some from nearer twenty-six, centuries before. And though many revolutionary discoveries—like those of Copernicus, Galileo, Newton and the other founders of modern science—had been long in the world, they had received no official recognition from the authorities of the Church, and so had never really permeated and transformed the world-view of religion. The two continued to exist side by side, in uneasy relationship with one another; indeed so, in a great measure, they still exist to-day.

The religious beliefs and values, moreover, had come to be, not only closely associated, but even in some degree identified, with that view of the world in terms of which they had so long been interpreted. An intellectual interpretation of the experience of religion is always essential if religion is to remain intelligent and pure; and a more popular or pictorial scheme, in which religious convictions can be represented, is in some degree both inevitable and desirable. But both of these are necessarily more or less temporary in character, and subject constantly to modification as knowledge grows and ways of life and thought change. Truth may be unchanging; but its apprehension and formulation are progressive and variable. This is true of every

system of dogma proper, and also of that semi-official dogma which so largely supplies the ruling religious scheme of each successive age. As Dr. A. N. Whitehead has recently observed :

> ' You cannot claim absolute finality for a dogma without claiming commensurate finality for the sphere of thought within which it arose.'[1]

Such a modification of the religious scheme is being constantly effected quietly and unnoticed; but during periods of rapid change, such as that of the last century, the modification required is too extensive and too rapid to be either quiet or unnoticed. Much of the accepted world-view of religion had become incredible, and was openly in conflict with discoveries which it was impossible rationally to deny or much longer to neglect. Outworn expressions, erroneous and unscientific ideas, mistaken history—in most cases, no doubt, the results of a real endeavour to understand—were now becoming superfluous lumber, which it was essential to be rid of, if religion was not to labour under the burden and the reproach of identifying its deepest convictions with what were palpable errors of fact. Yet so closely were the two interwoven—the experience of religion and the accepted view of the world which was so rapidly becoming out of date—that it was very difficult to disentangle them. The fundamental experience and its accidental vehicle of expression were so far identified that the rejection of the one seemed like the rejection of the other also. Moreover, in these matters the religious world was intensely conservative. Inevitably, therefore, the supporters of religion came in many cases (and not always unjustly) to be identified with obscurantism and hostility to the newly-discovered truth; whilst the pioneers of the new truth came to be suspected (again not always unjustly) of enmity towards religion. And the result was the threat of a disastrous separation—that between religion and intelligence: a result which must always mean the grievous impoverishment of both. The fault did not lie with either side alone. But the nature of the problem became clear. Was it possible to accept the new discoveries and the changed scheme of thought, and yet to find in them a spiritual view of man and the world? Or, was it possible to accept the Christian valuations and beliefs, and to find in the new thought a new interpretation of their mean-

[1] *Religion in the Making*, p. 130.

ing? There were, of course, those who would not face this problem. On the one side there was a tendency towards a somewhat blatant and aggressive agnosticism or materialism which took a pleasure in the discomfiture of the Church and held that at last its pretensions were disposed of. But such an attitude was as little scientific as it was religious; and scientific thought itself led to its downfall. On the other side, there was a tendency to stand by the old tradition and resolutely to shut out the new light or to deny its presence. But such an attitude was also doomed to ultimate failure, for it is not possible to preserve the Church in peace by leaving it anchored in the stagnant calms of an intellectual backwater. But for those to whom the faith of the Church was dear, and yet truth also dear, the problem was urgent; yet it was sometimes also hard and perplexing. It would be a great mistake to think that the issue was one merely between honest acceptance and cowardly dissimulation. There were some to whom the 'new faith' and the 'old faith' seemed alike dear and irreconcilable. It was in the year 1878 that, for example, G. J. Romanes' anonymous work, *A Candid Examination of Theism*, was published.

> 'And forasmuch,' he concludes, 'as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the "new faith" is a desirable substitute for the waning splendour of "the old," I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to "work while it is day" will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that "the night cometh when no man can work," yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible.'[2]

This melancholy conclusion reflects the stress and conflict of the process of transition through which the Christian faith had to pass, but it does not contain any solution of the problem. We may contrast with it a sentence—at once braver and more far-seeing—from an early paper by James Ward, read to a Cambridge society in 1879. He says:

> 'The tide that seems to have overwhelmed the legends of the church and the dogmas of the school will I verily believe turn out to have left the essence of religion purer and plainer than before.'[3]

This second quotation expresses both the faith of the Modern

[2] p. 114. [3] *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 108.

Movement and the nature of the task which called it forth. Its task was to accept the new knowledge, and, by means of it, to effect a reinterpretation of Christian experience and conviction, with a readiness to discard theories which were really superseded. And its faith was that, by this means, Christianity could not suffer, but would receive both enlargement and enrichment. Its aim was, therefore, constructive—to show that the spirit of religion and the spirit of truth were one spirit, the Holy Spirit.

Such, in its general aspect, was the situation which called forth the Modern Movement. It is obviously impossible to consider in detail all the new intellectual forces which were at work; but we may indicate briefly some of the principal directions in which discovery affected most nearly that view of the world with which Christianity had become so closely connected, and to which it was not seldom supposed, by both sides in the controversy, to be irrevocably committed. One branch of study affected another, and all contributed to the rapid change of outlook; but some had a much more immediate and direct bearing upon religious beliefs than had others. The scheme of things which governed religious and theological conceptions was largely moulded by the Bible and by the opinions which were held about the nature of the Bible; and this was so in England to an extent perhaps greater than in those countries in which the Bible was not generally accessible to the people. The conflict between the newly-discovered truths and the accepted world-view of the Church was thus in great measure a conflict between the new knowledge and the conceptions, historical, scientific, and so on, based upon the supposed inerrancy of Scripture. And the position based upon Scripture, as Scripture was commonly interpreted, was exposed to attack from several quarters. It was threatened, first of all, by discoveries which definitely conflicted with Scriptural accounts; it was unsettled, in the second place, by the much larger and broader conceptions which a widened range of knowledge made possible; and it was endangered, in the third place, by a great change of attitude towards the Bible itself. It was as the claim that the Bible was the exclusive source of inspiration and revelation was abandoned that, on the one hand, room was made for the acceptance of the new discoveries, and, on the other hand, that a wider and

truer theory of revelation and inspiration became possible. New knowledge did not permanently endanger a religious interpretation of experience; but it destroyed the narrow limits within which such an interpretation had been confined.

Of the various branches of study, perhaps the most important and far-reaching in its results was that of the natural sciences. It opened up whole realms of existence, and created a new outlook, which transformed the knowledge of the natural world. It was progress in the science of physics which was most characteristic of the earlier part of the period; and the method of physics remained as the ideal at which the other sciences aimed. Its progress did not cease later; indeed it was never more rapid, I suppose, than it has been in the twentieth century. But the biological sciences came later to occupy the forefront of interest, and greatly to modify the ideals of scientific study. The contrast of 'mechanism' and 'organism,' I suppose, roughly indicates the nature of the change. The far-reaching direct effects of physical science upon the ideas generally received by the Church have already been indicated. The vast extension of the field of knowledge, both through space and through time; the consequent modification of the ideas about the world's origin, and so about the meaning of creation; the increased understanding of the relative size and position of the earth, with the resulting abandonment of geocentric pictures and of ideas of a localized heaven, and so on: these and other like effects are too well known to need recapitulation. But there were effects perhaps more important. It was not merely that the Biblical cosmology was superseded. The ideals and methods of the study, with its underlying conviction of a 'reign of law,' which was so remarkably confirmed by observation and experiment, appeared to endanger or exclude divine action in the world; and certainly did render unlikely or even impossible divine action in the form in which it had been conceived. It appeared gradually to close up those gaps which for a time were a source of comfort to some theologians. But such gaps soon became a source rather of embarrassment, and it was plain that a revised conception of God's action, and not a limitation of it to certain fields, had become imperative. But there was worse in store.

Upon the basis of the theories of the structure of the physical world, and encouraged by their success, there grew up, in opposition to the supernaturalism associated with religion, a philosophy of the world as a whole, in which the attempt was made to explain the whole of experience in terms of those conceptions which were adapted to the explanation of the limited and abstract realm of the physical sciences alone. The aim was one of simplification; to explain, not only the physical world, but everything else, in terms of the principles of mechanics. It was an over-simplification, and therefore only possible at the expense of much of experience. But its influence was very powerful through the middle of the century. And it resulted sometimes in an aggressive materialism professedly hostile to every form of religion, sometimes in agnosticism. But the agnostic attitude, though it disclaimed all ultimate knowledge, and was even sometimes prepared to speak of its 'unknowable' as God, took the mechanistic scheme as its only ideal of knowledge, and had throughout a materialistic bias. That this was not the necessary or logical consequence of physical science, but rather an illogical development of it, many of the greatest scientists always realized; and the philosophers were not slow to point it out. 'In fact,' said James Ward, 'Naturalism, like Materialism, is only physics treated as metaphysics—a mistaken identification.'[4] But that it was a necessary consequence of the scientific view was a widespread belief, which greatly widened the breach, already too broad, between the scientific and religious worlds. And in any case, however unsound such a philosophy might be, a theology which only gave half-hearted acceptance to the clear discoveries of science was obviously in a bad position for resisting its attacks.

The naturalism of the middle and end of the century has to-day almost no supporters. It was attacked successfully both from without and from within the sciences themselves. It was attacked from without by the idealistic movement in philosophy, which grew rapidly in importance, influenced by the German thinkers of the opening decades of the century, till it displaced the English utilitarian tradition, and became the dominating English philosophy. It was of great assistance in the recon-

[4] *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 4th ed., p. 575.

struction of a religious view of the world for two reasons; first, because in nearly all its forms, though reserved in its attitude towards Christianity, it was really a philosophy of religion; and secondly, because it restored a spiritual interpretation upon a rational, and not upon a merely pragmatic or emotional, basis. And that is of the first importance. And naturalism was attacked from within by the advance of the biological sciences, which introduced new conceptions and demanded wider limits.

But the discoveries in biology, though they helped to bring about the downfall of materialism, created new difficulties for theology. It was, of course, the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, and of his *Descent of Man* twelve years later, which brought the new theories prominently before the world. The idea of evolution did not, of course, originate with Darwin. The idea of development was prominent in philosophy half a century before; it was implied in the new geological theories, as in Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830); and it was both the ground and consequence of the new historical interest. The strict interpretation of the Biblical accounts of creation and deluge was already impossible. And now a theory was advanced, supported by a great array of evidence, from physiology, experiment, and fossil remains—an array afterwards enormously increased from every quarter—applying the idea of evolutionary development to the explanation of the origin of species and, not least, to that of the origin of man. The accepted ideas of the fixity of species, of special creation, of the original perfection of man, all became untenable. And not only the fact, but also the method, of evolution, as it was interpreted, caused serious difficulty. The method of natural selection, whether adequate to all the facts or not, at least was correct so far as it went; and it seemed to substitute chance elimination of the unfit for conscious purpose and guidance, and to destroy the evidence for that special teleological adjustment upon which a defence of theism had so largely relied. Indeed it did deprive the teleological arguments, as they had hitherto been formulated, of much of their value. But here again, as in the case of natural law more generally, though the new theories were inconsistent with the special forms a religious view of the world had taken, they left room for, and even encouraged, a profounder inter-

pretation which both widened and deepened the significance of a spiritual evaluation. To achieve such a re-interpretation—a more cosmic Christianity—was the task the Modern Movement attempted to fulfil.

The traditional view of the world, moulded as it was by the received view of Scripture, was thus profoundly modified by the new study of the natural world. But there was another branch of study of hardly less far-reaching importance. The Bible itself was being studied with the same impartial interest and critical method as was devoted to the study of the facts of nature. The Bible had been accepted as the Word of God. And this, though it was variously understood, at least meant that everything the Bible contained was substantially true and substantially of a piece. It was inspired and the avenue of revelation; and inspiration was widely interpreted to mean what was called 'dictation.' From this followed both the inerrancy of Scripture and the mechanical way in which it was conceived. But now this was changed. The Bible was not a book, but a literature; and the literature of a particular people with a particular history. The various writings of which it was composed were of very different nature, of very different date, and (what was more important) of very different value, both religiously and historically regarded. The authors, moreover, to which they were ascribed, were in many cases not their real authors; and many of the books themselves were of composite structure. And finally, in this literature were represented the successive stages of a long religious development from its crude and barbarous beginnings to its climax in some of the greatest religious achievements of mankind.

The study, which led to this result, was concentrated at first mainly upon the Old Testament, and especially upon the composition, authorship and date of the Pentateuch. It was the denial of the Mosaic authorship of these books, and the discovery of their composite nature, which produced the acutest opposition. The result was achieved at first mainly by literary methods of source analysis, begun in the eighteenth century and finally established upon a scientific basis by Wellhausen in 1878. Similar methods were applied to the rest of the Old Testament, and linguistic and literary considerations helped to

determine the dates of its various books. But in conjunction with this went historical enquiry; and it became possible to trace, not only the process of literary composition, but also that of social and religious development, from its rude beginnings to its climax in prophet and psalmist. The background of the Old Testament, in fact, was reconstructed. And this was enormously assisted by archaeological discovery. The two great and developed civilizations of ancient Egypt and Babylonia, hitherto known only from references in Biblical and classical literature, were dug up and reconstructed, and their ancient languages and scripts were recovered and read. These great discoveries transformed both our knowledge of antiquity and our conception of the background of the Old Testament. It revealed parallels to many Biblical practices and ideas, *e.g.* to the accounts of the Creation and Deluge, and provided additional evidence and valuable corrections of Biblical history. And so the little nation of the Hebrews was once again seen in its real setting, amongst the far older and more highly developed civilizations of antiquity; and the story of its vicissitudes and achievements was revealed in the Bible, critically read, in folk-tale, in prophecy, in historical record, in legislation, and in poetry.

Similar methods of study were applied to the New Testament, with similar results. The Gospels too, at least in some cases, were composite documents; they too exhibited tendencies and had a background. Archaeology again assisted literary and historical study. And the result was to revolutionize knowledge about New Testament origins and conditions, by revealing the Jewish and Gentile worlds in which its books were written, to an extent hardly less than in the case of the Old Testament. The nature of the whole Bible, together with that of its authority, of its inspiration, of its value, was transformed.

These conclusions only won their way—or, rather, are only now winning their way—to acceptance very slowly. At first the new discoveries seemed to imply the abandonment both of much of what was dearest in the faith of the past, and of the basis upon which a great deal of the rest was based. But it was impossible to resist the conclusions permanently, though many attempts to do so were made. Here, however, as elsewhere, though the old formulations had to go, the old values were preserved, or even

enhanced, when the new knowledge was frankly accepted. The unique value of the Bible remained, though with a changed significance. It was seen now as one of the literatures of the world; subject to similar conditions of growth; liable to similar errors; and inspired in the *same sense*, if in a different degree. Its value and inspiration were found, not in the fact of divine dictation or miraculous revelation, but simply in the value and substance of what it contained, as a record of growth and achievement without parallel in the ancient religious literatures of the world. In other words, it was to be valued and used on its own merits as religious literature and record; and not on the ground of any unique manner of its communication, or of plenary inspiration. It was to be read, in fact, 'like any other book'; and it was when so read that it was found to be in many respects different from all other books.

But, in addition to increased knowledge of the natural world and of the nature of the Bible, there was another branch of study which greatly affected the received opinions. This was the science of the comparative study of religion. In the preface to a learned work called *An Historical Dictionary of all Religions from the Creation of the World to this Present Time*, by Thomas Broughton, 1756, occurs this paragraph:

> 'The first general division of *Religion* is into *True* and *False*. *True Religion* must ever be the same and invariable, and therefore there can be but ONE TRUE RELIGION. That infinite variety, therefore, in the doctrines and modes of worship, which have prevailed in the world (one only scheme excepted) are but so many deviations from the truth, so many FALSE RELIGIONS. This is a very copious subject; and, indeed, the chapter of *False Religions* is by much the longest in the *History* of the religious opinions and practices of mankind.'

So the matter appeared in eighteenth century England, before religion was studied historically and comparatively. But before the end of the succeeding century explorers and anthropologists, assisted by the historians of religion, had collected a great mass of material, both from records of the past and from observation of the present, which revolutionized this conception. It turned out indeed to be a 'very copious subject'—more so than ever Thomas Broughton had the means of knowing; but his method of classification was superseded. It led to a great change in the attitude towards religion; especially, I think, in two respects. In the first place, it became clear that religion in some form was

a universal, a normal and a necessary possession of mankind, in all ages and countries. It was no longer reasonable to regard it, with for example the Positivists, as but a stage which philosophy, and finally science, would supersede. The discovery of its extent and its variety emphasized the fundamental place it holds and always has held as a normal factor in human experience. This fact brought great support to the cause of religion, and indeed to a spiritual interpretation of the world as a whole, by encouraging the study of religious experience for its own sake, and the use of it as evidence for the validity of religious conviction. But it had also another side. Study revealed primitive religion as crude and barbarous, a force making sometimes for evil as well as for good. Furthermore, it revealed religions as connected, as exhibiting everywhere common features and analogous stages of development. But the connections did not exist only between what had been commonly regarded as 'false religions'; they could be traced between these and the 'one true religion.' Indeed, Judaism and Christianity were subjected to the same comparative and critical study as other religions. They were found to have much in common with them, and to be subject to similar influences and conditions; in a word, the 'first general division' was not into 'true and false,' but into higher and lower. Nor was it possible to divide religion into natural and revealed. Natural origins and growth could be detected in *all* religions, and some degree of revelation, though it varied enormously in degree, was present in them *all*. And so it was with Christianity as it was with its Scriptures; its claim to be the purest and truest of religions (and this was certainly not destroyed) came to be based, not upon any peculiar or miraculous origin, but upon its actual spiritual value and achievement. Again religion seemed at first to be endangered, and the special position of Christianity, even its divine origin, to be threatened. But again further thought showed that the new discoveries, if they made precarious all claims to finality based upon anything but intrinsic worth, yet vastly extended the scope and significance of religion, broadened its basis, and deepened men's apprehension of the nature of divine action.

These are but examples of the transformation which the progress of thought and discovery effected in the more or less

settled and restricted world-view with which Christianity had become associated. It would be possible to give many more, *e.g.* from the changes in philosophy, psychology, Church history, and so on. But there is a certain change of outlook, apparent in all these branches of study, which gained steadily in importance. This is the gradual breakdown of the distinctions, hitherto generally accepted, between natural and revealed, and again between natural and supernatural, considered as mutually exclusive, as often they were. These distinctions ceased, in great measure, to be useful; they ceased to interpret what was known of the world, and so they tended to drop out of men's scheme. There was no field of experience which could be closed against the explorations of critical enquiry, or what had once been known as the natural reason; all experience was a legitimate field for unbiassed study, and all exhibited, in some degree, system and order—was subject, in fact, to 'natural law.' And yet this did not exclude a spiritual interpretation, or lead to materialism or what was called naturalism; these latter were the result, not of genuine understanding, but only of the attempt to explain the whole of experience in terms of conceptions adequate only to the explanation of certain of the more abstract of its aspects. Evolution did not necessarily exclude creation, which might be evolutionary; and natural, still less rational or intelligible, did not exclude spiritual or divine—the principle of order might be the principle of both. But the result was a transformation of outlook. And it led, perhaps, markedly to that emphasis upon divine 'immanence' or indwelling which has been so prominent a feature of recent thought. Nowhere was this change more conspicuous than in the attitude towards miracle, once the storm-centre of discussion, but now, it is perhaps not too much to say, a matter of secondary importance. It is of secondary importance because the contrast, in terms of which the conception of miracle was formulated, has ceased to be either a radical or an intelligible contrast.

It was these changes in thought, this extension in the range of knowledge, which caused the Modern Movement. The transformed and enlarged view of the world came to confront the necessarily narrower and more limited world-view of the Church; and the conflict which resulted threatened to open a breach (as

indeed it did) between the new learning and the faith of Christians. The Modern Movement in the Church, as I emphasized at the outset, was a movement in *response* to these changes; it endeavoured to close the breach by accepting and propagating the new ideas *within* the Church. 'Fear of a truth without,' said Hort, 'can only be cured by taking it within, or rather accepting it as already within.'[5] To 'take within' the new truths which were so much feared whilst they remained 'without,' was the aim of the movement. It adopted this aim, moreover, in the belief that the result, even though it should involve a transformation, would not involve an impoverishment, of Christianity. It adopted it in the faith (to use again the words of James Ward) that, though many 'legends of the church' might be overwhelmed, the essence of religion would be left 'purer and plainer than before.' Its aim was therefore constructive—to achieve what I have ventured to call a more cosmic Christianity, in the belief that it would be a truer Christianity.

I have spoken of the causes of the Modern Movement as lying in the past; but they exist of course also in the present. It would be the greatest mistake to regard the task as now even nearly accomplished. Accomplished it never can be, so long as discoveries are made and men feel the need of understanding them. And it is likely that the degree of transformation required in the future may exceed that required or achieved in the past. The task is now only begun, and if it is to be progressively accomplished a lesson from the past century must be learned. That century made clear two things: the power of reason and the power of religion. To keep these two forces—reason and religion—together is a condition essential to the success of the movement; yet to-day there is again a reaction in favour of their separation. 'There can be no surer sign of decrepitude and decay in faith,' said Hort again, 'than a prevalent nervousness about naming and commending reason.'[6] It is only upon a foundation of rationality and intrinsic worth that religion, or anything else, can be permanently or securely based.

[5] *The Way the Truth the Life*, p. 176.

[6] *Ibid.*

THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT

By the Rev. ALFRED FAWKES, M.A., author of *Essays in Modernism, The Genius of the Church of England,* etc.

I.

THE Modern Movement is an outcome of the Reformation. It was contained in it as a conclusion is in its premises; and was in the nature of things. But it came later, and 'in the fullness of time.'

'I am not going to lay hands on my father Parmenides.' The Reformation was such an immense onward step in the advance of man that one does not willingly dwell on its limitations; this would be not to see the wood for the trees. But it was incomplete; it is indeed still in process: and, like all human things, it was a mixed magnitude. It was an emancipation, but it was originally rather a religious and moral than an intellectual emancipation; and its dogmatic position was its weak side. It was an appeal from the Church to Scripture, *i.e.*, from one authority to another. Here, as against those who identified the two, it was unanswerable; the contradiction between them was palpable. But neither Reason nor the 'Free Spirit'[1] were allowed much say in the matter. The latter had been discredited by the extravagance of its advocates; the Kingdom of God in Münster had gone down in blood: and the scientific criticism of the sources lay, as yet, below the horizon. Luther was a meteoric, at times a scarcely sane, genius; Calvin a belated Schoolman; Zwingli, the most reasonable of the Reformers, was the one who, if he were now living, would have the least to retract. It is in the men of less note, such as Balthasar Hubmaier and Sebastian Franck, that, in spite of the suspicion of Anabaptism which attached to them, we find 'a larger air.' Iconoclasm is not one of the 'fruits of the Spirit.' But harder and less gracious personalities were called for by the rough work of that rough age.

[1] *Psalm* li, 12.

II.

This was why the Reformation was followed on both sides by a hardening of the dogmatic crust which overlaid rational and spiritual religion. There was greater freedom of thought in Europe in the beginning of the sixteenth century than there was at its end, either in the Roman Church or in the Reformed Churches. Everywhere theology intrenched itself within increasingly narrow limits; 'I am so fast in prison that I cannot get forth.' But the larger lay world moved on; knowledge was accumulating, critical inquiry gathering strength. The aim of the Reformation was practical. The yoke of the Mediaeval Church, material as well as moral, had been so heavy that, once it was broken, Israel seemed to have come out of Egypt. To few, if any, did it occur to go further back, and test the foundations of the imposing structure of Catholic Christianity; the theology of the Fathers, of the General Councils, and of the Creeds was taken over by the Reformers automatically, and as a matter of course. There was, indeed, no sufficient reason why this should not have been so; the *apparatus criticus* was not to hand. But when the mind turned round on its inherited religious tradition, and found that this rested on a book, it was inevitable that the credentials of this book should be questioned: Biblical criticism, so far from being either superfluous or arbitrary, became the distinctive task to which Protestant theology was called.

III.

Its beginnings were international. Astruc and Richard Simon, the fathers of the criticism of the Old Testament, were Frenchmen; Hobbes, the redoubtable enemy of the Schoolmen, was English; Spinoza, 'the God-intoxicated,' a Dutch Jew of Portuguese extraction. In the eighteenth century it naturalized itself in Germany, where in the smaller states learning—which loves small states—flourished, relatively at least; and where research and inquiry were in the air. The movement was neither freakish nor episodic; *tout se tient dans l'ordre des idées.* Nor was it a merely national product. The stream might be coloured by the medium through which it passed, but it was 'the old stream of Christian tradition whose source is in the Galilean

Lake.' If we in England were not drawn into it, it was because we kept religion and science in watertight compartments, and seldom troubled ourselves about theology, which is not the same thing as controversy, at all. Of late years much has been done in Holland, in Switzerland, and notably in France: in history by Duchesne, on the New Testament by the acumen and massive industry of Loisy; and quite recently by the ingenuity of Delafosse — whom I am tempted to describe as a French F. C. Baur—who has found in Marcionism a key to many closed doors. There are reactions; such is the nature of thought, which moves spirally. But reactions overreach themselves. That against the Tübingen school is a case in point; it is in this sense that it has been said that in the higher levels of thought there are no reactions. The best English work has been indirect and literary—Robertson Smith is no exception, for he was a Scotsman; hence Santayana's unkind epithet for English scholarship—'mincing,'[2] and in his last public utterance (at a Modern Churchmen's Conference) Dr. Sanday spoke of an eminent Cambridge divine of the last generation, on whose claim to distinction he would have been the first to insist, as having 'dabbled in fundamentals.' We are, perhaps, a little too afraid of getting our feet wet. But, as a leaven, English liberal thought has been effective. The outlook of the Victorian world of letters—of such men as Macaulay, Froude, Tennyson, Browning and Matthew Arnold — was what was then called Broad Church, *i.e.*, Protestant, Erastian, and Latitudinarian. And it was shared by educated people in general. Superstition, now in fashion, was then out of it. There was less nonsense talked and written than now.

IV.

In the eighteenth century the English Universities were at a low ebb. Till the Reformation, European culture had been international; and under the Stuart intercourse with the Continent was frequent and free. After 1688 a suspicion of Jacobitism attached to it; and a period of stagnation set in. Religious revivals lie, as such, outside the province of mind, and go sour in their decadence. Pattison speaks of 'the hope-

[2] *Soliloquies in England*, p. 86.

less imbecility of Evangelical writing and preaching' in the early days of the Oxford Movement, which was then regarded as a revival of learning, if of learning in a restricted sense of the term. This accounts for the sympathetic reference to it in Thirlwall's Primary Charge—1842. Later, when from a school it became a party, and a double portion of the spirit of party entered into it, his judgment changed. In 1863 one who had been 'saved, yet so as by fire,' notes the deterioration. 'To traduce critical inquiry as scepticism, to hound on the mob to hunt down the small handful of clergymen who have endeavoured, however unskilfully, to put their hand to theology'—he is speaking of the writers of 'Essays and Reviews'—'this is the absorbing passion of a party which once sat at the feet of Dr. Newman.'[3] It has been made a reproach to Liberal Churchmen that they are not a party; that they have little or no organization or discipline and do not easily combine. It is, no doubt, a practical weakness, as some of us may have felt during certain recent controversies. But 'Shall we receive good at the hand of the Lord, and shall we not receive evil?' Morally, intellectually, and spiritually it is our strength. As a party, we should be as Samson shorn.

V.

Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona. Oriel was known as the *habitat* not only of Tractarianism, but of the earlier so-called Noetic school. The college was what Balliol became later, the home of Liberal religious thought: had Arnold and Whately not migrated, the one to Rugby, the other to Dublin, the Church of England might have been less 'by schisms rent asunder' than we see her to-day. The secession of the man of genius who impressed his personality so profoundly on modern Anglicanism, has been described by the lively pen of Lord Beaconsfield as 'a blow from which the Church of England still reels.' This was not the view taken by those who saw it at closer quarters. A distinguished Oxford contemporary of the future Cardinal tells us that 'the movement which swept the leader of the Tractarians, with most of his followers, out of the place was a deliverance from a nightmare which had oppressed Oxford for fifteen years. By the secessions of 1845 this vanished

[3] Pattison: *Essays*, 277.

in a moment; and from that moment dates the regeneration of the University. Our thoughts reverted to their proper channel —that of the work we had to do.'[4] In theology there was a return to Latitudinarianism—the opinion that 'vitals in religion are few.' This, indeed, has never lost its hold on Cambridge. A gulf separates Tract XC from Hey's *Lectures on the Articles* —still perhaps the best book on the subject—and the politics of 'Young England' from Paley's *Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy*. Yet at Oxford itself, the citadel of the Tract Movement, and in the pulpit of St. Mary's, the church of its founder, a memorable note of reason had been struck in the Bampton Lectures of 1832 on 'The Scholastic Philosophy considered in its relation to Christian Theology.' This book, which you may now pick up on a bookstall for a shilling, deserves a better fate than that of those defunct treatises on Divinity which Crabbe describes:

> 'Dull though impatient; peevish though devout;
> With wit disgusting and despised without.'

For no English writer covers the same ground; and it is a ground of the first importance. 'Without an accurate knowledge of the history of doctrinal statements it is impossible for members of the Church to confess their faith in the words which the Church puts into their mouths with a full understanding of the terms.'[5] Arnold describes it as 'a great book'; and his famous Edinburgh article, *The Oxford Malignants*, was provoked by what he considered the unjust attack on its author by the Church Party of the day—which he called 'The Party of Hophni and Phinehas,' a phrase more true than urbane. The lecturer, Hampden, afterwards Bishop of Hereford, lives in Newman's none too kindly portrait in *Loss and Gain*—'a little, prim, smirking, bespectacled man, bald in front and somewhat pompous in manner, who seemed never to have had any difficulty on any subject, but was so clear, or so shallow, that he saw to the bottom of all his thoughts.'[6] The influence of Joseph Blanco White on the Lectures has been disputed. It was probably considerable; to the Oxford of the time the Scholastic Philosophy was a closed book. White, who is now remembered as the author of one of the finest sonnets in the English

[4] Pattison: *Memoirs*, p. 236.
[5] Preface to Second Edition.
[6] Chapter ix.

language, 'Night and Death,' was a Spaniard of Irish origin who had been in Catholic orders, and later in life settled at Oxford. He was a man of active mind and European outlook, who opened new horizons to the then somewhat provincial English academic mind. Whether Hampden, who developed into a normal and rather uninteresting Bishop, saw the extent of the conclusions to which his premises led, is doubtful. But the Tractarians, who had an instinctive 'flair' for heresy, did: they saw that the Lecturer blew the dogmatic fabric, on the restoration of which they were bent, sky high. He might have taken as his motto Scaliger's great saying—*Non aliunde dissidia in religione pendent quam ab ignoratione grammaticae.*

> 'Dogmas of theology *as such* are human authorities. The intellect of man has insinuated its own conclusions into the body of the revelation in the course of its transmission, and modified the expressions by which truth is conveyed.'

His language in this connection is extraordinarily outspoken:

> 'This is the view which I take not only of our Articles at large, but in particular of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. If it be admitted that the notions on which their several expressions are founded are both unphilosophical and unscriptural, it must be remembered that they do not impose these notions on the faith of the Christian as matters of affirmative belief. The speculative language of these creeds was admitted into the Church of England, as established by the Reformers, before the period when the genius of Bacon exposed the emptiness of the system which the Schools had palmed off upon the world as the only instrument for the discovery of all Truth.
>
> If this account of the origin and nature of Dogmatic Theology be correct, surely those entirely pervert its nature who reason on the terms of doctrines as if they were the proper ideas belonging to Religion; or who insist on interpretations, whether employed by our Reformers or the primitive believers, in a positive sense; without taking into their view the existing state of theology and philosophy at the different periods of Christianity. Creeds and Articles, without such previous study, are as if they were written in a strange language. The words, indeed, are signs of ideas to us; but not of those ideas which were presented to the minds of men when the formularies were written, or when they were adopted by the Church.' [7]

Dogmas, then, are the result of the confusion of our tongues, and perhaps of the hardness of our hearts. They are 'the penalties of "Social Religion"'; were we all humble disciples of Christ, Christian sentiment would speak in its native accents and in its mother tongue.

In view of certain recent discussions, it is of interest to read that 'the general belief in Magic in the early ages of the Church

[7] *Lectures*, p. 379.

may sufficiently account for the ready reception of the theory of Sacramental influence. The maxim of Augustine, *Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacramentum*, appears to be, in fact, an adaptation of the popular belief respecting the power of incantations and charms to the subject of religion.' Hence the 'doctrinal supremacy' of the Eucharist. View it as it exists in the Roman Church, and it is found absorbing into itself the whole of Christian worship.'[8] We are reminded of the dream of the Patriarch in which the lean kine devoured the fat.

VI.

From 1840-1874 the See of St. David's was filled by a man of exceptional distinction—Thirlwall has been called 'the wisest of English Bishops.' He was raised to the bench by Lord Melbourne, who was himself well read in theology—of which he knew more than most bishops—and whose question to the reformers of his time, 'Why can't you let it alone?' will occur to some of us in connection with the liturgical controversies of to-day. Thirlwall's Cambridge reputation stood high and was general: a theologian who is only a theologian is neither fish nor flesh nor good red herring. He was the historian of Greece; in conjunction with Hare, he had translated Niebuhr—it is characteristic of the time that the translation was attacked by the *Quarterly Review* as 'favourable to scepticism'—and, later, Schleiermacher's *Essay on St. Luke*. In spite of Bishop Marsh, who was an exception, a knowledge of German was then regarded as a disqualification for the episcopate; 'Dr. Thirlwall,' the Prime Minister asked, 'why did you translate that book of Schleiermacher's?' And F. D. Maurice thought that, had he not done so, he might have succeeded Archbishop Howley at Lambeth (1848). The 'ifs' of history are an unprofitable subject of speculation. He was not supple; and perhaps the appointment would have been a bold one. When the vacancy occurred the Russell ministry had succeeded the Melbourne; and it was not made.

For more than a generation, however, he occupied a unique position among the bishops: 'sacrosanct' was the word applied to him by Archbishop, then Bishop, Tait. Had he been a Schoolman, *irrefragabilis* would have been his fitting epithet;

[8] Pp. 315, 321.

there was a certain massiveness about his mental stature; and he held the balance of judgment with an unflinching hand. The monument of his episcopate remains to us in the eleven great Charges in which he reviewed the position of the Church of England with regard to the events of the time: Tractarianism; the Gorham Judgment; the Eucharistic controversy, which unfortunately is still with us; Essays and Reviews; the case of Bishop Colenso; the question of the Court of Final Appeal. It is a discredit to the present generation of English Churchmen that these Charges are out of print.

He had one gift, a gift greatly to be desired in bishops; he was not afraid of being in a minority. He was one of the four bishops who refused to inhibit Bishop Colenso; he was the only one who did not sign the address calling upon him to resign his see. He supported the Maynooth Grant, the Conscience Clause, the admission of Jews to Parliament, and the Disestablishment of the Irish Church. With regard to divorce he wrote (1857): 'Independently of all religious scruples, I cannot help viewing the new facilities given to divorce with strong misgiving; but only because I fear that they may operate injuriously on the domestic interests of society; not because I think that the Legislature has, in this innovation, exceeded its rightful powers, and violated the law of God.' How his signature came to be attached to the Episcopal circular against Essays and Reviews was, and remains, a mystery. The document was drafted by the astute Bishop Wilberforce, and in 1870 Thirlwall wrote to Stanley:

> 'I cannot help lamenting that the secret history of that letter will never be known beyond a very small circle of persons, among whom I know only of one [obviously himself] who would wish to have it divulged.'

Posterity is, I think, wronged by such silences. There are cases, however, in which the lips of officials are sealed. But he opposed the Synodical condemnation of the book. The bishops, he said, could not settle such questions; and he rejoiced that no authority existed in the Church which could. Like St. Gregory Nazianzen, he avoided Synods—'I will not (said that Father) sit in one of those Councils of geese and cranes'; and he attended the Pan-Anglican Conference of 1867 unwillingly. 'I found all my forebodings exactly fulfilled,' he writes; 'but I was able to contribute a little to prevent mischief.' One is

reminded of the wise Scotch minister who, when asked to pray for the General Assembly, prayed that 'it might be guided not to do any harm.' In his article 'Thirlwall,' in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Dr. Richard Garnett calls attention to the Bishop's personal characteristics: his tenderness, in particular, to children, to animals, and to all weak things; 'except to weak-minded clergymen,' he adds quaintly. These ecclesiastics he, no doubt, loved as a Christian; but this, according to Wamba, in *Ivanhoe*, means that he 'did not love them at all.'

VII.

Mark Pattison, Rector of Lincoln (1861-1884), stands in the first rank of English scholars; he recalls the Scaligers and Huets of an earlier day. He had the morbidly introspective temperament common in the religious world of his time; we find it in Clough, in the two Froudes, and above all in Newman, under whose magnetism he fell in early life, and of which he retained traces to the end. He was on the verge of following him into the Roman Catholic Church; the legend was that he escaped by missing a train, and then thought better of it. But the crisis which dispelled his superstitions unfixed his beliefs; and he gave the impression of having suffered from religious shell shock, as men of his type often do. Hence perhaps it was that no other English, in particular no other Anglican, writer has his understanding of Catholicism, which is ever with us—the natural man, in Sohm's phrase, being a born Catholic—and which in these days it is of such importance that we in England should understand. This gives his *Memoirs, Sermons and Essays* a unique value.

> 'Catholicism is much more than a theology or a religion; it is much more than one among the denominations of Christianity. It is a whole habit of mind, founding itself upon deeply-rooted principles of philosophy, and striving, like the forms of animal and vegetable life, to develop itself under the given conditions of air and light and warmth. In the struggle for existence it meets another principle, or set of principles, of no less vigour and vitality than itself, and founded like itself on a widely extended survey of the facts of life. Middle-Age Catholicism, or the dogmatic and hierarchical system of an infallible Church, finds itself face to face with the principle of civilization, which is also striving to mould and organize society. For it is no longer, as it has been in times past, Protestantism, or the religion of the Bible, or the Reformed Faith, which is the antagonist of the Catholic Church. Its true rival and competitor is the whole of that fabric of science—

moral, political, physical—which has been slowly built up by the labour of four centuries, and the results of which tend more and more stringently to govern the conduct both of individuals and of communities. Between the Catholic Church and modern civilization the question is a struggle for existence—a struggle which can only be settled by the survival of the stronger.'[9]

VIII.

Of Jowett, Master of Balliol 1870-1893, it may be said that more than any other one man of his generation—perhaps of any generation, he taught Oxford to think. He moved among ideas with an exceptional facility; he was a great educator; and his distinctive gift was, I think, Balance; the μηδέν ἄγαν of the sage expressed his mind. He applied the maxim evenly.

'He was alarmed (writes a pupil) by the scepticism which he saw spreading among the ablest men at Oxford (1859). He could not imagine where it was picked up; he was careful (he thought so, at least) not to spread it, but it seemed somehow to arise of itself.'[10]

And at times he speaks like Ecclesiastes, a sceptic, *malgré lui*:

'As we pursue the never-ending track of investigation, our days are told. Life has passed away ere we have learned how to live. It is scarcely possible to over-rate the ill effect on the character of isolation in opinion from the rest of mankind. Alone we move in a world of shadows; there rises in us a feeling of suspicion regarding the human faculties themselves; a vain consciousness of superiority, though it be in knowing that we know nothing; an utter apathy about all aims of human good or schemes of earthly ambition. Better not to have been born than to live in doubt and alienation from mankind.'[11]

At others he urges the importance of seeing life steadily and seeing it whole:

'Men are apt to think that they cannot have too much of a good thing—too much piety, too much religious feeling, too much attendance at the public worship of God. They forget the truth which the old philosophy taught, that the life of man should be a harmony; not absorbed in any one thought, even of God, not absorbed in any one duty or affection, but growing up as a whole to the fullness of the perfect man.'[12]

Again:

'The less we define in theology, the better. Definite statements respecting the relation of Christ either to God or man are only figures of speech; they do not really pierce the clouds which 'round our little life.' When we multiply words we do not multiply ideas; we are still within the circle of our own minds. No greater calamity has ever befallen the Christian Church than the determination of some uncertain things which are beyond the sphere of human knowledge.'

[9] *Sermons*, p. 224.
[10] *Benjamin Jowett*, by Lionel A. Tollemache, p. 126.
[11] *Essay on 'the Law the Strength of Sin.'*
[12] *Sermons on Faith and Doctrine*, p. 307.

He was perhaps more like a good man than a clergyman. In 1880 Archbishop Tait wrote of him:

> 'It is amusing to note how entirely uninterested he is in all the peculiar questions now exercising the clerical mind.'

It would probably be still more amusing to-day. He was of the opinion, as some still are, that these questions had been settled once for all in the sixteenth century, and cannot now be re-opened. This was why he advised Stanley not to take part in the debates of Convocation:

> 'Your friends regret your going to a place where they are rude to you; and, whereas they do you harm, you can do these bigots no good: to say nothing of the whole affair being a great sham.'

And again:

> 'I am astonished at the carelessness about truth which there is in the Church of England. If it goes on, it will lead to utter unbelief among intellectual men.'

IX.

He taught me more than anyone I ever knew. And his sayings, like good wine, improve by keeping. Here is one:

> 'Distrust short and simple explanations of things. For things are neither short nor simple: therefore their explanations cannot be so.'

He used to talk of the Tractarians of his own generation, by whom he was not greatly attracted; temperamentally, he looked the other way. 'Not the work of a saint,' was his criticism of Newman's *Apologia*. What he meant was that the writer was angry, though, like the prophet, he may have done well to be so: and he complained of the length at which that famous book discussed the question whether Newman should or should not become a Roman Catholic, adding, characteristically, 'Not, I think, a very important matter.' Of another of the seceders of 1845, once a Fellow of Balliol, and in later life an authority on ascetic theology: 'His health made it necessary for him to eat a great deal and to drink a great deal; and he did both.'

His distinctly religious writings are too little known. His reserve on this subject was great; and the treatment which he had received from the religious world was not such as to encourage him to put his hand on either the den of the High Church cockatrice or the hole of the Low Church asp. But I know no religious works in which more unction, in the best sense of the word, is contained than in his three volumes of

sermons, his *Life and Letters*, and above all in his *Essays on St. Paul.*

X.

Stanley was the *littérateur* of the Movement; a versatile and many-sided man, with a historic sense, a lively imagination, a passion for justice, and a genius for friendship, and in general for society. This last was a distinct asset. Either because society has changed, or because there was no Elisha whom his mantle fitted—perhaps for both reasons—the clergy are now more professionalized than was then the case. He was a *persona grata* at Court. Queen Victoria's sympathies in Church matters were liberal: she took her position as Supreme Governor of the Church of England seriously, and had no mind to place the patronage of the Crown at the disposal either of the Bishops or of the Ministry of the day. As Dean of Westminster he occupied a unique position, the Abbey being a peculiar, and as such exempt from the jurisdiction of the Diocesan. Jowett spoke of him as 'the most distinguished clergyman in the Church of England of his time.'

He was an uncompromising advocate of comprehension; he preferred, but would not exclude. Here is the acid test of liberalism: one which we shall do well to apply to the controversies of our own too controversial age. This is why he was an enthusiast for the Royal Supremacy. It was, he believed, the Supremacy of the Law—standing between the clergy and 'the inquisition at once of arbitrary bishops and of tumultuous synods'; it guaranteed the national character of the Church. Never was it more indispensable than in our own day. May I quote his own words?

> 'Let us not rashly part with the frame-work which, with all its faults, has sheltered, down to this time, what has been truly called "the learning of the most learned, the freedom of the freest, and the reason of the most rational of the Churches in Christendom."' [13]

It would not long remain so, were this historical barrier against ignorance and superstition removed.

XI.

The ground covered by this paper has been large; and it has been difficult to avoid discursiveness. But there is a certain

[13] *Essays on Church and State*, p. 371.

unity of outlook and direction which may connect its variety of detail. The nature of this unity is easily overlooked. In the Encyclical *Pascendi, e.g.* (1907), the documentary importance of which is great, an attempt rather ingenious than ingenuous is made to transfer the question with which it deals—that of Modernism—from the ground of fact to that of speculation. It represents the issues as philosophical; and argues that scepticism in philosophy—by which is meant the rejection of the official Scholasticism of the Church—tends inevitably to scepticism in religious belief. And this view of the matter, in a modified form and a more religious setting, appears, from the recently published *Letters of Baron von Hügel*, to have influenced the second thoughts of this distinguished man, originally one of the protagonists of the Modernist Movement in the Church of Rome.[14] I cannot help thinking that, even as guarded and qualified by von Hügel, it draws a red herring across the track. That scholasticism is the backbone of the Catholic dogmatic system is, as the Encyclical of 1907 teaches, true; and it is well that this should be insisted upon: in dealing with *Roman* Catholics at least, we know where we are. But the question between Modernism and the Church is primarily historical; one of knowing, or not knowing, certain facts. These facts are concerned with various subject matter—with Christian origins, with Scripture, with comparative religion, with the science of the mind. If we have a turn for speculation, our knowledge will no doubt arrange itself under certain categories and dispose us to certain generalizations. But to account for Modernism in this way, or to associate it with any particular generalizations or speculative principles, is to put the cart before the horse. It is the premises which lead to the conclusion, not the conclusion to the premises. Many people do not philosophize at all; their minds are not built that way. And those who do, do so differently. Some incline to Pragmatism, which to others seems the negation of philosophy; some to Idealism; others to a qualified Realism: so many men, to many opinions; there is no uniformity in speculation; uniformity begins and ends with fact. In method, I suppose, we are all Rationalists, in the proper sense of the word: 'The spirit of men is the candle of the Lord.'

[14] Baron von Hügel. *Selected Letters*, pp. 248-333.

XII.

'A popular religion will always be corrupt.' This is one of Cardinal Newman's great sayings. While the difficulties presented by such a religion are so obvious that a schoolboy can scarcely fail to see them, it requires a philosopher to see through them; and philosophers are few, and are as a rule put out of the synagogue. Buckle compares two popular renderings of Christianity—the Scottish Calvinism and the Spanish Catholicism of the seventeenth century—and finds little to choose between them. Each was *Horribili super aspectu mortalibus instans.* To take, *e.g.*, a belief common to and central in both: 'The stumbling-blocks presented by the doctrine of the Atonement were the growth of above a thousand years; rooted in language, disguised in figures of speech, fortified by logic, they seemed (to some perhaps they still seem) to have become a part of the human mind itself.' In so far as these and similar difficulties had their origin in the wresting of Scripture, they disappeared in proportion as it was realized that the Bible must be read, not in the light of preconceived notions, but as literature, and like any other book. So that questions as to predestination, freewill, original sin, eternal punishment—*Aeternas quoniam poenas in morte timendum est*—these shadows of ancient night have ceased to perplex us: we have the confidence of the patriarch, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?'

What has been called the *scandale des intelligences*—the scandal of the understanding—comes to-day not from the Bible but from 'that figment of theologians, the Catholic Church'[15]; in which ambiguous term we so often sum up, and as it were consecrate, the prejudices, passions, errors, ignorances and limitations, sometimes of the past, sometimes of our own age. Churches, in this sense of the word, are necessary evils: necessary, because man is a political animal; evil, because as soon as we have said the word Church we have got outside the Gospel, and are dealing with the ordinances of men, not the commandments of God. 'I am satisfied,' says Dr. Arnold, 'that Church authority, whether early or late, is as rotten a staff as ever was Pharaoh, King of Egypt—it will go into a man's hand to pierce him.'[16] Neither the educated nor the masses are touched

[15] Jowett. *Life and Letters*, I, 368.
[16] *Life and Correspondence*, p. 360.

by the revival of ecclesiasticism now 'standing where it ought not' among us; the security of the former is their knowledge, that of the latter their common sense. The danger is to persons of emotional temperament, whose information is small, who are guided rather by sentiment than by reason, and who put certainty before truth. For them it is great. Hence the increasing antagonism between the ecclesiastical and the lay mind — an antagonism in view of which the saintly Abbé Huvelin, an *illuminé* of the highest and finest type, gave von Hügel a notable counsel:

'Jamais vous ne vous sauverez pas par une mutilation.'

And 'Ne lisez jamais les journaux religieux. Ils vous jeteraient en toutes sortes de tentations; ils vous feraient un mal inouï. Jamais moi-même je ne les lis.' [17]

In our own Church there is, no doubt, more freedom of thought and speech than there was a generation ago. But the conflicting conceptions of evidence, of law, of science, and in general of civilization, remain conflicting: between the two worlds there is a great gulf fixed. And in the things of mind racial barriers are breaking down. We in England, who have hitherto been the most national of nations, *penitus toto divisos orbe*, are becoming cosmopolitanized. Can we refrain from asking ourselves whether we shall escape the religious dissolution which is undermining Christianity in the Latin countries? Nor there only: an American writer has lately given us an appalling picture of the atmosphere of the American sects.[18] This strange misconception of religion seems to have produced an equally strange misconception of justice. The judicial crime recently perpetrated in America is a menace to civilization: a bad religion is a poisonous thing. These horrors are, happily, not likely to be reproduced in this country. But the Gadarene temper of Latin Catholicism is on the increase, not indeed in the nation, but in the Church, even among those of whom better things might have been expected. And religion is placed in an impossible position when men are driven to choose between it and knowledge.

'It would be a strange, an almost incredible thing, that the Gospel, which at first made war only on the vices of mankind, should now be opposed to one of the highest and rarest of human virtues—the love of truth.'

[17] *Selected Letters of Baron von Hügel*, p. 58.
[18] *Elmer Gantry*, by Sinclair Lewis.

ROMAN CATHOLIC MODERNISM

By the Venerable Archdeacon LILLEY, author of *Modernism, Prayer in Christian Theology*, etc.

IN the scheme of our proceedings which has been circulated I am asked to deal with the origin, methods, failure, and lessons of the Modernist movement in the Roman Communion. I am grateful for this indication of the limits within which I am expected to confine my treatment of the subject allotted to me, and I will at least try to respect those limits as closely as possible.

There is nothing more difficult than an adequate definition of the origins of any distinctive movement of corporate thought or action among men. The near and occasional origin of the movement may seem evident enough, but it is always in some more remote and intangible series of changes that its real origin is to be sought. Every movement occurs within a definite historical tradition and has its only sufficient explanation as a modification of that tradition determined by the needs of its own growing life. And the tradition, just because it is a life which is always acting upon and reacting to a changing environment, is always itself in a process of change long before the moment arrives when it becomes fully conscious of the change.

Now for the understanding of Roman Modernism it is, I think, specially necessary to take account of certain remoter causes inherent in the later history of the Roman Communion. No serious historian is likely to deny that the modern Roman Church is the sole direct and legitimate descendant of mediaeval Christianity. And the essence of mediaeval Christianity was that it was a clear and closely-articulated intellectual system. The best minds of the Middle Age had spent themselves in the effort to wed Revelation, the intact and intangible Revelation of the Holy Scriptures, to that view of the world, of man, and of the nature of human knowledge which had been disclosed to the thirteenth century by the Jewish and Arabian commentators of Aristotle. The result was the amalgam known as scholasticism, which was at once a philosophy and a theology. It must indeed be remembered that in the minds of the School-

men, at any rate from St. Thomas onwards, theology and philosophy did not completely coincide. There were portions of revealed truth, such for instance as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, which were not amenable to strictly intellectual demonstration. Their truth, accepted by faith, was at most capable of confirmation and support from certain analogies furnished by the reason. At these points, therefore, the scholastic theology overlapped the scholastic philosophy. But for the most part they were so much one that one of the two great *Summae* of St. Thomas, dealing with the same themes, could be traditionally described as the theological and the other as the philosophical.

The Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was on its intellectual side an intensification of the scholastic method. St. Thomas became the universal doctor of the schools, and the great Spanish theologians all alike appealed to his authority and relied upon his support for their rival interpretations of the nature and effects of Divine Grace. The first serious menace to the hitherto undisputed hegemony of scholasticism was the growing influence of the Cartesian philosophy, especially in France, during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In Arnauld, even in Bossuet, the signs of that influence are already apparent, but it was in Malebranche that discipleship of Descartes clearly motived the return from a Thomist to an Anselmian and Augustinian type of philosophy.

But it was not only on the metaphysical side that the integrity of scholasticism was being threatened throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century. That century saw the beginnings of that careful and exact research into the records of the past, and of the positive view of history which it gradually established, which were to revolutionize so profoundly the earlier conceptions of the unchanging nature of dogma and of the very nature of Revelation itself. And it is certainly not least to members of the Roman Communion that we owe this momentous change. It is necessary to mention only the great Jesuit Cardinal Petavius, the scholars of the Benedictine Congregation of St. Maur with Mabillon at their head, and the Oratorian Richard Simon, in order to recall the measure of our indebtedness.

It may be said that with the close of the seventeenth century the scholasticism whose revival at the beginning of the same century had made Spain a nursery of theologians sank into a state of coma from which it has recovered only in our own day. The eighteenth century was, so far as Roman theology is concerned, the century of casuists and canonists. Its great names are St. Alphonsus and Benedict XIV. Then came the nineteenth century revival. But it was not a revival of scholasticism. It was, on the one hand, a revival of popular religion of a somewhat thin and sentimental kind through the influence of the romantic movement in literature. Its prophet was Chateaubriand and its Bible *Le Génie du Christianisme*, and it is hardly necessary to characterise either beyond saying that they were the strangest successors of the Catholic saint and the Catholic thinker, the strangest parodies of the solid virtues of the one and the solid theology of the other. On the other hand, the Catholic Revival of the nineteenth century found expression in the Ultramontanism of Joseph de Maistre, whose recoil from the anarchy of the Revolution sought refuge in a Church which should no longer argue or reason about truth but decree it. But Chateaubriand and de Maistre combined to create a greater than either, a real religious seer, de Lamennais. Those who are outside the Roman Communion may be allowed to admire the later Lamennais of the *Paroles d'un Croyant*, along with the earlier, the author of the *Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion*, and perhaps to see in the one the inevitable outcome of the other. But it is with the earlier only, the obedient son of the Church, that we are here concerned. For it was he who attempted to replace the old theology by a new, the traditional theology of the schools by a theology of tradition itself. In his view of religious tradition as truth divinely revealed to and in the life of a corporate society, as such truth preserved and deepened by being thus corporately lived, he was a distant precursor of the Modernists of his own Communion.

The sole object of this summary review of the fortunes of the traditional Catholic theology of the West has been to show that from the end of the seventeenth century up till at least the last quarter of the nineteenth its hold upon the most intellectual elements of the Roman Church had been considerably shaken. The great edifice of reasoned faith which the thirteenth century

had erected seemed crumbling into ruinous decay, while by its side various makeshift structures hastily arose which had to be as hastily demolished because they could not obtain, and in most cases probably did not deserve, a certificate of structural soundness from authority. It was in such circumstances that Leo XIII began his pontificate by recalling Roman theology to a more careful study of the ancient structure with a view to repairing the breaches wrought in it by time and neglect. The injunction of the great pontiff was no doubt salutary and has borne much fruit, if only in substituting for the mechanical text-book knowledge of a system immediate contact with one of the master-minds of Christian theology. But for the moment other questions were engrossing the attention of the younger generation of Catholic scholars, especially in France, questions to which St. Thomas could give no answer. For all educated Frenchmen the six volumes of Renan's fascinating study of the origins of Christianity had for the first time made accessible the general results of a century of German scholarship. The Catholic Universities and Institutes independent of State control which were then springing up throughout France provided students eager to grapple with the new difficulties for traditional theology which had been thus disclosed. A disinterested historical study of Christian origins seemed the necessary preliminary to any apologetic which could hope to be convincing and effective in the new circumstances. In the eighties and nineties of the last century, therefore, the call to the study of St. Thomas fell largely on unheeding ears. Even for those whose bent was philosophical rather than historical his methods seemed spiritually harsh and sterile. Blondel's philosophy of action, a philosophy which found in an analysis of the fundamental nature of all human activity the existence of a transcendent element without which it could not be fully and satisfyingly human, seemed to the younger generation a surer and more immediate way of establishing for man's aspiring soul the reality of God than any and every deduction of His existence from the data of sense. Thus Modernism began, even on its philosophical side, in an almost involuntary recoil from the methods of apologetic to which authority invited.

I have tried to indicate both the more immediate occasions of Roman Modernism and the more remote historical circum-

stances which made it or some similar movement possible. I am now invited by my brief to speak of its methods. But before doing so I must pause for a moment to recall what it itself claimed to be and aimed at effecting. It has often been remarked that Modernism in the Roman Church, the Modernism which was condemned by the Encyclical *Pascendi*, was not a single uniform movement, but a number of converging movements which had grown up in more or less independence of one another. The Encyclical had already recognized this puzzling variety of its interests and origins in describing it as not a heresy, but the 'compendium of all heresies.' But this very variety pointed to a unity of conviction and purpose which the authors of the Encyclical either did not perceive or refused to admit as extenuation of the guilt of heresy. The one point at which practically all the Modernists met was a fervid belief in the Roman Church as the natural heir and actual depositary of the inclusive tradition of Christian life. They believed as firmly as the most orthodox member of their own Communion that the living tradition of Christianity had been mutilated in the Churches of the sixteenth century Reform by the very fact of their separation. They sadly admitted, or rather proclaimed, that their own Church had largely forfeited her power of interpreting to the world the original saving Gospel in its entirety, to which nevertheless in virtue of all her long history she was the sole legitimate witness. That failure was due to the rigid obstinacy with which she opposed the most inevitable, or at least irreversible, developments of modern life in the West, whether on the side of more accurate knowledge of history, of scientific discovery, or of changes in social organization and economy. And they proclaimed it as their one aim so to restore her living touch with the world that it would open its ears again to her message and recognize in that message the only hope of its own salvation. Incidentally Rome, thus transformed in spirit and temper, would reveal herself even to the separated churches of the Reform as the true witness to Christianity, as the Kingdom of God, as Augustine's 'city built upon the love of God up to the contempt of self,' as a universal society founded on gifts of Divine grace and ministering those gifts to its members through their corporate union with it. Rome, they asserted, had become narrow in outlook and sectarian—'waspish' was the

epithet used by one of them—in temper. She, too, had suffered the ill effects of the Reform, had lost in the long and embittered conflict which it entailed something of that evangelical zeal and burning charity without which she must be untrue to herself and her mission. She had become too much of a government transacting with the powers of this world, intriguing for their most sinister favours while resisting their most legitimate demands, and too little of the Divine Society which cared for nothing but to win the hearts of the world to God. And they would bring her back to a realization of her true character and mission.

To this end they regarded it, as I have said already, to be an essential preliminary that Catholic scholarship should frankly and courageously face the issues raised by the critical study of the Scriptures, and especially of the New Testament, regarded as historical documents. It was not merely that it was necessary to do this in order to demonstrate the Church's faith in the immunity of her own claims from historical attack. It was especially that she might gain a new certitude, after all the sifting process of history, of the exact character of those claims. The Church was the living continuation of the original Gospel message. But a century of historical criticism had raised in the most acute form the question of the actual nature of that message. Before the age of criticism all Christians would have been agreed in holding that the essence of Christianity must consist in the original teaching of its Founder, and all controversy turned, in fact, upon the evidence which the rival churches could confidently adduce that they represented that teaching. But criticism of the Gospel records had revealed an unquestionable if never exactly definable element in that teaching as they record it which clearly represents rather the faith of the primitive community than the actual words of our Lord. The difficulty therefore of defining the essential content of Christianity by a confident reference to the actual teaching of its Divine Founder had been immeasurably increased. And even if scholars were agreed in finding the undoubted kernel of the teaching of Jesus in the proclamation of the Kingdom of God and its coming, that message was still capable of very various interpretation. The Lutheran Harnack could find in it no more than the promise of an immediate participation of individual souls in the Divine righteousness. The Catholic Modernist, on

the other hand, accused Harnack of unfair dealing with the historical evidence in suppressing or explaining away, in obedience to a personal theological bias, the strongly eschatological form of the announcement of the Kingdom. And though as a historian he was ready to deny that there was any evidence that Jesus ever thought of founding a Church—indeed, on the contrary, to affirm that all the evidence pointed to the impossibility of His having had such an intention—yet he thought himself justified, following the lead of St. Paul, in regarding the Church with its charismatic gifts as the actual fulfilment in history of a promise whose actual form had been determined by the current Jewish expectation of a coming Messianic Kingdom. The Church was at any rate the actual society which had grown out of the impulse given by the teaching and personality of Jesus, and from the first it was for the faith of its members the body of Christ, the organ of His Spirit which was also the Divine Spirit. It was never for them the chance creation of their faith, a mere accident originating in their discipleship of a human teacher. On the contrary, their faith and their discipleship were the effects of a prevenient Divine action. That faith and that discipleship were themselves charismatic gifts of the Spirit which Jesus had promised to send as an abiding presence with His disciples. Already for St. Paul and for the author of the Fourth Gospel that was how the promise of Jesus had been fulfilled. For St. Paul certainly the Lord, the Risen Christ. was the Spirit which informed a visible society as the soul informed its body, and communicated to its members certain supernatural gifts of grace. The evidence of this supernatural character of the Church, of its actual indwelling by the Spirit, was just that its members did actually possess those graces and did visibly manifest their possession by them in certain miraculous powers.

This, the Catholic Modernist claimed, was what the New Testament evidence attested as the actual development of the religious impulse due to the original teaching of Jesus, whatever in fact that teaching may have been. He was therefore able to assert simply as a historian that Christianity first appears in history as a society whose members believe that it is a Divinely informed society, possessed by supernatural gifts of grace. For the rest, he held that the further development of the life of that

Church, at least in the West, had been marked by a progressive realization that the Divine charismata were not instruments of a merely miraculous power, but of specifically moral growth; that they were gifts not of a wonder-working magic, but of holiness. In proportion as the Church in the persons of its individual members failed to use those gifts, just in that proportion was it falling away from being the true Church. But in virtue of its Divine character, of the fact that it was the creation of the Divine Spirit and not of a historical accident, it could never fall away utterly. The Divine Power within it would always keep alive sufficient faith, enough enthusiasm for righteousness, to recall it to its true witness and mission even in the darkest hour.

Roman Modernism was therefore the attempt to frame a new apologetic founded on history. It invoked the aid of critical history to determine as far as possible the content of the original Gospel. It found that content in the proclamation of the Kingdom of God—of man's subjection to the will and guidance of the Divine Spirit in and through the corporate life of a supernatural society, existing here on earth under temporal and purely human conditions, fallible and subject to the gravest defections in virtue of its accidental human character and condition, yet by reason of its essentially Divine constitution and character infallibly pointing on to and guided towards its own fulfilment in a supra-temporal, an eternal, order of moral perfection and blessedness. Loisy could carry this apologetic so far as to find in every development of the Church's life as determined by the circumstances of history a Divinely-guided means of preserving her character as the guardian of the original Christian message and mediator of the Divine grace. But others saw the danger of this apotheosis of history. They continued to distinguish, or to insist on the need of distinction, between the Church as a Divine school of saintship and as a human instrument of government, and to judge the latter by the measure of its authentic ministration to the former.

The root offence of Modernism probably lay in its insistence on this distinction, and yet the distinction was of the very essence of its self-appointed rôle as the instrument of a distinctively religious revival within the Roman Communion.

Equally unacceptable was the further distinction between revelation as the primary formulation through emotionally suggested imagery of immediate religious experience and dogma as the intellectual elaboration of such experiences by the collective mind, a distinction which George Tyrrell thought so important that he laboured till the end in the attempt to give greater and greater precision to it. Indeed, I think it may be said of his writings as a whole that they are the prolegomena to any future doctrine of Revelation. And the supreme need of Christian apologetic to-day and in the immediate future is just an adequate doctrine of Revelation.

What is called the failure of Roman Modernism was simply its suppression. Roman authority is powerful enough to suppress, and though it may be true that there is no authority on earth which can poleaxe opinion, however dangerous, yet every authority which has sufficient confidence in its own power can and will get rid of those who hold opinions it considers dangerous. And as Roman Modernism had its sole *raison d'être* as a movement of religious renewal within the Roman Church, the refusal of authority to recognise it as a permissible movement meant its immediate and necessary failure. To ask then, Why did it fail? is equivalent to asking, Why was it suppressed? In other words, Why did an authority of exceptional political intelligence account as so dangerous that it could no longer be tolerated in any form a movement which had as its avowed object the deepening and extension of the spiritual power and attractiveness of the Church which that authority represented? The reasons for its suppression seem obvious enough. First of all, the Modernist apologetic was both in its philosophical and in its historical aspect too complete and revolutionary a breach with the traditional theology of Rome to have any chance of judicial appraisement by official authority. The most it could itself expect, or did in fact expect, was an arrest of judgment which might allow its value as an influence in regaining the lapsed or indifferent world to the Roman Church to be gradually demonstrated. That delay was in fact granted to it throughout the pontificate of Leo XIII, the shrewdest occupant of the Papal chair in recent times. But Modernism did not in fact succeed in making a popular appeal or becoming a popular in-

fluence. Its handicap was too great for a short-distance race. For it was almost entirely a clerical movement, and also almost entirely a movement confined to the Latin countries. And in the Latin countries there is, or was then, practically no intellectual interest in matters of religion among the laity. In Italy, I believe, such an interest is now just beginning to appear among the intellectual classes, thanks mainly to the patient and determined efforts of some of the excluded Modernists to introduce the study of religion in its historical phases and development into the State universities. As a consequence of this penetration of the universities by the religious interest, groups of young laymen are now to be found in all the chief centres of Italian culture eagerly devoting themselves to the positive study of religion as the greatest of human facts. In France, too, there seems to be a growing public which welcomes translations of classical Christian texts buried hitherto out of sight and knowledge in forbidding tomes of Byzantine Greek or mediaeval Latin on the dust-covered shelves of old libraries. Even the first part of the *Summa* of Aquinas has recently been added to such a popular library. And all this work of lay education has been undertaken and carried through either by members of the old Modernist group or by laymen directly inspired by their influence. It is just possible that even the orthodox zeal of Pius X might have been checked by the existence of such an eager, yet intelligent and critical, lay interest in religion twenty years ago.

Yet it is not probable. Roman Christianity is a religion, by all its tradition a deeply spiritual religion, a religion which more perhaps than any other form of Christianity has produced men who in their intimate commerce and immediate communion with God have consciously transcended all symbolic and sacramental means of approach to Him. But if it is this deeply spiritual religion, it is that religion so closely bound up with a particular theology that for all practical purposes they are one. To question the sufficiency of the theology is already to have denied the reality of the religion. And again, that theology is so closely-knit, such a firm intellectual synthesis of truths reached by the severest deduction from first principles, that to question it at one point is to throw the whole system into

doubt. For us English Churchmen who have never had a scholastic theology, whose classical theologians are a jurist and a moralist, Hooker and Butler, it is impossible to conceive the difficulty of a Roman in escaping from the spell-binding power of his theology. A Scotch Presbyterian can understand it better, as the instance of the late Professor James Cooper sufficiently demonstrated. For Calvinism, like Lutheranism, derived wholly from the Middle Age, and they both retained the scholastic method and developed their own special scholasticisms; while Anglicanism, as Creighton very justly reminded us, derived more from the new learning of the Renaissance and inherited the Erasmian suspicion and dislike of theological over-systematization. And just because it is so difficult for the Roman religious teacher to break with his theology, if he does so he breaks with it completely, as a whole. He becomes unjust, as I believe the Modernists were, to its value, blind to its intellectual vastness and dignity as a structure. He cannot select, as the outsider might, from it materials for the building of another structure. The Modernist by his revolt against scholasticism had opened between himself and the official theologians an intellectual gulf which could not be bridged. He was thinking in a live way, facing the most recalcitrant findings of science and the most disconcerting verdicts of history, and trying to wrest from them a spiritual significance which might accord with and even sustain his Christian faith. They were not thinking (in this sense) at all, but at the most exercising the intellectual subtlety and ingenuity of the solver of a 'Torquemada' crossword puzzle. Between them there was no possibility of contact or understanding. Sooner or later condemnation was inevitable.

Finally, I am asked to draw from all this story its lessons for ourselves. I see only one, the lesson that a revolution so vast and fundamental as that at which the Roman Modernists aimed cannot be precipitated by an intellectual *coup de main.* The forces that resist it are still strong in an age-long possession of the hearts and souls of men. Religion, more than any other human experience, is rooted in the deepest, the most fundamental, the most unanalysable of our emotions. It is only when universalized as an emotion that it can be rationalized at

all, and then it seems almost to rationalize itself, to picture the world of its actual knowledge as penetrated by the Reality which it has emotionally apprehended. The difficulty for religion in our day is that as an emotion it has no conscious universality, while the world of actual knowledge is more and more a common possession and the method of enlarging it more and more a specialized gift which all in their measure can acquire. In this world of superficial knowledge men find their only natural meeting-point, and it is just there that their contact is most superficial and least significant for the development of what is of eternal value in their life. Religion as an emotion is individual, casual, the experience of a temperament, finding its expression in some ritual, discipline, speculation which is temperamentally and often only temporarily attractive and satisfying.

All this paralyses the need of religion for a sufficient intellectual basis. It is summed up in the modern contention that the religious experience is autonomous, a contention which has its truth but, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would justify out of hand the worst excesses of superstition and magic. On the other hand, and often from the very same quarters, there comes the contention that religion must be rationalized, that no religion can survive without an adequate metaphysic. It was the distinction of the Roman Modernists that they saw the truth of both these facts, that religion as an experience of the whole man has its own rights and that to endure and become universal it must be the soul of a world-view which is as adequate as possible in view of the knowledge of the time. It was their misfortune that their attempt to deepen religion and to rationalize theology was by the necessity of the circumstances in which they wrought conceived in too hasty a temper and then nipped untimely in the bud. We are at least placed in a more fortunate position for taking up and continuing their work. But it can at most be a work of distant, if hopeful, preparation. And there are surely signs that it is not a vain hopefulness in the fact that the Modernist method is gradually leavening all schools of thought among the clergy of our own communion and among English teachers of religion generally, and is no longer confined to those who naturally forgather in this Conference.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE MODERN OUTLOOK

IS A SYNTHESIS POSSIBLE?

By Professor W. R. MATTHEWS, D.D., Dean of King's College, London, author of *The Gospel and the Modern Mind,* etc.

THE aim of the Modern Movement to secure a synthesis of Christianity, and the modern outlook is the theme of this paper. All Modernists will agree that such a synthesis is eminently desirable, and indeed one of the primary needs of the Christian Church; but the agreement appears to extend far beyond the limits of those who sympathise with the Churchmen's Union and includes many who would dislike the label 'Modern Churchman.' We should be wrong if we did not recognize with gratitude the spread of the conviction for which Modern Churchmen have stood—that the Christian faith needs to be interpreted in the light of modern knowledge and thought. An illustration occurs to me in Dr. N. P. Williams' Bampton Lectures on Original Sin. Consider that book, with its frank acceptance of modern views of the world and its repudiation of ideas which have long been accepted in the Church; consider, too, its reception by those who desire to stand in the ancient ways. A change has come over all parties and groups in the Church. We are all Modernists now—the difference is one of degree. Newman once said: 'We shall be rejected, but our cause will triumph; our names will be reviled, but our ideas will win.' With greater truth the same might have been said by the founders of our society.

The cause of this desire to come to terms with the modern mind is not difficult to discover. It is very plain that if we are to speak of the Gospel to this generation we must speak in terms which it can understand and appeal to motives which it really possesses. It is no use to shut ourselves in the ark and wait for the flood to subside. The movement of the modern spirit is not a destructive inundation sent, in the providence of God, for the chastisement of sin and the trial of faith; it contains a new

revelation of truth which we shall neglect only at the peril of making our witness ineffective.

The task of working out a synthesis between religion and current thought has always engaged the attention of enlightened Christians. It is no new and unheard of work that we are employed upon; only the conditions have changed. When the Gospel first stepped out upon the arena of the civilized world it came with weapons forged by such men as the Apologists and Clement of Alexandria, presented as the true philosophy which answered the questions of the ancient world. The authors of the synthesis which was achieved by the scholastic theology were Modernists, for they built upon the Aristotelian logic and metaphysics which had been rejected by earlier builders and had indeed furnished arguments for the opponents of Christianity.

The need for some synthesis between Christianity and the modern outlook was, I venture to think, never more pressing than at the present time, and perhaps never more difficult to achieve. A wide view of the condition of religion during the past century is sufficient to bring the fact home to us. In his book, *Science and the Modern World*, Dr. Whitehead, a scientific and at the same time a sympathetic observer, sums up the situation as follows:

> 'The present state of religion among the European races illustrates the statements which I have been making. The phenomena are mixed. There have been reactions and revivals. But on the whole, during many generations, there has been a gradual decay of religious influence in European civilization. Each revival touches a lower peak than its predecessor and each period of slackness a lower depth. The average curve marks a steady fall in religious tone. In some countries the interest in religion is higher than in others. But in those countries where the interest is relatively high, it still falls as the generations pass. Religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life.' (p. 269).

Probably no well-informed person would seriously quarrel with this account of the facts. Nor can there be much doubt concerning the diagnosis of the wasting disease from which organized religion is suffering. There is no decay of the religious impulse. The thirst for some spiritual basis for life is perhaps stronger and more widely diffused than ever. Why, then, is the state of the religious curve such as Whitehead

describes? If we think of the revivals of religion which we have known the answer lies on the surface. The Evangelical and the Catholic revivals have left a deep mark upon our English-speaking civilization. We owe to both of them blessings which we can appreciate only when we compare our own condition with that of nations which have not been influenced by them. But both of them stood apart from the general advance of the human mind. Both were of the nature of reactions—necessary reactions and fruitful reactions, in my opinion, at least in part. The Catholic revival, indeed, has been the parent of much scholarship and thought, but perhaps it has kept its eyes fixed mainly on the past and has been more eager to acclaim the teaching Church than to constitute the learning Church. We are told by many that there are signs of a new revival of religion, and it may well be true. The question is, what kind of revival may we expect? Shall it be a stirring of old loyalties, an awakening of faded memories, and nothing more? In that case the curve of which Whitehead speaks will not change its general downward direction. The vision haunts us of a revival which shall mark the beginning of a new curve with a steady upward tendency. How can such a revival be assured? Only by the abolition of the discord between the religious consciousness and the forward movement of thought; only by the attainment of such a synthesis between Christianity and the modern outlook that Christians, so far from trembling at every advance of science or scholarship as a possible difficulty for faith, can confidently welcome every new light as confirming and enlarging their thought of God.

I conceive that it will be in the province of other papers which will come after this to deal with the problem of how this synthesis is to be wrought out, but it lies within the scope of my subject to try to define the nature of the problem a little more closely. We are in search of a synthesis. It is implied in the statement that there are two elements in question which at present imperfectly coalesce—Christianity and the modern outlook. The question which lies across our path is nothing less than what do we mean by these two terms. A speaker who should attempt to define one of them in a short address would require a large charity on the part of his audience. If I try dogmatically

to say what I mean by both, I can only plead that the task is laid upon me by authority.

What is Christianity? In that short question we have the essence of the theological debate of the last hundred years. There are many answers to it, but probably for our purpose the answers which may be considered resolve themselves into two. On the one hand, we have the view which has acquired the name —whether rightly or wrongly I do not enquire — of Liberal Protestant. According to this we must seek the true meaning of Christianity in the pure Gospel which was preached by Jesus. Very early that teaching was overlaid, obscured, distorted, even destroyed, by the accretions of dogma, superstition, philosophy. Even in the Gospels themselves the simple faith in God and the unworldly moral idealism of Jesus have become so mingled with other matters that only a drastic and delicate criticism can recover the original. On this view, the essence of Christianity is the faith of Jesus, and that consisted in the two master thoughts of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man.

We need not go all the way with the more extreme eschatological school of interpreters to be convinced that this simplification of Christianity is not really supported by the facts. The simple teacher of ethical monotheism is found in the Gospels only by a *tour de force* in which subjective preferences are the moving power. Christianity from the first moment when we may discern it in history has been something other than the faith of Jesus; it has been a faith that *centred upon Jesus*, accepting Him as the 'spiritual ruler of mankind.'

Such at least is the Christianity in which we have grown up, the religion which 'our fathers have told us' and tradition has handed down. We turn then to the second view of this matter. According to this we must look at Christianity as it has existed in the historical process, as a great fact of the spiritual life of humanity. When we do so we shall find that we can best regard it as a specific type of religious experience, preserving its unity and identity under all the changes and diversity of form, propagating itself from one generation to another through a religious fellowship which expresses itself and carries forward its spiritual treasure by means of doctrine, worship and sacrament.

Can we delineate further the characteristic features of that type of religious experience which is specifically Christian and discover what logicians would call its 'differentia'? Very dogmatically, because time is short, I will attempt to enumerate those which appear to be essential. There are, it seems, four great 'moments,' or, if we prefer, foundation affirmations, of Christianity:

(1) The Christian Religion is a form of ethical monotheism. It stands in the direct line of the Hebrew Prophets and is the inheritor of their experience of God. For this reason the Christian conception of God unites, as no other religion has done, the religious and the moral consciousness. For Christianity, God is not only the Creator but above all the Holy One—the supreme Value, the Sustainer of Values. Thus we could hardly contemplate a development of Christianity which abandoned the idea that the Divine Being is most adequately conceived under personal forms, nor could we recognize as Christian a pantheism which destroyed the ultimate distinction of good and evil. A spirituality which has emancipated itself from the claims of moral goodness, or which presumes to rise beyond good and evil, is not Christian.

(2) But, as we have seen, Christianity is more than ethical monotheism. Its salient peculiarity is that it has found God in Christ. Jesus has been for Christians not merely One who has shown the way to the Father, One to be followed, but One who has manifested the Father and who claims not only service but worship. The life of God which runs through all the sons of men and is the ground of their being has been fully and adequately shown forth in one Life, which moreover persists in undying power, the life of His servants and the object of their adoration. The Christian religion is not simply the experience of the Holy God, but first of all the experience of God with us.

(3) Christianity has been a religion of redemption. Nothing could be further from the truth than to think of the Christian religion as a philosophy, a view of the world and nothing more. Its power has not been there; rather it has resided in the capacity to awaken the conscience of men to their inadequacy, to their need for being raised by some Power not within the re-

sources of their ordinary personalities to peace and harmony with the purpose of the world. The continued influence of Christianity upon the world which is a source of wonder to men, who see its doctrinal system buttressed with outworn modes of thought and its traditional outlook riddled by criticism, is surely due to this fact, that it answers to a need deeply rooted in human nature.

(4) The Christian experience is one of fellowship. The central Christian tradition is deeply hostile to the idea that the highest life of the spirit is one of solitude, or that a man can work out his religion for himself in the recesses of his inner consciousness. On the contrary, the life of fellowship is of the essence of the Christian experience. The highest spiritual condition is to be a member of the Kingdom of God, and the power of the Spirit of God, though not confined by any limitations, is normally found in the community of believers. A Christian outside the Church is an anomaly. A Christian who does not feel the need of the Church is an imperfect Christian.

Such, very roughly and crudely stated, are, I believe, the characteristic features of the Christian experience as it has transmitted itself to us through the centuries which divide us from its hisorical beginning. And these moments, I would add, are the abiding content of the Christian faith. A religion which gave up any one of them would so far depart from Christianity. It is this spiritual tradition which forms one of the elements in our desired synthesis.

We may note, however, before we pass on that the affirmations on which our religion rests are compatible with many different scientific and philosophical opinions concerning the structure of the universe, though not with every view. The Christian ideas have, in fact, been interpreted in terms of Platonism, of Aristotelianism, of Cartesianism, of Hegelianism. With none of them has the amalgamation been complete, with no outlook has the synthesis been final, and some of the views of the world with which Christianity was led to ally itself have vanished from the thought of the world, leaving their records only in the histories of philosophy. We must not, however, infer from this that religion has no concern with philosophy, or that, resting on the firm ground of religious experience, we may

ignore the passing fashions of speculation. If I may quote Dr. Whitehead again, he says:

> 'Religious experience consists of a certain widespread, direct apprehension of a character exemplified in the actual universe. Such a character includes in itself certain metaphysical presuppositions. In so far as we trust the objectivity of the religious intuitions, to that extent we must hold that the metaphysical doctrines are well-founded.' (*Religion in the Making*, p. 86.)

The conviction that the religious experience which is Christianity does in fact have 'objectivity,' that it is 'true,' commits us to certain general conceptions about the nature of Reality. In order to substantiate these convictions we must needs relate them with what we believe, on other grounds, to be true about Reality; we are compelled to harmonize them, so far as possible, with the view of Reality which comes to us in science. Until we have done that we have not only the mental pain of an imperfectly unified philosophy, but we lack the full assurance of the truth of our insight whether it be scientific or religious.

It is more than time to turn to the other element in our desiderated synthesis—the modern outlook. I confess that I find it difficult to decide what are the fundamental features intended to be conveyed in this expression. Yet we cannot doubt that it has a meaning. Difficult as it may be to define our inevitable presuppositions, our mental atmosphere differs profoundly from that of the sixteenth century, the sixteenth or the first. It is perhaps natural that we should not find it easy to describe the contrast which we feel, for we cannot without an effort raise ourselves above the stream of which we form a part and treat it as an object of contemplation.

The modern world has been made by science; the character which marks it off from all the preceding ages is the dominance of the natural sciences, their wonderful advance and their absorption of most of the highest intellectual power in their service. I will not stay to dwell upon the transformation which has taken place in our knowledge of the extent of the physical universe. Important as the results of science are, the importance of the scientific method is greater. Mr. Chesterton and others are never tired of telling us that the so-called ages of faith were really the ages of reason, and they are right in the

sense that in those ages the method of thought was by deduction from supposed self-evident premises. They were quite naturally both ages of authority and ages of reason. We must have some given premises from which to reason, and we must have confidence in the validity of reasoning. The modern outlook is not rationalist in this sense. Its new knowledge has been built up by another process, that of inductive reasoning from observed facts. Our minds are ruled not by syllogisms but by hypotheses.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of this change in method of thought upon the modern outlook. Let us take two salient points. The modern mind is in revolt against the old conception of authority, not because it is a peculiarly rebellious and stiff-necked generation, but by reason of its innermost nature. Not that even the modern mind can dispense with authority altogether, but it needs it, so to speak, at the other end. It does not require general principles from which to deduce its scheme of being; it requires facts to start it on the road of explanation. The only authority which the modern mind can recognize is that of fact and experience. There is matter here for reflection when we are considering the approach of Christianity to the modern world. It will listen indifferently to claims for infallible authority attached to general propositions; a revelation of dogmas will not easily be assimilated to its habits of thought. But when we base ourselves on the facts of religious experience, when we point to the massive and persistent phenomena of the religious life, we present it with a challenge which, on its own principles, it must recognize, for we offer it facts which demand to be correlated with the rest of the known phenomena.

Further, the modern mind is in revolt against fixed and comprehensive views of the universe. The trade of producing complete systems of philosophy still goes on, but it is a dying industry. The modern mind is not very confident that it can 'grasp this scheme of things entire'; it is perhaps less interested in the enterprise than most previous generations. And this again is a natural consequence of its habit of thought. The realm of fact, of experience, is endless; the task of linking phenomena together and of penetrating to their interrelation is also endless. In the process the outline of a world order doubt-

less begins to take shape, but the possession of a scheme of things in which every fact has its place and every question its answer seems to lie at the end of a process which is only just begun. Thus the more vigorous modern minds find no attraction in a theology which forms a completed and closed system, but rather grounds for suspicion. Perhaps there are no words which our dogmatic theologians need more grace to say than 'I don't know.' Yet their science would gain in men's estimation if they had the courage to confess ignorance, for the modern mind can readily understand a body of knowledge which, firmly based upon experience, advances by revision of concepts and the transcendence of inadequate views to an ever deeper insight. Modernist theologians are frequently reproached with vagueness and indefiniteness. We may be well content to bear the reproach if it means that we have not a glib reply to every problem and count not ourselves to have apprehended the fullness of the mystery of God in Christ. For no answer is better than a wrong answer and a vague suggestion often more spiritually fruitful than a dogmatic assertion which closes the avenue to truth.

Even so imperfect an account of the modern outlook must mention the one principle which enters into it, at least in the guise of a presupposition—the principle of continuity. It is at the very root of the modern world-view, and yet by its very nature incapable of proof. That every part and aspect of the universe is continuous with every other, that all phenomena are linked together, that there are no gaps or chasms, is the basis on which the revolution produced by science and scientific method is reared. And we have all imbibed this presupposition from the mental atmosphere in which we move. The evolutionary conception of the world is simply one application of this principle of continuity, though for religion the most important. The bearing of evolution upon our conception of God and our belief in Christ has been studied recently in many notable books, among which I may mention the most recent, Canon Raven's *Creator Spirit*. To go further into this question would be to trench upon the subject of other papers, but this remark I may perhaps be allowed. There has been a remarkable change in the conception of evolution within the last ten years among

thinkers who are determined to be loyal to the scientific standpoint and adopt with pride even the name of 'Naturalists.' The old view which held that continuity meant reducing the higher values of existence to the lower, and rejoiced in mechanistic metaphors, is vanishing. In various ways thinkers on evolution are converging on the conception of evolution as a creative process, and, as I believe, the return to a definitely teleological conception cannot long be resisted. Here perhaps more than anywhere else we may see the promise of a new synthesis which will deepen and purify our thought of God and His relation with the world. Could there be a more striking justification of the principles for which Modernism stands? Who was right in the controversy on evolution? Not those who denounced it in the name of a definite and dogmatic religious system. Those who had faith to believe that new truth could not, in the long run, be hostile to true religion, and that the Christian faith has no interest in restricting research, are in sight of vindication.

The word synthesis, I suppose, implies something more than a mixture of two entities, and something different from the swallowing up of one by the other. The synthesis, when it is reached, will be found to have involved some change in the traditional statements of Christianity, but it will not have left the modern outlook unaffected. Nothing could be more absurd than for a Modernist to adopt an attitude of worship towards the presuppositions and modes of thought of the present age. One who refuses to accept the theology of any past century as infallible will scarcely be on firm ground if he attributes infallibility to his own. There is no infallible outlook, because there is no outlook attainable by man which includes all the manifold riches of reality. And indeed it is one of the characteristics of our modern view to recognize the provisional character of all knowledge and to expect the revision of those who come after. Because we wish to state our faith in terms which will be in harmony with the thought of our time, we do not the less hold fast to the belief that Christianity has something of transcendent value to contribute to the thought and life of to-day, nor do we suppose that this age, unlike every other, does not need conversion. The spiritual man judgeth all things—even the modern outlook.

The attempt to synthesize the modern outlook with Christianity will affect all the four 'moments' which I have ventured to name as the essentials of the central Christian experience. Probably the task will be found most urgent and also most difficult in respect of the doctrine of God. We have to relate it with the modern conception of evolution and the modern emphasis upon values. In the process it will be necessary to sweep away much obsolete metaphysics, but we may hope that we shall gain, at the end, a new vision of the living God of the Prophets and of our Lord. The meaning of the experience of God in Christ again has to be thought out afresh in the light of the evolutionary conception of the world. Redemption has to be presented as an intelligible answer to a real need, and it may be suggested that we shall best approach it from the standpoint of psychology. The Christian fellowship, the Church, has to be related with the modern social consciousness and its place defined. Is its mission to be the ark of salvation from a naughty world or to be the soul of the body corporate?

The late Professor James Ward in one of his last essays, after pointing out that the tendency of philosophic speculation is to bring it into closer relation with religion, seems to leave it an open question whether Christianity will survive: 'Whether the result will be a remoulding of Christianity or a new religion time alone can show.'[1] We at least have no doubt that the Christian faith can be reinterpreted in the terms of the modern world. We do not want a new religion. But we do not conceal from ourselves that the synthesis which we seek is not to be come by lightly. Nor do we believe that it will ever be complete. For there are aspects of the modern outlook which are really incompatible with the Christian religion. I have sometimes thought that the chief obstacle to the progress of the Gospel is not modern thought but the modern absence of thought. Thomas Carlyle spoke contemptuously of the spirit of his age as that of 'triumphant analysis.' It is not an adequate description of the modern outlook, but it sums up a very influential factor in it. Archdeacon Lilley spoke in the eloquent conclusion of his paper of the superficiality of the knowledge which is the common possession of the modern world. Probably

[1] *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 181.

he and Carlyle mean much the same thing. Christianity is an answer, the answer, to the problem of this enigmatic world and the riddle of this strange life of ours encompassed by mysteries. It replies to the questions, What ought I to do? What may I hope? But how if people do not ask these questions? Perhaps never before did so many find it easy to postpone these ancient enquiries. There are so many problems which can be solved by 'triumphant analysis,' it is so pressingly necessary to think of the economic values, that life often passes away before men pose to themselves the one supreme question or raise their thoughts to the one ultimate value. Probably those who possess the Kingdom will always be a 'little flock' compared with the multitudes who have no interest in it. But one thing we may hope to do—we may preach the Kingdom in words which the modern man can understand, and show it, not as something aloof, incomprehensible, but as growing out of the life and thought of our day as their completion and their crown. For, in my view at least, the chief justification of Modernism, the purpose of our search for a synthesis, is not that we may water down the Gospel but that we may make it more effective, that men may be able to say once again, by the power of the Spirit, 'we do hear in our tongues the wonderful works of God.'

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE

By the Rev. Canon B. H. Streeter, F.B.A., Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford, and Canon Residentiary of Hereford.

CHRISTIAN Faith transcends modern knowledge only in the sense that life necessarily transcends our knowledge of it. Dr. Matthews reminded us that the Middle Ages were the 'age of reason'; an age which wrongly valued knowledge. You cannot have too much reason, but you can make a wrong use of it; and you cannot have too much knowledge, but you may get the knowledge you have out of focus. If we are to get reason and knowledge into focus we must start by realizing the fact that these are the property of persons. Reason is a function of personality; it is a function of life. Knowledge is a thing which persons have,

it is not a thing which exists in the blue. Therefore it is from the standpoint of personality and life that we must approach all questions concerned not only with religion but with the interpretation of the universe.

Modern psychology is pushing us in this direction. I select two points as illustrating this. First, the emphasis on the idea that thought, in the sense of ratiocination, is a function of conation; what you want, you will; you then *think* how to get what you want. It is not that you first think and then want. If Descartes had lived in these days he would not have said *Cogito ergo sum*, but *Volo ergo sum*. When a baby first awakes to consciousness it cries for something it wants, and in that comes the consciousness that there is a not-myself.

Another point is the curious fact discovered—I am thinking of the theory of the complex—that supposing there is down in the bottom of your subconscious self a conflict; if you get this up into clear knowledge, that is a very long way towards getting rid of it. I think that is an idea which is capable of giving us the key to many other problems; getting knowledge, getting a clear consciousness of something about your inward life, enables you to enrich that life. Knowledge is that which *liberates* life, as well as that which enables one to direct it.

In the New Testament God is light and God is life, and religion is life in the light. The Christian Faith—any faith, any theory or philosophy, which is any use at all—must transcend knowledge: not modern knowledge but *any* knowledge, and that, not because the Christian faith has got something mysterious 'up its sleeve,' as it were, but simply because of the nature of Reality and the nature of religion, the richness of which cannot be completely represented by any purely intellectual concepts.

An analogy which is of help if we are to consider the relation of theology—or the philosophy of religion, which seems to me a rather better name for theology—to religion is the relation of criticism to art. Criticism, the theory of art, has been of immense value in the past to art on its creative side. The majority of the great forward movements have started off with a criticism of the ideals, the methods, the technique of previous movements. I may instance the great Romantic movement, and the kind of criticism that people like Wordsworth made of the poetical

traditions of the eighteenth century. Again, there is the Pre-Raphaelite movement. My audience is no doubt familiar with the latest movements in modern art. I will not quote any of these; especially as I have not read anything on the subject for the last six months, and I should probably therefore only be able to deal with the latest theory but two!

If we look back over the history of our religion we find a similar interaction between criticism of the ideas of the past and liberation of creative force. The obvious example is the teaching of the Hebrew prophets in the eighth century before Christ, the essence of which was the criticism of existing conceptions of religion. 'Wherewith shall I come before the Lord? With burnt offerings, with rivers of oil, with my firstborn? He hath shewed thee what is good. Do justly, love mercy, walk humbly with thy God.' The message that religion is not sacrifice but mercy is one which is still unpopular, even in some sections of the Church of England.

Our religion starts off, then, with a criticism of the intellectual and ethical conceptions of previous religions. The development of religion in the Old Testament is a continual series of criticisms. We think of Ezekiel's criticism of the idea that the sins of the parents are visited upon their children; and the criticism of Job in his turn upon the contention of Ezekiel, that every man gets exactly what he deserves; and so on. The early Christians faced the religion of the ancient world in the spirit of criticism. The complaint which that world made against them was that they were atheists. And so they were. They started by making a clean sweep of more gods than any of us could count in half an hour. Polytheism is a dissipation of the religious energy. If there are some hundreds of deities a divided attention is inevitable; also, seeing that those divinities are good, bad, and indifferent, polytheism is immoral. The intellectual simplification of monotheism, which came with the preaching of Christianity, let loose the greatest moral creative force in the history of Europe. The Reformation, again, followed on the criticism by the Renaissance of the Middle Ages; and that again was an immense releasing of creative moral force.

During the last fifty years there has been a similar criticism of traditional religious ideas. It is difficult for us, unless we

read some of the biographies of people in the early part of the nineteenth century, to realize how dark was the cloud of the overhanging fear of hell. Cardinal Manning says, 'The lake of burning fire was never for more than a moment'—that is all through his life—'absent from my mind,' and he thanked God for it. Criticism, in liberating us from that fear, has made possible a religion motived primarily by love.

Then again, the rigidity of a theology involving a complete rigid, final, intellectual formulation of belief and conduct has gone. The result should be an immense liberation of life. That is the thing we have to look for and work for, the liberation of life. I see signs of it all round among the younger generation, especially in movements like the Student Movement, the Scout Movement, etc. These recognize the fact that religion is essentially *adventure*. It is not walking in continual fear; it is not doing just what you are told; it is not opening your mouth and shutting your eyes and taking what your elders give you; the essence of it is Adventure—but constructive adventure.

I agree completely with what Dr. Matthews *said* in his paper dealing with the effort to secure 'A Synthesis of Christianity and the Modern Outlook,' but not with the implications which *some* people might derive from its title. In regard to purely intellectual questions, like the present state of physics or biology and the like, of course it is necessary to produce a synthesis between Christianity and the modern outlook. But the particular stage which any particular science has reached is a very small part of the total life of man. If I look at the modern outlook as a whole, the thing that I want to do is, not to make a synthesis of that and Christianity, but to *change the modern outlook*. If you take up the ordinary novel or magazine article, if you think of the literature which reflects the feeling of the *intelligentsia*, it is an age of which the outlook could be summed up in two Latin words, *Vanitas vanitatum*. The great difference between to-day and the days when I was an undergraduate, in the later Victorian age, is that our leaders then believed that all was well with the world. To-day, if there is one thing on which all those whose eyes are open at all are agreed, it is that things are very bad with the world. We live in an age when no small proportion of the intellectuals have abandoned hope, and by openly

despairing of all ideals confess themselves morally bankrupt. That element in the modern outlook is one with which I have no desire to make any synthesis. The business of Christianity is to change that, and to change it by using the weapons of thought which the modern world has put into its hands; to save the world from itself, and for that purpose use its own best things.

Dr. Matthews quoted a well-known thinker, to the effect that the problem was whether after such and such adjustments Christianity will survive. If one looks round the world to-day, the problem which is before most people who think is, not whether Christianity will survive, but whether civilization will survive. That is the real problem. It is for those of us whose call has been to think about Christianity in relation to the philosophy of life to be thinking of it in relation to this problem.

We can sometimes get encouragement and inspiration by looking at a great age of the past. Towards the end of the twelfth century there was a period when the world, for very good reasons, felt itself to be 'going to the dogs'; when there was running over the world, especially Italy, Provence, and other districts, which were the most advanced in civilization, a form of Manicheeism which is technically known as the Albigensian heresy. A movement of thought of that kind is, of course, a reflection of the general consciousness of men; and that Manichaean theory that the world is essentially evil was an obvious and necessary reflection of the facts of the time and of the despair induced by the failure of existing religion. That situation was saved mainly by the appearance of St. Francis of Assisi. If we ask what St. Francis really did, we answer that he liberated a new spiritual force, which came from a new vision of God and a new understanding of Christ—those two things being connected with one another.

Another thing worth noticing is that this liberation of new moral and religious life was followed by—I do not think that it is merely *post hoc*, but to a large extent is *propter hoc*, there is a causal connection between the two—the great creative artistic revival of the Renaissance. If you go to Assisi, you see the people who are painting there are Cimabue and Giotto. The Renaissance was born round the tomb of St. Francis. Again, the scientific movement of Europe, which arose through turning

away from abstract *a priori* reason to the experimental verification of facts, starts a few years later in that same century with Roger Bacon, who was a Franciscan friar.

I see no hope whatsoever for our modern civilization unless somehow or other we can let loose fresh life—which may well be creative in art, politics, science, as well as in what we call technically religion or morals—coming from a renewed vision of God and a clearer understanding of Christ. Those two, as in the days of St. Francis, being closely connected with one another.

The greatest value, it seems to me, of the intellectual criticism of the last forty or fifty years is that it offers to give us these things, if only we will open our eyes and take hold of them. Consider our conception of God. The Early Church was up against the Greek conception of God as the Absolute, the One Substance. It enriched that by making it a Living God. The Middle Ages, owing to the dominance of legal conceptions (which was necessary from the fact that law was the one really great sphere of thought which had survived), tended to think of God as Sovereign and Judge. It is the power of that conception which has just been broken for our age; we are getting back again, very largely under the influence of the philosophical movement associated with the name of Bergson, to the notion of God as Life, to the Living God. We are beginning to see that Personality, which is such an infinitely richer thing than either Substance or Sovereign or Law, is the form under which we have to think of God.

Then, again, historical criticism has brought the Figure of Christ out of the stained-glass window into the street; and we can see Him as One who, from one point of view, was the Artist, the Artist in the art of life. If you think of His sayings, He is not a legislator, He is not a preacher; He is a Poet and the Adventurer, the man up against odds, venturing all for a great cause and a great ideal.

If we feed our minds on conceptions of this sort, we cannot but see that it must have far-reaching consequences. If we look without, there are the enormous problems, social, economic, international, with which the world is faced. Turn adventure in that direction, and it becomes constructive thought, con-

sidered experiment. If we look within the divided personality, the soul wounded with the sorrows, and distracted with the moral struggles, of life; we see adventure in the inward overcoming, from which always arises that which is creative in influence without. 'Ye are the light of the world.' One who, along the lines which Christ pointed out, has in his own person overcome sorrow, or mastered the inward struggle, becomes, just by being there, a source of creative power towards those among whom he lives. He may be one who can go further and make that creative activity apparent in administration, in speech or in writing. It may be that the circumstances of his or her life are such that he or she is one of those who serve, though they can only stand and wait—but their influence is no less creative.

Our duty, then, is to be the foremost to appropriate this clarification, this simplification, of the conception of God and Christ that has thus been put into our hands by the intellectual analysis and criticism of modern philosophy, modern science, and historical criticism. Vision will bear fruit in action; but first we must see the vision. We may begin just simply to accept it, let our minds dwell upon the glory of God seen in the face of Jesus Christ; lift up our hearts in prayer, not the prayer of abasement or despair, but that of the confidence with which the child approaches the father that he knows loves; in adoration, which is the recognition that God is the Beauty and the Truth as well as the Goodness of things. 'Lift up your hearts. We lift them up unto the Lord.'

THE REINTERPRETATION OF TRADITIONAL FORMULARIES

By the Rev. J. F. Bethune-Baker, D.D., Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.

THE prevalent dissastisfaction with our existing formularies is many-sided. Some of our most Christianly-minded friends would have none of them. Others would wish to eliminate everything metaphysical from their creed and substitute for it statements of ethical principle and aspiration. Others again are mainly affected by particular clauses or phrases which affirm or imply beliefs, historical, ethical, scientific, which they have come to regard as misleading or even positively untrue. There were not many of us, I suppose, who had to wait for Dr. Otto's fine book to learn that religion in its distinctive character is neither moral nor rational. If scrutiny of ourselves was not sufficiently illuminating, we had only to look round among our religious friends in order to discover how much remained even in the Christian religion of primitive conceptions neither moralized nor rationalized. But one of the great merits of Dr. Otto's book which has not, I think, been sufficiently recognized—other attractions have obscured it—is that he shews the gradual emergence in religion of the moral and the rational. The mark of the great religion is not its success in maintaining the primitive sense of the numinous. It would cease to be a religion if it did not keep this sense alive. But it shews its greatness by the measure in which it is able to direct this sense to moral and rational ends, and in its conception of the numinous at least keep pace with the ethical and intellectual evolution of a progressive race and its civilization. In this essential and critical function of a great religion it is bound to find its sacred books and formularies of all kinds an impediment and a drag.

This is our experience to-day. Jesus in His world-view, His attitude to life and His teaching, His valuation of reality, working on the religious conceptions of His time, both moralized and rationalized those conceptions to the highest degree. It is

always to His conception of the Father-God and His ethical ideals that we turn. The Church by its valuation of Him, its estimate of the significance of His experience and of His place in the whole order of reality which the doctrine of the Incarnation, rightly understood, implies, established for ever, as we believe, the standard of measure of truth. The Church has had in its hands ever since the master-key to the understanding of the scheme of things.

It used it effectively in its early solutions of the moral and intellectual problems by which it was confronted. But different conditions and different problems need different solutions. And the formularies of all kinds which embody the solutions that were adequate to the moral and intellectual conditions of the past are in some respects below the level of the demands of ethics and reason to-day. We have new keys to knowledge and moral judgment in our hands in all the new learning about the world and man and the fascinating story of the drama of their evolution. Wherever these things are concerned our formularies represent an older learning, not always the best of its time, which nowadays discredits the religion of which they are supposed to be, so far as they go, the expression. Yet when we use the master-key of the doctrine of the Incarnation we find that it fits all the new knowledge and experience of our time, and opens out to us an interpretation of the world, a revelation of God and His purpose and way of working, and a revelation of Man, which at once satisfies and stimulates our intellectual cravings and our moral sense. Our religion is the Incarnation, the God-Man, the Cross the Way of Life, the ever-emerging, insuppressible, conquering Good. Our religion ought not even to seem to harbour bits of obsolete history, ethics, and science. That, I suppose, should be one of our guiding principles of revision.

Dr. Major has already given us an introduction to our discussion this evening. In his article in the July number of *The Modern Churchman* he has depicted the position as it presents itself, I suppose, to most of us in general and in respect of various details. In this article he says: 'To-day traditional Christianity with its scheme of salvation lies shattered: it has lost intellectual authority with all classes'; and he quotes Mrs.

Humphry Ward's description of Modernism as 'the attempt of the modern spirit, acting religiously, to refashion Christianity, not outside, but inside the warm limits of the ancient churches, to secure not a reduced, but a transformed Christianity.'

I presuppose that general statement and that description. In Dr. Major's statement, as I understand it, the stress lies on the words 'its scheme of salvation.' I should wish to add to his statement my own conviction that our traditional Christianity has to a large extent lost moral authority also because of its obsolete anthropology, but I cannot enlarge on that part of the subject now. I must, however, adopt for myself a limitation which Dr. Major seems to reject when he criticizes Mrs. Ward's expression 'the ancient churches.' No doubt the need is the same in all the churches of more recent origin that have formularies at all; but it is inside one of the ancient churches, sharing its life to the full, and within its order, that we ourselves have to work.

I hope I shall not be wasting your time if I dwell a moment on this point as marking for us at once a principle and a limitation. None of us, I am sure, harbours any idea of a new church or a new religion. We know that in the past Christianity and the Church have passed through many stages of the process of change and development that the world and everything in it exhibits, and our chief concern at the moment is that this natural change and development should have free play in our own Church. We do not want it to be artificially arrested through the false idea, as we hold it, that the only way of safeguarding the sense of the numinous in its specific Christian manifestation is by the revival of beliefs and practices of times before the Reformation. In all ages the modern churchmen have been those who responded more easily than others to the stimulus of new thought and knowledge, new ideas and experience, new revelations of the spirit of Man and of God, and sought to domesticate them all in the Church and the religion it offered men as their guide to the truth of things in life and thought. If Christianity began with Christ, it was certainly refashioned by St. Paul, by St. John, by a long series of thinkers and teachers, Fathers and Doctors and Councils, after them. The sixteenth century witnessed refashioning of a more obvious kind on a

large scale and in a great part of Western Christendom, and the ancient Church of England was refashioned by the march of events and the peculiar genius of the English people in such strange wise as to preserve its continuity and retain all the characteristic features of historical Christianity while adapting in various ways its constitution and teaching to the new conditions and ideas of the time. So, having lived as it seems almost from hand to mouth for more than a hundred years, it found itself established in the unique position in Christendom that it has occupied since and occupies to-day. Catholic and Protestant, primitive, mediaeval, and reformed, respecting antiquity and all that we call 'tradition,' but not inaccessible to fresh knowledge and new movements; tenacious of the faith once delivered to the saints, but claiming no infallibility for the interpretations even of the most august assemblies of the faithful in the past. 'General Councils may err, and sometimes have erred, even in things pertaining unto God' (*Article* xxi). By its history in the past, by the very personality and character its special experience have developed in it, it seems to be marked out as the destined representative of an organic Christianity continuously developing and shaping itself anew to meet the constantly changing conditions of knowledge and thought and life that determine for men the real world, generation after generation, that confronts them.

I wish that what Bishop Creighton and other historians in the Victorian era wrote about it, and Mr. Fawkes's little book of only a few years ago, could be broadcasted for the use of our official representatives to-day. The Church of England is so splendidly worth saving in its unique historical character. Whoever else goes out of the Church of England, Modernists must not; for it is their natural home, and true appreciation of its character seems to be in danger of being left to them. So in all essays in reinterpretation and reformulation let us cherish the consciousness that we are first and foremost and all the time concerned with the Church of England. It is in and through the Church of England that the new presentation of Christianity must be made, if the religion of the future is not to sweep away all ancient landmarks and institutions. And we must remember that we can only save by serving.

If we accept this principle, the limitation it imposes on us is severe. For many of our natural allies are but sleeping members of the Church, and by its new constitution have no power to influence its future: and the modern moralizing and rationalizing of traditional Christianity has progressed in recent years too fast for the rank and file of English Churchmen to keep pace with it, and it does not yet seem to them to be what it has been to those engaged in it—a spiritualizing process which liberates the spirit of Man only by bringing him into closer immediate communion with the spirit of Christ.

How then is the needed evolution to be expedited? Is it to be by reformulation of ancient formularies? Of course there is precedent for this course. We know that it was reformulation that gave us our Book of Common Prayer and our Articles of Religion. There was no new knowledge then of the facts of the beginnings of Christianity: no new knowledge of the primitive background, lacking which the new authority given to the Bible was a snare. There was no new science: the earth was still the centre of the universe with the sun as its satellite. But there was a new learning, and a quickened sense of spiritual and moral values in religion, and on the whole the reformulation carried out by the Church of England was a fine achievement of the Modernism of the sixteenth century—typically English.

Can we hope for as good results from reformulation to-day? The attempt has been made. Unlike many who are here to-night, I am one of those who have had no share in making it. Apart from joining in the plea that, whatever was done, we should have one Order for Holy Communion as the use of the undivided Church of England, I have been only a spectator of other men's work; and now I only attempt to estimate the result in its bearings on the question before us this evening. I have no information about the proceedings of the Archbishops' Committee on Doctrine, which might be instructive, so I can take only the instance of the Prayer Book—the most obvious first-fruits of the new constitution of the Church of England.

'All was in confusion; Nous came and brought order.' In this case Nous 'in commission,' distributed in uncertain proportions between vicar, church council, and bishop, is to establish the order, congregation by congregation. It seems to me that

we are to have a period of sanctioned confusion in the form of permissible variations. As a mirror of the state of the Church of England to-day, the new book reveals the absence of controlling mind, common will and consciousness—a position of instability. Anyone can fish in these troubled waters. But that is not why the Churchmen's Union has given its official blessing to the book. It is, I infer, because of some new freedoms, modernizations of words, additional prayers, omissions or attenuations of phrases that obtrude ideas once as firmly believed as they are to-day generally rejected, all of which changes indicate movement to something better than was. Here and there, I think, they imply a modification of traditional doctrine in the same direction.

As regards the new order of Holy Communion, we are assured that no change of doctrine is meant or intended. Yet the new order will have in future the same authority as the old one. Where the teaching of the Church of England is in question the old order will have to be interpreted by the new one. It will be a question of the legal construction of the two documents, the older in the light of the newer; and I cannot but believe that doctrine deliberately rejected at the Reformation, because it was neither moral nor rational, now becomes inferentially permissible, and therefore sanctioned as it was not before. If a case like that of the baptismal regeneration controversy, *mutatis mutandis*, was before such a body as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, I think they would certainly infer such doctrine as the *rationale* of the new order. In this instance, if I am right, reformulation points backwards. It takes us back to a lower moral and rational level than we were on before.

But more instructive still for our purpose is an instance to which special attention is due, for it exhibits definitely doctrinal reformulation—the new Order for the Baptism of Infants. There are changes which nearly everyone will welcome. But, but! The old Order contains a highly technical term which has been the subject of much controversy: 'seeing now . . . that this child is regenerate.' Various interpretations of this term have been given and allowed in the Church of England as expressing the effects of baptism. It has become, as it were, a blank cheque on which you can write values in your own coinage. It is re-

placed by the good plain English 'born again.' True, 'born again' stands in the Authorized Version of the Nicodemus episode in the Fourth Gospel (*Jn.* iii). But it was corrected to 'anew,' or 'from above,' in the Revised Version, and even in our Order of 1662 it stands as 'born anew.' It was only Nicodemus who thought it must mean being born a second time, and we ourselves only use the phrase 'twice-born' of adults who have had some conscious experience, which is impossible in infants. To assert it as the result of the baptism of an infant, to say in plain English that this is what Baptism does, is to take back from us the freedom of interpretation of a technical term that had been won in the process of moralizing our traditional doctrine of sacraments. And it is extraordinarily hard to devise an ethical *rationale* of the sacrament of Baptism in the case of infants. This is the only instance of outspoken reformulation that has caught my eye, and in it Modernism loses heavily by the change —as I imagine its opponents must have realized with some amusement, if membership of such learned assemblies does not atrophy the sense of humour.

So I am led, by this evidence of the results of the laborious and prayerful work of good and learned men to-day, to the conclusion that the Church of England as a whole is not ready for reformulation of doctrine. Let us have no attempts at present at formal replacements by anything like official authority of the technical terms of traditional Christianity. It is not in that way that the refashioning we want can be done.

Let us not seek to find other terms for Incarnation, Sin, Forgiveness, Atonement, Resurrection, Salvation, Eternal Life, Communion of Saints, Heaven and Hell, or any of our technical terms. Let us rather go on as we have been doing, interpreting, explaining, openly repudiating some meanings which in the past have been connected with particular terms and expressions, treating them all as provisional and contingent, but keeping them as part of the common stock of our religious language.

If need be, we justify them in general, as we generally can, in relation to the particular environment of which they were the product. But as regards the present we take them one by one and fill them out with meanings that correspond to the knowledge and experience of to-day. We treat them as symbols of

the realities which from the beginning they were devised to reflect and represent — realities of which our conceptions are different from those which have been prevalent in the past and are still in backward popular belief attached to the terms. We commend our interpretations, our revaluations of old beliefs, to the *communis sensus fidelium* and seek its sanction. I have no doubt that in time that sanction will be given.

Far more generally than even ten years ago men and women, having ceased to treat the Bible as a storehouse of information about God and the World and Man, have come to regard it rather, New Testament as well as Old, as a picture-book of Religion, in which the religious experience pourtrayed is the revealed and revealing fact, and the description of it only a picture of the fact in the fashion of the time.

We have to treat our doctrines as the product of picture-thinking of a similar kind, pictorial representations of religious realities, and seek to construct pictures in the fashion of our own times. That method will give us, not the legal, but the religious, construction of our formularies. I have no doubt that Dr. J. M. Wilson is moved by the true prophetic spirit—the spirit that discerns and speaks out the things of God—when he pleads and urges that the picture for our own times must be dominated by the evolutionist conception of the world and life. That will give us beyond question a transformed Christianity. We shall keep those of our legends and pictures which are suggestive of what is true, to stimulate our children's and refresh our own imagination. We shall keep them in our richly furnished Church of England for those who are still at the level of thought and belief to which they correspond. In the course of our revaluation of old beliefs we shall be content with fewer affirmations and we shall leave many questions open.

Will our valuation, therefore, be less Christian? Will it be a 'reduced' Christianity that results? I am not sure what the phrase means, but we know that this group of Churchmen is always charged with being 'humanistic' and 'Unitarian' in their views. There is never a Conference of this kind that is not followed by criticism to that effect. What are the facts? Shall we be 'humanistic' in our religion?

Certainly the refashioned evolutionist Christianity will set

a higher value on the world and man than traditional Christianity has ever allowed them. It will treat disparagement of either not as pious, but as positively irreligious. It will glory in the long travail and the achievements of the spirit of Man. In this way it will be frankly humanist. The world and man will receive at last the valuation that is implied in the doctrine of the Incarnation.

But will God, therefore, have less place in it? Will there be less recognition of the God in Christ reconciling the world to Himself? A man is religious, I suppose, in proportion as he is conscious of God and brings that consciousness to bear on his conception and conduct of life; and the characteristic note of Christian religion is the particular variety of that consciousness that results from the conviction that Jesus in His whole experience was the manifestation of God in flesh—the hidden God in the World and Man, thus for the first time clearly revealed.

And what are the facts as to the second charge? Shall we be 'Unitarian' in our religion?

Well, it must be said quite plainly that our critics do not seem to know that the old Unitarianism is dead. To the Unitarian the principle that God is one, as an entity self-contained and exclusive of all else, was fundamental. Over against Him was set the Universe and Man. The antithesis, God and Man, was ultimate. Therefore of no man could godhead be predicated.

The evolutionist Christianity, on the contrary, does not attempt to conceive of God apart from the Universe (that question belongs to the realm of pure speculation) or in antithesis to Man. Its faith is fixed on God as the ground of all being and creative activity, manifested in the Universe, and in Man, however partially, yet more fully than in aught else. In every man by his very nature and constitution there is a faint image of godhead. In Jesus—His personality and character and life—there was a full image, and so in Him we bow down before and worship godhead in its most visible human embodiment. 'No man hath seen God at any time.' Here, in Jesus, is the most revealing vision.

To a Unitarian the doctrine of the Trinity is a piece of incredible metaphysics. To us it is a picture of the reality of the life and activity of God. Father and Son are of course

purely human similes; but just because the Modernist believes that all that is is grounded in God, he is not frightened by human analogies; and, believing that the experiences of human life in the world in their fundamental character are not unlike but (on however lower a plane) like the experience of God, he readily pictures the Divine Life and activity in terms of Father, Son, and Spirit. He conceives of the Divine Life as one of eternal self-communication, outgoing, giving. He does not fear anthropomorphisms just because he believes that the whole process of the world is a manifestation of God, and that in the highest human capacities and relationships He is most clearly revealed.

So the Christianity that is refashioned by the evolutionist knowledge of to-day will be bold to proclaim the old gospel of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Kingdom of God, and the Future Coming of the Christ in glory, as the meaning of the whole process and the true picture of man's significance and place in the scheme of things, and so of his responsibility as a free agent to further the process. For it is an account of ourselves that we give, an account of every man, when we affirm our faith in the man Jesus as incarnate Son of God. And on evolutionist lines we say there is plan discernible and purpose. There is a trend to good: good has emerged; against all odds, as it might seem, it has been produced. Man as we know him at his best is the latest and highest order of being evolved: all else has gone to the making of him, and he includes elements of all else. High moral personality is not a bye-product of the process but the outcome of its travail.

We cannot define this 'personality.' But we know it by its manifestations, and personality which is the outcome of the process must serve us as an index to the characteristic quality of the creative principle of all. A directing spirit is the image by which we picture it most truly: not 'impersonal'; it cannot lack the characteristic of personality, however it may be transfigured in the reality.

This refashioned Christianity, accordingly, humanist and evolutionist as it will be, will yet be permeated and controlled by the consciousness of God as personal (which means a God transcending the process in which He is none the less inherent,

for personality in us means that we too in our measure are conscious of a similar transcendence), and of Christ as the supreme manifestation of Him that has emerged in the process, and the medium of the true knowledge of God and Man in all their relationships with one another.

I cannot see how reinterpretation of our formularies on these lines can give us as our religion a Christianity that could be called 'reduced,' unless it is by the quantity rather than the quality of its beliefs that the Christianity of our religion is to be measured.

AFFINITIES OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT WITH CATHOLICISM

By the Rev. W. W. Longford, D.D., Rector of Caversham.

IN its primary significance the term affinity suggests a relationship between *two separate entities* — as, for example, that between a man and his wife's mother, forbidden in Scripture and our laws to marry together. There it is a relationship found outside common origin, and in a bond with a third entity. Even though, in the illustration, this bond is not of such a kind as is held to encourage mutual tolerance, we must not be deceived into thinking that it has any real bearing upon the relation of the Modern Movement to Catholicism. If we turn from Canon Law to Chemistry, we discover affinity to be defined as the peculiar attraction between the atoms of *two simple substances* which makes them combine to form a compound. Here we may feel that we are getting on the track of the thing we want. The magic word 'synthesis' springs to our lips; and the fact that the formation of this compound is not infrequently accompanied by violent explosion may tend to confirm us in favour of the term and of this chemical allusion. The difficulty, however, in regard to the acceptance of either elucidation is found in the fact that Modernism and Catholicism are not separate entities — nor, for that matter, are they simple substances. We are not dealing—and this is the point which may

be at issue—with two distinct systems, or even with a system (Catholicism) and a potential system (Modernism). Catholicism is a system, Evangelical Protestantism (so far as it has not been grafted upon Catholicism) is, or was, a system or a series of kindred systems. We should be justified, if we cared, in seeking either relationships with third entities, or partialities disclosing common affections, in regard to such systems. But Modernism is not a system: it is something existing within a system. It is not even limited to the sphere of religion, since it finds a place and manifests its activities (with varying degrees of reproach) in every sphere which does not inhibit intellectual processes, from agriculture to philosophy. It is a point of view, not a creed; nor even, as some would have it, an apology for a creed. Even more certainly it is not a religion. It only exists as an antithesis, that is, as antithetical to another attitude found in all systems, be they religious or not—the attitude known as Traditionalism. The Modern Movement in religion is this point of view manifesting itself in action, within Catholicism and within Protestantism. It can have no affinities with that of which it is part.

I have laboured this point, perhaps somewhat lightly, yet nevertheless in all seriousness, because those who accept the name Modernist sometimes miss it; while of Catholics the Roman anti-modernists, if no others, will not admit it. The orthodox Romanist holds Modernism to be an alien system with clear-cut philosophy and doctrine; the Modernist of to-day often seems to think of himself as a devotee of a new eclectic system, speaking not infrequently as carelessly as he thinks.

The problem before us, therefore, is not to search for points of relationship between *two systems*. We must abandon 'affinities' in any strict sense of the word. What we shall ask ourselves is how far and in what ways the values in which Catholicism finds its real expression can be found to accord, or can be brought into accord, with the Modernist point of view within its confines.

Our first business must be to make clear to ourselves what it is that constitutes Catholicism, reformed or unreformed, Eastern or Western. A simple definition is of course quite impossible. We may say, however, at the outset that the distinguishing mark

of Catholicism is found in its *outlook*. It concerns itself primarily with the whole rather than with the part, with the Church rather than with the individual—or, shall we say, with the individual only as a member or potential member of the Church. This type of outlook has its dangers, as Evangelical Protestantism has not unfairly contended, without itself always escaping the opposite extreme of error. From this outlook, founded in it and moulded by it, there has issued a characteristic form of religious life and polity which sets chief values upon the things which have purpose and meaning for the whole. In summarizing these things we shall summarize the greatest common factors of Catholicism. What are they? First, regard for Continuity, that is, for continuous and unbroken church life from Apostolic times; secondly, regard for an Ordered Ministry, not self-appointed, but receiving its commission in regular succession from the Church of the earliest days; thirdly, regard for Sacraments as symbols of unity and channels of blessing; fourthly, regard for Creeds as normal standards of Christian profession; lastly, regard for Scripture as the common source of Christian discipline. It will be seen that these chief objects of regard have what, from want of a better term, may be called *community value*. They have it actually in use, and they have it by their origin, since they owe their several existences to the needs of the society. Held in one common nexus, they constitute all that is vital to the Catholic system.

If we could continue our enquiry from this point our task would be easy indeed. Unfortunately this is not a complete picture of Catholicism as it manifests itself to the world; nor would it be recognized as such by the majority of those who consider themselves Catholics. Eliminating without argument, as perhaps here we may, the ultramontane doctrine that Papalism is the first and the indispensable condition of Catholicism, we have yet to notice features of Catholicism which are so characteristic as to be deemed inseparable from it, not only by adherents, but also by those who are without.

In the first place there are habits, customs, usages—it is hard to find a single word to cover all—mainly having reference to worship and the Church's life. Not only has Catholicism baptized Art into the service of religion, using form, sound and

colour to convey or perpetuate its messages, through architecture, ornament, vesture, music and the like: it has consecrated distinct types of liturgical service, of posture, action and practice which, however freely imitated within other systems, have to be acknowledged as arising within Catholicism and as characteristic of its life. Speaking generally, all these things also have community value, or are supposed to have it. They differ in different parts of the world; they may be held in restraint, or they may have been given freedom to multiply. To the outsider probably they constitute the most impressive group of features: for the 'pious geese' within they tend certainly to overshadow almost everything else. Catholic revival, as we know it of late years in the English Church, has meant very largely revival or absorption of this type of feature and, as we shall notice later, of the dogma which tends to surround it. Nevertheless if all or any of these things were eliminated tomorrow, Catholicism proper would not be affected in any more essential way than if Papalism, itself only a developed custom, were abandoned. This is a point to be clear about before we return to this topic.

We have now in short compass enumerated the things which may be considered vital to the maintenance of a Catholic system, and the things which are characteristic of the expression of religious life within Catholicism. We come now to matters characteristic of Catholicism but in no sense peculiar to it—attachment to Tradition, regard for Authority as governing thought and practice, and that development of Dogma which has been one of the chief consequences of that attachment and that regard. It may be in the minds of some that it is in these things that we discover one of the distinguishing notes of Catholicism. Let us at once disabuse our minds. Though those things are outstanding features of Catholicism, they are by no means peculiar to it. They are characteristic of every religious system, and where they are not found you have no system. Tradition is as characteristic and its use is as clearly marked in Evangelical Protestant systems, where they survive, as in that of Catholicism. The chief difference to be remarked is that one type of tradition began later than the other; that it was not evolved but laid down in a more or less logical and

permanent form, being selected and adapted from the older forms. But for Evangelical Protestant bodies as well as for Catholic systems traditional statement has been, and is, binding —whether of Scripture, Creed or Confession. Upon both the weight of Tradition has hitherto borne heavily — whether of teaching or of custom. As to Authority of a corporate nature— whether disciplinary or didactic—history shows how fully it has been received both in idea and practice by systems other than Catholicism. If it is personal authority, the Pope himself has not been more powerful than Calvin or Knox within their respective spheres : if it is group authority, no Catholic synod has had greater power over life and thought than the post-Reformation Scottish presbytery. That Catholicism has stood for the principle of corporate authority, and Evangelical Protestantism for the right of private judgment, is one of the most humorously false generalizations that has ever been made. Private judgment was asserted by individual reformers, but signs are scanty that they allowed a like privilege to others, least of all to their own followers. So far as religious systems are concerned, it is at least arguable whether private judgment has not been more free within Catholicism than within Protestant systems. The only real point of difference---and this has an important bearing upon the situation which lies ahead of us—lies in the fact that Catholicism in theory and in practice has stood for the supreme authority of the living voice within the body; while the Protestant systems are tied to the supreme authority of the written letter. This authority they can only evade by self-destruction. This condition for the most part these systems are achieving, leaving only their names to their posterity. Catholicism for the most part sees no call for metamorphosis and is not using the power which it possesses.

These considerations lead us naturally to the position with regard to Dogma. Dogma is doctrine held to be essential to the true knowledge and practice of religion. It has consequently relations both with Tradition and with Authority. Tradition is concerned with the facts of history, of custom, of doctrinal theory : Authority sets its imprimatur upon what may be received and states how it is to be received. It is the creator, therefore, of Dogma as such. Dogma is found in all religions and systems

of religion. Christianity began upon dogmatic foundation; this I think we should all be agreed upon, however much we might differ about its extent. Catholicism (not a religion, but a religious system) was built upon this original deposit—the doctrine of Jesus as to God and Man. It differs from subsequently formed Christian systems not in that it has been more dogmatic —what could be more dogmatic than Calvinism?—but in that it has accumulated more dogma. It has had a much longer time in which to dogmatize, and, its interests being wider than those of specialized systems, it has found much more about which to be dogmatic. It differs, again, in and through the fact that, having stronger corporate feeling and being concerned with a less specialized clientele, it is less mobile and more conservative than the narrower systems. They may voluntarily shed dogma without great difficulty in order to persist; Catholicism never abandons it without a struggle, and tends to accumulate more rather than be content with less.

It is here that we are brought to the heart of our problem. There is nothing alien to the spirit of Modernism in the idea or use of Tradition, or in the recognition of a distinct function of Authority within any system which claims to be more than a congeries of individuals; nor, as I hope to show subsequently, in any of the factors which constitute community values in which Catholicism finds what is most characteristic of its own system. Where difficulty arises is in the dogmatic glosses which have been put upon all these things, as also upon customary observances, and upon doctrinal speculations concerning themselves with God, human nature and the universe.

How does Dogma arise? Whether within or without Catholicism the process is always the same. First of all we have facts of experience—using experience in the widest sense —the vista of created things, the record of the Cross, the experience of reconciliation, the phenomenon of a ministerial function active in the Church. Upon such things with our never sleeping 'why' and 'how,' 'whence' and 'wherefore,' we theorise. Theory tends to settle into definition, and definition into dogma. This is the process we see come to completion in *Genesis* i in regard to the creation of the earth, its living forms, and the firmament above. It is a process which has never

changed, and it is not only useful but legitimate in its earlier stages. Before theory is hardened into definition it is free, and we are free in regard to it. Afterwards we are not so free: we must accept or reject it, and take the consequences to thought and action arising from our decision. Definition may be compared to a crystallizing process. A chemical solid in a state of solution or fusion is the same thing as the solid in crystalline form: but in crystalline form it has new properties, and however perfect geometrically it has generally lost in capacity for adjustment. Definition leaves us with the crystal solid, either to make the best of or to reduce to its former state. But when definition becomes dogma there is no loophole for freedom; the authoritative seal binds us to it permanently, with consequences that are inevitable.

The primary type of consequence is that which affects our system of thought and our mode of action, so far as the latter is determined by that system. For instance, take the dogma of a flat earth and a fixed firmament. This dogma becomes a fixed axiom of thought in regard to the universe and our action therein, with such practical consequences, to take only one example, as that the whole force of authority, ecclesiastical and lay, was set against Columbus' plan to discover an antipodes. More than three thousand years before his day, if the latest conclusions are true, this very thing had been done by men unaware of the dogma and unshackled by its consequences. In a more spiritual sphere, consider the situation of St. Paul. Just as the Spaniards saw the universe only in the light of the above-mentioned dogma, so St. Paul saw the Cross in the light of the Jewish dogma of Fallen Man. None can calculate how wide have been the ramifications of practical consequences in binding and loosing thought and conduct throughout Christian times through this preliminary limitation of St. Paul's freedom, and the further limitation of the Church's freedom by the acceptance of his view as dogmatic.

But there is also a secondary type of consequence, which re-duplicates the ultimate mass of consequences to thought and action. At a certain stage in mental development man becomes possessed by the force of logic. 'If so and so, therefore such and such.' Among theologians, and particularly Catholic theo-

logians, this mental process has been a positive affliction. From dogmatic premisses not free from the possibility of error logical sequels are discovered, which are in turn dogmatized and turned into new premisses. When the logic itself is faulty the consequential error is the more grotesque. As illustrative of this situation we may take the mass of deductions from the dogma of Transubstantiation and their effect upon life and thought; or those occurring upon the dogma of verbal Inspiration, which had reached such a pass by the day of Erasmus.

Modern science, as we know, appreciates the value of definition, but it is more fully aware than religious thought has ever yet shown itself of the dangers of inexact definition, of the difficulty of exact definition, and of the consequences of dogmatizing. The margin of possible error in the kind of definition that religion deals with is never small, and the wider the spheres of definition and of fixed dogma the wider the possible bulk of total error is likely to be in its system of thought and the practical issues thereupon.

Within Catholicism these processes have been at work in regard to every one of the features characteristic of the system Catholic thought and life, in so far as it is distinctive, whether as officially insisted upon in unreformed bodies or sub-officially taught in reformed bodies like the Anglican Communion, is the complex consequence of a rationalism, in no small part immature and faulty in itself, proceeding by unsound methods not infrequently to contradictory conclusions, *e.g.*, marriage, both a state of grace and of pollution! Definition began to develop in the credal forms: but continuity, apostolic succession, scripture and sacraments have all been 'theorized,' defined, and ultimately dogmatized and made to bear logical dogmatic offspring. And not only so; the personality of Jesus, the facts of Gospel history, of Church constitution and history, morals and the art of conduct, liturgy, ceremony, custom—all have come under the same thrall with the same fate. Take, for example, a fact of history—the development of the Papal power in the West. Based on pious custom, advanced by fraud and established by diplomacy, it gave rise concurrently to a doctrine which, in spite of protest, became dogma. From this dogma, despite successive protests, not a few deductions had been made

by the time of Luther; nor is it probable that that of Infallibility will be the last. This is only an outstanding instance of what is going on, and of what has gone on, in every part of the Catholic world, and while officially Anglican Catholicism is severely restrained in regard to most of these things, through the pruning effected by the Reformation, there is no lack of evidence of broken restraint among individuals and parties.

The resultant situation is justified by those who are satisfied with it either as the issue of legitimate development—an argument very much to the fore among certain Anglo-Catholics today, with whom it has a forward as well as a backward validity—or as the achievement of an infallible church. Both arguments beg the question; and the insecurity of the latter is not lessened in view of mistakes known to have been made in the past. Nor is it particularly fortunate for this argument that history has to substitute working majorities for an infallible church; and has curious records of how those majorities were built up. From that responsible for the Infallibility decree we may learn all. In point of fact, we are faced either with a disease—a process of degeneracy in which things of living value are seized upon and ossified—or with a development proceeding from a level of spiritual intelligence analogous to and as low in the scale of life as coral, which lives to petrify and which grows by petrification. It is a development not peculiar to Christianity; its emergence is equally clear within Platonism. The magnificence and majesty of the structure need not blind us to its worth.

Whatever be the explanation—and the truth may not be confined to either—we have to recognize that what we find is not and has never been the deliberate fabrication of the whole body. While Catholicism, as identified with the type of life and belief that we are discussing, does in truth offer a home to the kind of spiritual intelligence which rejoices in all the things that can be found there, it has never been without those who take the furniture for granted (who form a majority), or those who think the furniture, in part at least, incongruous, or even those who definitely dislike it. Responsibility for the present situation lies with leaders aided in their endeavour by the first class, and not impeded by the second, and only at times held in check by the third. The fourth class they have generally had

sufficient strength to over-ride. Catholic systems are handicapped *vis à vis* determined leaders by their very bulk. The larger the body, the greater the proportion of those willing to be led, and the more easy is it to secure wide approval for matters which few understand. This fact emerges as clearly in politics as it does within the ecclesiastical sphere. It does not follow that, if some living principle which can be understood is brought to light, revolution among the masses of adherents cannot be expected. To realise this we have only to notice what happened in the Lowlands of Scotland and in the North of England, among backward and hitherto bigoted folk, after the appeal of the Reformation came to be understood. The chief difficulty of the Modern Movement lies in the power and the bias of the general body of *leaders* within Catholicism; and one of the chief reasons for this bias—even though we admit that not a few, particularly among Romanists, tend to measure Truth by the standard and the supposed interests of the system—is found simply in past methods of training. Universities, ancient, mediaeval and modern, have much to answer for. monastic schools and theological colleges have even more. I make this slight excursion partly to clear Catholicism from universal reproach, partly to show that there is no reason to despair of a modernized Catholicism by reason of any intrinsic disability within the system.

The Modern Movement is more than alive to the essential instability of the unweildy and unsound structure which Catholic dogmatism has set up. It sees that the very rationale of a true Catholicism is in process of destruction, since power and purpose to embrace the whole are limited by every new official dogma. It sees by the same process the establishment of an ever wider mortmain upon Truth. Some at least here will be familiar with the name of Bernard Gilpin, one of the first tutors chosen for Wolsey's famous Renaissance college at Oxford. His career is not without inspiration for modernist Catholics of to-day. In an apologia for his acceptance of the English reformed position rather than that of the separatist Papists, he pointed out that the new Romanism set up by the decrees of the Council of Trent had narrowed the earlier condition of Catholicism by setting new limits upon freedom of thought.

He instanced in particular the dogma of Transubstantiation of 1551, and showed that previously a much less rigid view of Real Presence could be and was held. The charge which he then levelled is essentially the same charge which we prefer to-day.

Modernism would not suggest that the processes which we have been examining have not had as their general end the very task which it is setting itself—the discovery and expression of Truth; nor would it willingly fail in recognizing the immense intellectual activity which has been expended to that end. But Modernism does hold that the processes have such serious defects that there is little security in the conclusions. Further, the static system which has resulted offers no openings for the intellectual faculty save those of elaborating logical pedants upon matters already settled, of coming to grips in each generation with the precise significance of extinct terms of definition, or of creating apologetic by which such terms may be explained or explained away. In other words, intellect is concerned with the necrology, not with the biology, of religion. Modernism insists, and the Modern Movement is securing, that intellectual processes must be applied to truer ends, both in their own interest and in that of religion.

With the endeavour to frame concepts to make experience intelligible Modernism naturally has every sympathy: nor is it blind to the fact that dogma is as necessary to any religion which does not refuse intellectual sanctions as bone is to the tissue of the higher organic forms of life. So Christianity must be dogmatic. But in a religion claiming universal scope and an unequivocal devotion to Truth the sphere of dogmatic declaration must be confined within the narrowest limits consistent with its central message. Only so can it have the power of universal appeal, and at the same time be unimpeded in continuous capacity to exhibit Truth in living form. Modernism therefore would go back to the originating dogma, and dissolve all other bonds holding liberty in check. It finds the originating dogma wide enough in its appeal to include humanity, sufficiently restricted in limitation to cause no division between man and man. Plato saw, with reason, that philosophical truth could not be fully communicated in writing. Contact of soul was needed to kindle and carry on the flame. This is even more necessarily true in

regard to religious truth. Embodiment in writing cannot take the place of living tradition, and is always the first step towards misunderstanding.

When all this has been said, we do not urge that there is no value in definitions, which Modernism would have free from the tutelage of Authority. Modernism would make full use of all that Tradition has to offer; but by way of warning as well as of guidance, as any wise man will use past experience. It would hold itself compelled, however, to be explicit as to what it found, and as to the moral and spiritual danger of maintaining as valuable things which had lost their value. For the rest, since there must be doctrine in a teaching system, it would insist that for the future all doctrine should be kept sufficiently fluid to be capable of being moulded to the needs and outlook of each age. It would say in effect—as Catholicism has not hitherto said—'schism is the intolerable thing, not heresy.' There must needs be heresies, in the original sense, not only as necessarily concomitant with freedom, but also as adventures in the realization of Truth. They remain but heresies in the original sense until they are proscribed; and heresies within the Church will right themselves if they be not driven into dogma by too stiff an attitude of condemnation. It is schism, not heresy, that drains the Church of life.

And this freedom must include within its sphere theory of conduct. This does not imply licence, since it is only freedom within the word of Jesus that is claimed. But apart from that limitation, Goodness must not be held in bondage any more than Truth. Ethics dogmatized can be, and have been, carried wide of the purport of original principle; not a little that is held now to be axiomatic in regard to conduct owes little or nothing to the teaching of Jesus. The system of casuistry only follows the same perverse way as other types of theological dialectic, and, supported by the practice of direction, destroys that spontaneity of goodness which can only flow from deepening spiritual experience within. 'The reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things. You will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue if you are a really good and true man.' So Plato urged—and is not that the very same thing that our Lord himself taught? How far is this from the early Jesuit

practice of securing the interests of their patients by weakening the moral character and reducing it to alien domination! And, in fact, how far from the general attitude of all Christian systems.

We are now in a position to return to the point at which we left the characteristic features of historical Catholicism, and to consider them in the light of that freedom from dogmatic restraint with which Modernism re-endows them. And, first of all, there is that practical side of Tradition which we may call Catholic custom. In regard to the general characteristic of baptizing Art into the service of religion—whether in plastic or literary forms, in music or painting or vesture—Modernism is perfectly happy with it so long as it is true art, and welcomes it as normally a natural and true method of expressing and suggesting spiritual values. Modernism does not, like Puritanism, divorce Beauty from Goodness and Truth. That this method can be degraded it will readily admit; that it can suggest and express what is incompatible with Christian truth it does not deny. But a bad use should not exclude a good use, and only through good use will Truth prevail. It is, of course, one of the dangers of this method that old forms may be taken too literally: they cannot be 'fluid' expressions, for we cannot be perpetually renewing them — except possibly in the case of liturgies. And it is liturgies which matter most, since whereas the other forms of art are mainly suggestive and tend to lose the original force of their appeal with time, the liturgy is expressive, and what it says must live.

But beyond this we have ritual customs, and customs of piety. The former probably should rank under Art, as dramatic and as suggestive, in part at least, of an attitude towards spiritual truth. Catholic Modernism would not abandon ritual; it would rather cling to it as of real community value, so long as it was undogmatized. If 'heresy' can be suffered to right itself, ritual coloured by 'heresy' will follow the same course. Some of us know that from our own personal experience. Customs of piety come and go; if they be undesirable they become more difficult to change, and more dogmatic in assertion, if proscribed, than if left to themselves. We may regret, with St. Augustine, their tendency to multiply; but if we can sufficiently

supply Truth, error will not prevail. 'Overcome evil with good' is a sound practical and psychological principle—more favoured in the breach than the observance. Catholic Modernism keeps itself aware of the extent of the flock, of the wide differences of need, and of mental and spiritual outlook. It takes seriously the Parable of the Tares. Naturally it would not encourage such customs as tend to accumulate about doctrine which, in its considered opinion, is indefensible. But it does not follow that by the forbidding of custom men are delivered from the thrall of false views.

And now, lastly, in regard to the features which we hold to characterize Catholicism proper. Let us take them in historical order of emergence. We have, first of all, Sacraments, marks of the Church's life from the outset, coeval with the germ of the primitive ministry, long anterior to Christian canonical Scripture and to formal Christian Creed. Sacraments supply that mystical element which, as von Hügel has insisted, necessarily companies with the intellectual and the institutional in religion. Modernism naturally has regard for that element. It would see in the sacraments 'warrants and witnesses of eternal realities.' 'They teach the mind by other senses that which the Word doth teach by hearing.' But Modernism would urge that they have suffered dogmatic abuse. That dogmatic abuse arises from the introduction of the term 'validity' to the doctrine of the sacraments. 'Validity' means primarily 'capacity to do for you the thing which you expect of them.' The point would not arise apart from a discriminating attitude of party against party, which it is thought proper to maintain by creating an importance for the human action of ministering which is in derogation of the sufficiency of the Divine operation. When Peter Damiani was sent from Rome to force celibacy upon the clergy of Lombardy and to break the independence of the archbishops of Milan, he used the argument that sacraments received at the hands of the married clergy had not this validity; and he so impressed the ignorant that the married clergy were rabbled from their cures. As a notion, this idea of validity as dependent upon persons, rather than as issuing from God Himself, is at least as early as Ignatius. But that does not justify the notion itself, or the uses to which it has since been put. As Baptism is

not even yet confined to ministerial action, and as the Eucharist was not so confined entirely till after the time of Tertullian, any argument implying that sacramental values depend upon ministerial action must fall to the ground. The idea and dogma of a 'valid' ministry stands or falls with this perverted idea of validity of sacraments, to which alone it has reference; as also does the notion of validity of orders maintained through continuous succession, or through such succession only in obedience to Rome.

An 'ordered ministry,' apart from dogmatic assertions, Catholic Modernism would still urge to constitute the only possible means by which unity of development can be achieved. An ordered ministry, with an equal right to act in any congregation, is necessary to any church life which would consider all congregations as but parts of the whole. Such a ministry the Apostles themselves constituted at the outset, and it is quite clear that they did not neglect to provide authorized leaders to guide and teach the expanding Church. This authorization would imply ordination, an official setting apart for a specific purpose, but when that is said, all is said.

Coming to Continuity, this as we know and value it becomes a more impressive feature with the passage of time. Continuity of authorization or commission we embrace as a fact, though again without allowing it the dogmatic significance usually alleged. The value of continuity lies in what it was meant to perpetuate—not 'valid' sacraments, but personal witness going back to the first days through the ordered ministry, or, more particularly, through its bishops. This is the force of continuity as it is recognized in Eusebius. The value does not lie in security of any mysterious power communicated through the Apostles. All of real significance that those bodies have lost who have broken away from Catholicism to start a new witness of their own is the confidence which is to be found in a more extended continuity of witness and a more dignified ancestry. The chief factor in creating and maintaining institutional schism disappears once we are free of the dogmatic accretions upon fact.

Of Scripture and Creed it is hardly necessary now to speak. Scripture is part of Tradition—the earliest and most valuable

part. Creed has been dealt with already, either directly or by implication, in dealing with Tradition and Dogma. We might perhaps find place to urge in regard to Creed that as Catholicism had power to state, and to amplify from original simplicity, Modernism holds that there is no greater impropriety in simplifying and stating again to-day in creeds for common use. Statements of fact now only understood in a symbolic sense, and demanding apologetic as they now stand, while interesting historically, rob the credal forms of the practical value which they exist to maintain as normal standards of Christian profession.

I have attempted to show how the Modern Movement within Catholicism can approach and value the great distinctive features of its ancient system; what it must necessarily discard, what it finds in accord and what it can bring into accord with its spirit. I have felt compelled to spend no small proportion of my time upon the dogmatic issue, since once that is grasped the way to re-statement and re-habilitation of values is comparatively easy. It will be held, I hope, after the complement to this paper has been read, that we who accept the modern outlook from a Catholic standpoint, despite past defeats, have no justification for despair. The future, do we all but grasp our opportunities, is quick with hope of such a Catholicism as the world has never yet seen. Lausanne is showing us the opening of the gates: let us press forward without delay into our heritage.

AFFINITIES OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT WITH EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTISM

By the Rev. J. P. Hodges, M.A.

WHEN a name becomes the distinctive mark of a party, it invariably acquires a wider meaning, since it requires to be interpreted according to its topical implications rather than its strictly etymological significance. This is true of the terms Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical, when used of parties within the Church, since none of them can be understood without reference to its acquired meaning. The Evangelical would drop much of his teaching if he preached nothing but the Gospel, and most of us 'believe in the Holy Catholic Church'—but regret to say that it does not exist. Like the golden guinea which all through its history struggled hard to be a pound sterling and failed, these terms remind us not only of an ideal but also of the stern reality of circumstances. 'Evangelical' refers strictly to that group within the Church of England, which, while owing its origin largely to the work of Wesley and Whitefield, refused to separate from the mother Church and become a sect like the Methodists. But the principles which this revival of the eighteenth century raised once more into prominence were, in the main, those for which the Protestant reformers of an earlier century had struggled. The frequent scorn of the word Protestant as being a merely negative term is based on unsound criticism, since it overlooks the fact that, used as it is antithetically to Catholicism, it denotes one of two entirely different religious approaches. Hence, by the term Evangelical-Protestantism, with which this paper is concerned, we refer primarily to the Evangelical group within the Church of England, but with the wider reference to that earlier Protestantism which it resuscitated and to the way of life which was its characteristic.

What then was specially distinctive in Protestantism? In the religion of both Catholic and Protestant the *goal* was the same, since each sought equally the assurance of salvation. But

the means of reaching that goal varies, the method of approach is different in both cases. Catholicism interprets religion in terms of a system, and is marked by its emphasis on the need and value of that system. None need blind himself to the fact that it is and has been a magnificent system, and that for many centuries of its history it was peculiarly suited to the stage of civilization with which it dealt. But the inevitable tendency of every highly organized system is to lose the freshness of its life in the complexity of its organization : and all the circumstances under which Catholicism developed aided such mortification. It had extended its influence over wide areas and large communities, but in dealing with mass conversion it diluted its spirituality with a large measure of formalism in order to make it cover the ground. The result was a highly-polished surface; but it showed ominous cracks when subjected to strain. Certainly, Catholicism had attempted to include the whole of life under its aegis, and its system seemed to offer the requisite means for dealing with all of life's problems; but on meeting these, it either forced them to conform to its rules or dismissed them under the category of the mysterious. In this way Catholicism had grown so largely mechanical that the relation of the individual to his Maker seemed a matter of formulae.

As a consequence, the Reformation was, as Harnack insists, 'first and foremost a critical reduction to principles' which involved not merely discarding this or that piece of machinery as inefficient, but abandoning the conception of religion in terms of a system. Not that no Protestant organization arose : it did, with creeds and practices as fanatic and incongruous as those to which Catholicism had lent itself. But in so far as a systematized religion means that ends can only—or chiefly—be achieved through the performance of fixed ceremonies and rites, this is characteristic of Catholicism, but was practically, if not wholly, abandoned by Protestantism. The latter rests at rock-bottom on the definition of religion as a bond between persons, and as such essentially a personal affair. It maintained in the first place that to look for salvation by means of the perfunctory fulfilment of the demands of a system, however admirable in many of its parts, was mechanical and Pharisaical : it involved placing confidence in 'works' (by which term, of course, Luther as also St.

Paul meant not moral actions so much as ceremonial demands; his is as often overlooked now as it was misunderstood then). But more than this, such a systematized religion detracted from the original simplicity of the Gospel. Jesus had called men to confidence in God and to an adventure for His sake. He had given a personal call to His disciples and had demanded of them such a living, active faith as would bring them into immediate contact with the Source of power and ensure for them that convicting experience of the presence of the Spirit which would sustain them in all their struggles. In like manner God speaks to every man and He looks for the same immediate response of faith. Sin, whether it arises from the defiance of His voice or the refusal to listen to it, separates man from his Maker; but when man turns back from his wandering path and submits to the venture of faith, even though he is conscious of being 'yet afar off' he is welcomed with the personal embrace of a loving Father who bestows on him, unmediated and unmerited, free and full forgiveness.

Protestantism, then, asserted that whatever else may rightly be included in the domain of religion—and of necessity there are many things—nothing can be acceptable which weakens this foundation-stone of religion, the free untrammelled access of the soul to Him who is closer than a brother. Man ever seeks to achieve self-realization, and Protestantism encourages him to attain that end by placing himself unreservedly in God's hands. There can, of course, be no such self-attainment apart from the realization and fulfilment of corporate responsibilities; Protestants have often forgotten this, not so much because of wrong principles as through faulty appreciation of those principles. But its emphasis was rightly thrown on the fact that true religion must begin in and be sustained by the intimate communion of the soul with God.

This is the specifically Protestant conception of the religious approach to God, and it is fundamentally opposed to what Catholicism has shown itself to be. But to reach this conception we have X-rayed the body in order to watch the beating of the heart; we have still to say a word about the cumbersome body. For if Protestantism refused to regard religion as a system, it by no means abandoned a scheme of salvation; on the contrary

it elaborated that scheme to such an extent that Protestantism became almost synonymous with Calvinistic doctrine, and in the mind of such an acute thinker even as Matthew Arnold its adherents seemed little more than pagans 'suckled in a creed outworn.' However, it was no new doctrines which the reformers enunciated; they accepted and elaborated doctrines which had already found a sanction under the older religion. Not that we can thus free Protestantism from an odious responsibility or saddle Catholicism with all the implications, good and bad, of these doctrines. In such a matter it is proportion which counts, and in dragging doctrines—somewhat inconspicuous in mediaeval Catholicism—into the foreground of the Protestant picture the reformers obtained a perspective much like that which one gets in viewing a house from a position contiguous with the drain-pipe. Their chief defence is that each of their theories—concerning Predestination, the Fall, Atonement and Conversion—was elaborated with a view to emphasizing the direct relationship in which the soul stood to its Maker.

A very brief glance at this doctrinal position is all that we need give here. Man, sharing with Adam the consequences of his fall, was born under the curse of original sin, and was by the justice of God condemned to hell. God had intended man for companionship with Himself; but He had foreseen the Fall, and by an inscrutable decree He had made an arbitrary selection of men and angels on whom He proposed to confer an entirely gratuitous and unmerited salvation. These were the elect who were thus predestined to salvation; the rest were condemned to hell to suffer the penalty of their sin. But all alike through Adam had sinned. There was thus a problem—how could God's justice be fully met and His just wrath placated on behalf of the elect? Man had lost all through his folly, and

> 'Die he or justice must; unless for him
> Some other able, and as willing, pay
> The rigid satisfaction; death for death.' (*Milton.*)

Thus Protestants, following Anselm, saw the problem in terms of a conflict between the justice and the mercy of God, and their theory of the Atonement had to take account of this. Nearly all theories of the Atonement so far have proved to be like 'the remembrance of a guest that tarrieth but a night'; but, consider-

ng its premisses, the Protestant theory is at least a consistent one. An offended God must be propitiated, and who else but His Son could undertake the work which this meant? In fact, as Luther said, 'by none other sacrifice or offering could God's fierce anger be appeased but by the precious blood of the Son of God.' Hence Christ was slain and His sacrifice was accepted by God as the satisfaction for our trespasses; He was substituted in man's stead as the victim on the Cross, and so God's justice was met, His mercy was released and free salvation was offered to the elect through the Blood of the Lamb. But how were the elect made aware of their salvation? First by God's prompting them through the voice of conscience and so arousing a 'sense of sin'; the necessary part which man must then play was to cast himself in entire submission upon God, for such faith alone led to justification. To man in his helpless position was imputed the merits of Christ so that he was accounted righteous in God's sight; this changed state became known to him in the experience of Conversion and the peace which followed in the assurance of salvation.

Such was in brief outline the Protestant scheme of salvation. There were various modifications of it, Lutheran, Arminian, etc., but the differences were less imposing than the agreement, and the scheme did undoubtedly bring into prominence the value of the individual soul for which Christ had died. Stress was laid upon the theories of Justification, Sanctification, etc., in order to emphasize all the more the need for man to recognize his utter helplessness and so, through faith, achieve conversion. Usually what was looked for was an emotional experience. Those acquainted with the life of Bunyan will remember what an agony that could mean; for years he was tossed about on a sea of doubt and despair, until finally it was sheer exhaustion rather than any moral change which brought him in submission to peace.

This doctrinal position has until recently been fully conserved by Evangelical Protestantism. Many of the Evangelicals, in fact, who remained within the Church accepted it more thoroughly than did Wesley and those Methodists who leaned to the more moderate Arminian views, though the former showed themselves the more alert in gradually modifying and eventually discarding many of their beliefs. Whitefield gripped

his hearers by teaching them that 'a certain number are elected from eternity and these must and shall be saved and the rest damned'; Wesley spoke of the problem of how to be reconciled to an offended God and urged his followers to 'plead solely the blood of the Covenant, the ransom paid by thy stubborn soul.' And many of our hymns, whose popularity pays a tribute to the Evangelical fervour of a century ago when enthusiasm was almost synonymous with Evangelicalism, repeat sentiments about the Blood of Jesus, the efficacy of the Cross or the utter helplessness of man which now require so much interpretation as to make them well-nigh valueless for modern devotion.

Does this necessarily mean, then, that Evangelical Protestantism maintains a position which is remote from modern thought? On the surface, this is undoubtedly true. No serious student to-day believes in an inscrutable decree electing some to heaven and condemning the rest to hell: all that is worth preserving in the theory of the Fall gains in clearness by discarding the older language: substitution and satisfaction have little place in any modern interpretation of the Atonement, for the only substitution which the Christian need believe in is that by which he repeats for himself Christ's death unto sin; while, although the Cross is still central in Christianity, it is so not as an isolated point in time, but as the culmination and epitomization of a *life* of sacrifice and perfect obedience: and lastly, while conversion is as necessary to-day as ever, the modern Christian believes with Matthew Arnold that

> 'Sin is not a monster to be mused on but an impotence to be got rid of; (and that) all thinking about it beyond what is indispensable for the firm effort to get rid of it is waste of energy and waste of time.'[1]

To seek for affinities, therefore, in doctrine seems, to use Disraeli's criticism of those who marry not for money but where the heart lies, 'a sure sign of insanity in the stock!'

Others again may rightly ask if Protestantism has ever been noted for the welcome it has offered to new truth; and the answer must be that certainly the appearances are against it. It was not foremost in greeting the new heaven of the astronomers nor in converting the new earth of the explorers; it was indifferent to the literary and historical enquiry of the early nineteenth

[1] *St. Paul and Protestantism*, p. 37.

century as it was hostile to the later evolutionary theories of Darwin. Its characteristic attitude may seem not unfairly represented by the man who, on hearing that a bookshop was soon to be opened in his town especially for theological works, exclaimed, 'The worse for the parsons, the Bible is sufficient for them'; or by the evangelist who in an excess of zeal prayed, 'Lord deliver us from the perils of modern thought; yea, Lord, deliver us from all thought whatsoever.'[2]

But we have mentioned all this on the one hand to acknowledge that it has been an important part of Protestantism, and on the other to lead up to the conclusion that it is a superficial view which would confine Evangelicalism within these terms. To do so is like estimating the value of the tree from the leaves which it is continually shedding, rather than from the life-force which is ever actively supplying a new grandeur. Three things should be borne in mind in this connection. In the first place, in considering the history of Protestantism some allowance must be made for the fact that in so far as it originated as a protest—in the affirmative sense of making a stand for a truth as well as in the negative sense of denying an opposing theory—its development was peculiarly liable to the tendency to exaggerate the sense of contrast. The critical antithesis of 'either—or' originated not with the Tübingen school but in the distant past when Abel criticized the offering of Cain; and its history subsequent to that has not advanced its success. Thus the reformers encouraged the individualism of the age chiefly because Catholicism had thrown its emphasis on the corporate character of the Church. Again, the Catholic sought remission of sins at the hands of the Church's officer; the Protestant was taught that such forgiveness came only when, confessing that 'no man may deliver his brother nor make agreement unto God for him,' a man stripped his soul bare in the presence of his Maker. Or again, the Catholic was taught that a moral transformation can be achieved through patiently following the round of a dreary discipline; the Protestant asserted that we are justified by faith and not by works. We criticize these contrasts because of the implication that they are mutually exclusive; but we are able to do so because, mainly by their aid, we have gained a vantage-

[2] Quoted in Dr. Major's *Gospel of Freedom*, p. 40.

ground whence we see what was fundamental in each. Protestantism, for example, has undoubtedly encouraged a dangerous individualism, though the recent history of the Church shows that this kind of selfish outlook does not belong exclusively to any one party, Catholic or Evangelical. But we have now gained a much clearer conception of the fundamental importance of both the individual and the corporate elements in religion, and we have to search for such a synthesis as will secure the real development of personality through the experiences and responsibilities of corporate effort.

> *' L'individualisme chrétien trouve sa limite dans la communauté, qui n'est pas le simple produit des voluntés individuelles. Il en est de même du rapport entre les Eglises particulières et l'Eglise en général, ou communion des saints. Il faut canaliser la piété individuelle au profit de l'Eglise en lui donnant le moyen de se satisfaire dans le cadre ecclesiastique . . . . Unissons le Corps mystique de Christ et le personalisme religieux.'*[3]

This suggests a second point. In economics one learns to appreciate the value of the distinction between a ' long ' and a ' short '-period view; such a distinction is also of the greatest importance here, for in dealing with the history of Protestantism one needs to take a ' long-period ' view. That is only a concise way of stating the oft-quoted maxim of Aristotle that ' the nature of a thing is that which it is when its becoming is completed.' To contemplate the ruins of past beliefs always tends to induce the feeling that one is gazing over long generations of the dead sneering in their impotence. But a truer and more inspiring conception arises from the conviction that progress has been made. One considers the underlying spirit or conviction which prompted those beliefs, which held them as a stage in the revelation of truth and discarded them only when they could be replaced by something truer and more fitly representative. And so, if we may quote words of Cardinal Newman in a sense a little different from what he intended, ' the Reformation set in motion that process of which the issue is still in the future.' Consider, for example, the outlook of Protestantism upon the world. By refusing to accept the theory of ' counsels of perfection,' by rejecting the idea that the celibate life was a state

[3] Ed. Vermail in *' Le Philosophie religieuse d'Ernest Troeltsch '* in *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses*, 1921.

more holy than the married life, the reformers broke the back of that false asceticism which in the Middle Ages had been closely akin to Manicheeism. But despite this, early Protestants accepted a semi-asceticism which more nearly achieved the spirit of Catholicism than the Middle Ages had ever done! But that has now been discarded and, still adhering to the *principle* which was behind the reformers' work, modern Protestants have adopted a different outlook on the world and its wonders which has allowed them—to give one illustration—to value art for art's sake. Thus, given a long-period view, Protestantism is achieving something which at least its early history could never have suggested. Or again, consider the attitude of Protestantism towards learning. There can be little doubt that the Reformation was essentially an appeal to sound scholarship; it is unnecessary to elaborate this beyond pointing to the exact criticisms of those who attacked the Papal scaffolding or the careful labours of Cranmer, who is as rarely denied the pension of the scholar as he is accorded the palm of the saint. But yet a short-period view of history might reveal Protestants as indifferent to education and hostile to research. Not so a wider view, however. Only by temporarily repudiating its principles could Protestantism become indifferent to scholarship, and now it is continually unfurling new banners with its early motto of criticism and scholarship marked in no uncertain letters.

This brings into prominence the third point which concerns the necessity of a true perspective. A distinction, that is, must be drawn between what is fundamental in Evangelical Protestantism and all else—be it theory or attitude—which, however useful in the past as a means of giving expression to principles, was yet not essential to its existence. If this distinction is observed, then it will be found that the fundamental principles which Evangelical Protestantism has conserved must form also the heart of the Modern Movement; the rest can be discarded.

One thing of great importance which lies at the heart of Protestantism is the principle of adaptation. The reformers began by the assertion of their right to change customs and theories which had the sanction of long usage and to adapt them to newer and proved needs. The Catholicism of the Middle Ages

by its very appeal to a divinely revealed infallible body of truth was under a bondage which stultified progress. Obviously the 'eye to the past' need not necessarily preclude development, but it is noteworthy that when such a principle of development was made by Newman into a science, it was repudiated by the Pope: but he who is always consistent is usually consistently wrong, and those who accept the Papal view have still to learn that 'he who never changed any of his opinions never corrected any of his mistakes.' Newman's essay, therefore, although we do not admit much of the reasoning which he maintains in it, advances a principle which has been more true of Protestantism than of Catholicism. 'To live,' as Newman said in a delightful phrase, 'is to change, and to be perfect is to have changed often.' Protestantism began by questioning the validity of an 'infallible' body of doctrine, and by so doing it repudiated infallibility for itself; it proceeded by adapting doctrine and organization, and through the long turmoil alike of success and repression it has preserved the right to change much better than it has preserved any particular changes made. It met the growing individualism of the sixteenth century by proclaiming that religion itself was essentially a gospel for the individual. It incorporated within its folds the ideals of democracy and aristocracy and, as in the political world, the struggle—at least in England—led to a compromise which included much that was good from both sides, so Protestantism similarly achieved the principle of toleration; and in spite of its very intolerant beginnings it was not only the first to maintain this, but probably it is the only type of religion which can maintain it and remain consistent to its principles. Not that this process of adaptation has been easy, or that it has been widely welcomed; the implications of the term 'Protestant bias' refute this. But the astonishing progress made by the Liberal movement among Evangelicals in recent years, together with the undoubted fact that among the wider circle of Protestant sects most of the old distinctions and many outworn theories have practically vanished, all point to the vitality of Protestantism and show that its adherents recognize that

> 'New occasions teach new duties,
> Time makes ancient good uncouth,
> They must onward still and upward
> Who would keep abreast of truth.'

Thus Protestantism has shown 'a capacity for constant rejuvenation.'[4] And surely the best way of facing modern problems is to harness the experience of the ages to the adventurousness of youth. One of the most pathetic sayings which Newman ever uttered told why he abandoned adventure; 'When I was young,' he said, 'I was bold because I was ignorant; now, I have lost my boldness because I have advanced in experience.' Such a confession only registers a futile regret that we were born with the everlasting question-mark stamped in our minds. But while the call to adventure must always involve dangers—and Protestantism offers a wide example of these—it must ever remain an essential part of Christianity, for, without it, religion sinks into convention. It was the driving force alike behind the virile faith of Bunyan and the missionary work of Wesley; it is one of the strongest elements in the life of the Evangelical party of to-day, and by its nature it remains modern in every age—'as old and new at once as nature's self.'

We turn to another great principle which Protestantism has preserved. It has always involved *ultimately* an appeal to freedom—not license, though undoubtedly it has erred at times on that side, but an ordered liberty. The reformers began their work by incorporating the critical spirit of the Renaissance. The latter had harnessed criticism to scepticism and, had it been allowed to take its course outside of the Church, or with no other connection than the indulgent similes of a Pope or the safety-valve of the satire of an Erasmus, there must soon have been such a combination of critical indifference[5] and hostility as either to destroy the Church or to abandon it to the superstition of the populace. But Protestantism afforded a means of guiding and controlling such criticism and by encouraging it as a spirit of enquiry within the Church it made of it a constructive rather than a destructive power. The working out of this critical spirit affords an excellent example of the need for a 'long-period' view and of the importance of looking to the principles to explain the significance of Protestantism. For nothing seems surer at first than that Protestantism was in its early development not

[4] The phrase was Troeltsch's estimate of the significance of the modern world—'*eine Fähigkeit beständiger Verjüngung.*'

[5] Cf. the attitude of Rabelais.

an intellectual but an emotional affair. However, let us start from an unquestionable fact. The reformers were among the first scholars of their time, and it was by means of a critical scholarship that they successfully attacked the abuses of a system and the thraldom of tradition. But their work carried them further than they realized or were willing to grant at the time, for by demonstrating the importance of judging a thing in the light of its historical development, they established historical science as an essential part of the equipment necessary for dealing with modern problems. And this has destroyed for Catholic and Protestant alike the possibility of any external authority to which a final appeal can be made.

For example, of the three authorities which the mediaeval Church recognized, the reformers modified that of the Church, subordinated that of tradition and retained the authority of Scripture. And by thus singling out the Bible, they gave its authority an altered importance which not unnaturally brought into a greater prominence the theory of literal inspiration. Thus leaders who acknowledged that they had spent half their lives in error avoided claiming an infallible authority for themselves by finding its source in the written word of God. But this really did violence to their principles. In the first place, a little reflection showed that the New Testament itself was an early collection of traditions which must be subject to the same process of historical criticism as that which had been successfully used in another field. But secondly, this destroyed the absolute value of the Bible, since to criticize its text or its doctrine was to make the *ultimate* appeal to the individual judgment. And however much the rigidity of Protestant doctrine may seem to deny this, the Protestant principle has involved the ultimate appeal to the individual judgment. This may seem dangerously open to errors, though these have been checked by referring individual caprice to scientific conclusions based on a comparative treatment of individual judgments. But there is no escape from it. The conception of the Church as an external authority still, of course, exists, but as wielding a disciplinary power rather than offering an objective criterion of truth and doctrine. With Tyrrell we can esteem the authority of the Church arising from its ' formulation of the collective experience of the saints . . .

gathered round and organized into one Society under Christ, the Incarnation of Conscience'—a definition which was commended by Dr. Rashdall as expressing the right relation between the three great authorities, Conscience, Christ, and the Church.[6] But as Prof. Troeltsch observes, 'Even where the older religious convictions hold their ground their truth and binding force are, at least among Protestants, primarily based on inner personal conviction, not on submission to authority as such.'[7] And if we interpret the signs of our age aright, he might have omitted the limitation to Protestants: for the writers, for example, of *Essays Catholic and Critical* appeal to no ultimate authority other than their own private judgment, and a Catholic Church which finds room for the views so ably expounded in that volume is itself characterised by that freedom for which Evangelicals have fought.

The attitude of the Modernist, therefore, to authority is one which Evangelical Protestantism has made possible for him. True to the principles—as distinct from the practice—of the latter, he recognizes no finality in Creeds, Confessions, Councils or Articles. Christ—not as the dead hero of a narrative, but as a living Person disclosed in experience—forms the only ultimate moral appeal; and when the guidance thus afforded plainly conflicts with that of the written word, the former must be obeyed. The Gospel record is an invaluable source of inspiration and guidance, but it must be interpreted in the light of historical research; and given this light the Modernist agrees with the Evangelical in believing that the fundamental Christian message is so simple that the individual is capable of understanding it for himself. The Church with all its wealth of experience, and Tradition with its accumulated evidence, offer unparalleled means of witness to guide men and to check their caprice. But religion must freely fill an organization, not be fettered by it.

Finally, we would note the emphasis which Evangelical Protestantism has laid upon the importance for real religion of individual experience. The objection has sometimes been raised that the aspect of Protestantism has lost much of its value owing to the fact that with our new knowledge of psychology we are

[6] *Conscience and Christ*, p. 167 n. [1].
[7] *Protestantism and Progress*, p. 18.

forced to admit that a religious experience proves nothing. But if psychology has helped to explain why and how a religious experience may occur, it has not thereby explained it away; and the answer to the question whether or not a religious experience has *proved* anything depends largely on what it is that one desires to be proved. Certainly the early Protestants did not argue that a religious experience offered proof of the existence of God, for the certainty of that existence was not called in question by any. What they did see in it was proof-evidence of the sincerity of a personal effort in religion. It was independent of the testimony of others—except for the presuppositions through which the experience came—and the glimpse into reality which it afforded carried its own powers of conviction. For that reason alone it occupies an important place in a religion which repudiated the idea that religions could be practised or salvation procured at second-hand. Like Baxter we may discard the necessity of an *emotional* experience as basing religion too much 'in fears and tears and scruples,' but we cannot overlook the importance of that experience of the abiding presence of the Spirit which comes from the response of the whole personality to the call of God. 'Whoever,' says Bousset,[8] 'has found God after the manner of our faith has had an experience which lends eternal value and significance to our life here below.' That Evangelical appeal will never grow old which demands that each of us shall experience God's freely-offered forgiveness and the power of His love redeeming us from the petty world of desires and ambitions which the soul tends to live in. Such an experience retains all that spontaneity of faith which involves the joyful grasping here and now of Christ's power to make a man effective in well-doing. It emphasizes the fact that as man is made in God's image so the relation between him and his Maker must be essentially a confidence between persons.

It may be that the problem has swung round now and that men assume the possibility of religious experience in order by a comparative treatment of what is experienced to reach conclusions relative to the existence of God. But that refers rather to mystical experience than prophetic inspiration, and while the two are by no means mutually exclusive, it is the latter which has

[8] *Faith of a Modern Protestant*, p. 111.

been specially characteristic of Protestantism. For Protestantism has always favoured the prophetic element in religion, and consequently has ever encouraged men to be on the alert for a new vision of God. The marks of a true prophet are sincerity, simplicity and courage; the first of these involves sparing no effort mental and spiritual to achieve that conviction of the truth which alone can promote effective action; the second is attained by keeping a tight hold on what is essential and regarding with healthy suspicion all that tends to obscure it; the last may necessitate cutting clean across creed and convention and thus provoking the criticism of friends and the contempt of foes. But religion will always need its prophets, for without them spirituality tends to become merged in a cult; as Milton said, 'If her waters flow not in a perpetual progression they sick'n into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition' (Areopagitica).

If, then, we may conclude in a short summary, we would insist that while the principles which justified the existence of Protestantism have not always been adhered to in its history, they have yet cried for a recognition which is gradually being given to them; and it is in these principles that one must look for affinities with the Modern Movement. Thus, by asserting the right to adapt customs and beliefs to the new thought of a new age, the reformers have secured for Protestantism that 'capacity for constant rejuvenation' which is the backbone of the Modern Movement. Again, by appealing from the bondage of one supposed infallible authority to the invaluable rights of individual judgment, Protestantism encouraged that exact thought and critical scholarship which are the hall-marks of modern learning. Finally, Protestantism preserves real religion from evaporating in cult and custom by demanding that by sincerity of personal effort each shall experience the love of God and the redeeming power of a Saviour for himself. It thus encourages men to seek the prophet's vision of God by means of sincerity, simplicity and courage. And in so far as Modernism is giving expression to the prophetical inspiration of Protestantism, its voice may seem to cry in the wilderness, but its appeal will be heard.

MODERNISM AND AGNOSTICISM

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc., author of *Religion and Science from Galileo to Bergson.*

VICTORIAN Agnosticism, which divided reality into the knowable and the unknowable, had more than a little in common with mediaeval theology. It was a fundamental tenet of both systems that there are some truths which are, while there are some which are not, accessible to human reason. But at this point, unhappily, agreement between them terminates. Whereas the mediaeval view was that where reason ends revelation begins, the agnostic view was that where reason ends ignorance begins. Thus of the two the mediaeval view was the more optimistic.

St. Thomas Aquinas and Herbert Spencer, then, had this in common besides their omniscience, they both alike repudiated the superficial view which regards reality as completely fathomable by human faculties. But here their paths diverge. To the fundamental question as to the need for knowledge about the unknowable, they returned very different replies. The Victorian Agnostics taught that such knowledge was not only impossible but unnecessary. On the other hand, St. Thomas was of the opinion that knowledge about the unknowable, although unattainable, was absolutely essential; far more so than any knowledge which human reason could supply. One could get along without science or sanitation, but one could not get along without the truths of Revelation. Unless the individual and the society knew, believed and practised these truths, they could not be saved. Salvation for Herbert Spencer depended upon an enlightened exploitation of the truths of natural science. For St. Thomas it depended upon a sure faith in the truths of Revelation. For the nineteenth century the unknowable was the irrelevant; for the thirteenth it was the indispensable and vital.

The contrast and the resemblance between Victorian Agnosticism and mediaeval theology may be carried further. The mediaeval theory was that not only man's knowledge, but his will, was quite inadequate to meet the needs of human destiny. But the Victorians, with an inconsistency we cannot too warmly admire, although believing in the limitations of man's knowledge, could discern no limitations to his power of moral achievement. They did not suspect that the unknowable might have its complement in the unattainable; that mankind was subject not only to intellectual but, what was far more serious, to moral weakness and imbecility. The mediaevalists held strongly and clearly that both the complementary deficiencies existed, and indeed were so conspicuous that no one but a philosopher could overlook them. They held that just as man required Revelation to enlighten him, so he required Grace to moralize and empower him. The axiom was that neither knowledge nor virtue were possible to unassisted human nature. This was the fundamental principle of mediaeval theology, as it was the fundamental heresy for Victorian Agnosticism. The thirteenth century believed in God, the nineteenth in Man. What the twentieth believes in, it would be difficult to say.

As we are dealing with the twentieth century, it must first be pointed out that Agnosticism, as a system of thought, is practically extinct. Herbert Spencer's theory of the unknowable, adopted by T. H. Huxley and christened by him Agnosticism, seems to us to-day to have been an undue simplification of the problem of knowledge. It does not seem to us at all clear that there is one sphere of reality about which we can know everything, and another sphere about which we can know nothing. The Agnostic view, roughly stated, was that where you have natural science, there you have knowledge, but outside this sphere you have speculation. To-day this hard and fast line between the knowable and the unknowable cannot be drawn—all that could be urged is that different things are amenable in very different degrees to exact scientific treatment, or exact mathematical measurement (which is the same thing). Scientific knowledge, for example, of human nature can hardly, from the nature of the case, be so exact as our knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. Psychology is not, and can never

be, so exact a science as Astronomy. There are, in a word, degrees of exactness, and even of possible exactness, in scientific knowledge.

As for the Agnostic attitude towards religious truths, the Modernist, like his Broad Church predecessor, would be inclined to share the distrust of theological dogmatism displayed by the school of Huxley. But this distrust of theological dogmatism would not be carried by Modernists to the extreme of denying the possibility of all definite religious truth which was the logical corollary of the Agnostic attitude. This would appear to them to be a gospel of despair. Nor could they accept the Agnostic view as to the comparative unimportance of religious truth. The Modernist holds strongly that the importance of religion, and of religious truth, cannot be exaggerated. Here he holds with the mediaeval rather than with the Agnostic view.

As was hinted above, the real reason why the nineteenth century Agnostic felt able with equanimity to relegate religion to the limbo of the unknowable was because the new evolutionary outlook tended to make him unduly optimistic. There seemed to him to be a sort of inevitability about human progress, and he sometimes did not pause to consider where the motive power of the evolutionary process had lain, and where it still lay. His belief in human nature was such that anything resembling the traditional doctrine of Grace seemed to him an impertinence.

The Modernist to-day stands midway between the positions of the mediaeval dogmatist and the Victorian Agnostic. He cannot accept the Agnostic view that religion is at once unknowable and unnecessary; nor can he take the view that human nature, in itself and unassisted, can work out its own salvation. On the other hand, he finds it equally impossible to return to the mediaeval view of a Supernatural Revelation and of Supernatural Grace—at least in the forms in which these doctrines have been traditionally held.

It cannot be said that anyone has yet been able completely to work out along Modernist lines a satisfactory theory of Revelation and of Grace. Yet some such theory is needed if we are to avoid Agnosticism or scepticism on the one hand, and

the unscientific and unhistorical dogmas of Revelation and Grace which have been inherited from mediaeval theology. The Agnostics left behind them this problem as a legacy by shelving it themselves, or, rather, by denying its existence. They declared religious knowledge to be impossible and (because human progress was assured without it) unnecessary. We to-day, taught by the bitter experience of the war and post-war Naturalism, are much more inclined to believe in the necessity of religious knowledge, and also of its possibility, though we cannot conceive it to consist in a supernaturally revealed theology. Historical science, and no mere *a priori* prejudgment, forbids us to do so.

This is by no means the place in which to try to work out the lines along which the Modernist theory of knowledge and of redemption will proceed. So far as a theory of knowledge is concerned, Canon Streeter has in *Reality* indicated the lines upon which to construct such a theory. He approaches the problem of religious truth by way of the problems of aesthetic truth. This seems a hopeful avenue, because we realise that in matters of art or morals, truth, and its demonstration, is not a matter of mere logic, but rather of taste or perception. To those who do not possess the necessary degree of aesthetic or moral discernment, demonstration is impossible. Thus in these realms we may be dependent for our knowledge of truth upon the discernment of a few: the rest of us must take it, if we take it at all, upon authority or trust. Religious truth may be of this sort, not capable of logical demonstration; not, that is, self-evident to all. Yet it does not seem at all necessary to introduce the idea of a Supernatural Revelation; it suffices to supplement logical demonstration by insight. No doubt this presentation of the case is liable to perversion and can be misrepresented as a reliance upon subjective *criteria*. But as asthetic taste is regarded as objectively valid, so also may religious insight—at least where there is a certain consensus of the best available opinion.

With regard to the other side of our problem, the problem of human nature and its redemption, which the Agnostics were inclined to ignore, this is a problem of psychology. We may be sure that this study will reveal more and more the dependence

of individual human beings, for their moral and spiritual health and well-being, upon something both deeper and wider than themselves. Individuals must somehow be saved from themselves in order to find themselves. But all this has to be brought down from the region of vague generalization on to the level of definite religious practice and belief, a transformation in which Modernism will play a distinctive part.

In surveying Victorian Agnosticism, the feelings of Modernists are tinged by regret that our contemporary *intelligentsia* appear to lack sympathy with some of the spiritual and moral values of Christianity. When Agnosticism was 'the religion of all sensible men,' serious and thoughtful people believed in progress, in the gradual humanizing of life, in liberty, in the future of civilization. To-day, on the contrary, all our younger *intelligentsia* are pessimists, who repudiate a belief in progress, regard social and political idealism as dangerous chimeras, and so on. They have little hope for the future, and strive, with indifferent success, to derive as much satisfaction as possible out of the present. At best they are epicureans; at worst, materialists. This is the sort of background against which Modernists have to do their work. There is a greater temptation for Modernists than ever there was for their Broad Church predecessors to revolt against modern culture and revert to mediaevalism, if only because the mediaeval standpoint did recognise that without religion, and the knowledge and power associated with it, there can be very little hope for humanity. Yet Modernists know perfectly well that in some essential respects mediaeval theories are no longer tenable, and so we are compelled to discard them and must provide, if we can, new ones to replace them. Such is the task to which Modernists are addressing themselves in a spirit of faith and hope.

MODERNISM AND THE REUNION OF CHRISTENDOM

By the Rev. H. D. A. Major, D.D., Principal of Ripon Hall, Oxford.

A WELL-KNOWN Modernist, when invited to read a paper on the Reunion of Christendom, declined by saying that he no more desired or believed in a Black International than he did in a Red International. I agree with him entirely, but Christian Reunion means for me not a Black International nor a Red International, but a White International. Certainly, the Modernist does observe in certain efforts which are being made to secure reunion to-day the attempt to create a Black International. This is one of the objections that he has to the Malines Conferences. If such efforts proved successful they could have but one end, submission to the Papacy or absorption into it. But for the Modernist a unified Christendom enslaved intellectually, morally, and spiritually by the Papal system would be a disaster. To have the Christian Church governed absolutely by a single hierarchy, and the head of that hierarchy the most influential potentate in the world, would be as fatal to democratic ideals as it would be to Christian ideals. If achieved, such reunion would be followed by a condition of stagnation which would steadily invade every department of life, and this stagnation would as certainly at a later period be followed by violent reformation and anarchy.

Towards Papalist reunion the Modernist has no contribution to make. On the contrary Modernism is a more formidable opponent to such reunion than is either Protestantism or Secularism, because Modernism has something more attractive to offer mankind than has either Romanism or Secularism or Traditionalist Protestantism. The Modernist, when he is confronted with the problem of the reunion of Christendom, recognizes that while the present divisions among Christians are deplorable and scandalous and wasteful and weakening, yet there are kinds of reunion which would be even more detrimental to the influence of the Christian religion than are our present 'unhappy divisions.' Any reunion which barred future progress by forcing the

Christian Church into a narrow, rigid, ecclesiastical *cul de sac* would be a reunion of that type. A reunion which fettered the Christian intellect by restricting freedom of research: a reunion which stifled the Christian conscience by penalizing the proclamation of new truth where it is in conflict with traditional error: a reunion which forbade full Christian communion and fellowship with all who love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity, even though they may ignore certain ecclesiastical conventions: is a kind of reunion which the Modernist is compelled to resist to the uttermost in the interests of future Christian influence and progress.

The Modernist sees clearly the terrible danger which accompanies a reunion which is the outcome of skilful ecclesiastical compromise rather than the full and free affirmation of Christian principles. Browning's lines are full of warning for him in this connection:

> 'O if we draw a circle premature
> Heedless of far gain,
> Greedy for quick return of profits, sure
> Bad is our bargain—'

This circle premature, the ecclesiastical Charybdis, so tempting and so fatal, must be sedulously avoided. Better far to have no reunion than a reunion of that kind.

Before the problem of the Reunion of Christendom can be helpfully solved, we have first to solve the problem of what is the Christian Faith and what is the Catholic Church. Our Lord gave to mankind the Christian Faith: St. Paul gave to mankind the Catholic Church.

The Christian Faith in its essence can be found in the character, conduct, and teaching of our Lord. The outcome of that faith is a perfectly clearly recognizable attitude towards God, towards Jesus Christ, and towards man: and an equally clearly recognizable attitude towards the world of moral and spiritual values, and towards the world of material possessions and activities.

One of the marvels of the religion of Jesus, as von Harnack has pointed out, is that Jesus made His Gospel so very simple: He excluded deliberately from His religion so much that the religious world of His day regarded as essential, and which the religious world ever since then has been trying to include in the

religion of Jesus. When the Modernist considers the problem of the Christian Faith in relation to the Reunion of Christendom, this is the Christian Faith he is concerned with. It is here as a modern student of Christian origins that the Modernist takes his stand, and he cannot do otherwise. He is not concerned in this connection with later controversies and extensions of the Christian Faith, whether made in the age of the General Councils or at the Reformation: the only faith upon which the reunited Church can take its stand is the faith of the Gospel which Jesus Christ proclaimed and sealed with His blood.

When some six years ago I put the question to Sir William Ashley—whom we miss so greatly on this occasion—'What degree of unity in Faith will be necessary in a reunited Church?' he replied:

> 'The only faith in which it is necessary that the Church of Jesus Christ should be united is the Faith of Jesus Christ Himself,' and he added, 'and that can be sufficiently collected from our Lord's own prayer.'

Dr. Headlam, at the Lausanne Conference, has put forward the following formula for acceptance as the faith-basis of reunion:

> 'The Faith of Christ as taught in Holy Scripture and handed down in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds.'

This on the face of it, I say on the face of it, for Bishop Headlam's exposition of it (not included in the final findings of the Conference) makes it much more acceptable to Modernists, differs widely from Sir William Ashley's faith basis of reunion, and although at the present time there may be found a number of persons who for the sake of union are willing to accept Dr. Headlam's formula, especially among the more conservative elements in the ancient Christian Churches, we have to bear in mind that there will be vast multitudes who cannot accept it, partly because it stresses not primarily the faith of Jesus Christ Himself, but the primitive Christian faith about Jesus Christ, and secondly because the Creeds make affirmations which in the light of modern criticism threaten to become less and less acceptable to the modern mind as the expression of the Christian Faith. The great moral and spiritual affirmations of the Gospel of Jesus are absent from them, and they seem to many to stress unduly various theological, historical, and in some cases even mythical dogmas.

The Modernist would urge strongly that in seeking our faith-formula of reunion we must think not simply of those who are Christians at present, but of the vast multitudes outside the Christian Church for whom within it we hope to provide a spiritual home. And not only must we think of the multitudes of non-Christians living at this moment on this planet, but also of the vast multitudes yet unborn, who are potential members of the Christian Church of the future. They also are included in those great words of the Christ of the Fourth Gospel: 'Other sheep I have, which are not of this fold, them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice: and they shall become one flock, one shepherd' (x, 16).

We are so apt to think of the Christian Church as old and that its past is longer and more important than its future. This, as Bishop John Wordsworth wrote, 'is a natural and unconscious prejudice—but still it is a prejudice.' Certainly it is a prejudice which those who plan for the reunion of Christendom should set before their eyes as something to be avoided at all costs.

When we thus look outside the narrow limits of present-day Christendom and away towards the far horizons of the future, we feel as Modernists that some formula of faith very much more simple, and very much more comprehensive, is required than the two Creeds, and here I must add another qualification—something very much more *authoritative*. The words of the Creeds, though they have the authority of ancient usage and even of General Councils behind them, have not the authority of the words of Jesus Christ Himself, and we believe that the verbal expression of the Christian Faith in which the Church of the future is to re-unite must be found in some genuine affirmations of the Lord Himself—not necessarily the Lord's Prayer, though *lex orandi est lex credendi* is a very profound saying. Yet the absence from the Lord's Prayer of any affirmation of the Lord's Faith in Himself, which was a very important element in His Gospel, would seem to point to the need for some faith-formula which includes such affirmation.

Let us now in the light of our modern studies look at the Catholic Church. Here we know not what was the mind of Jesus. The words which in the First Gospel (xvi, 18) He is related to

have addressed to St. Peter, and which are inscribed round the dome of St. Peter's at Rome, are not found in Mark, or Q, or Proto-Luke, and so we can put no great weight on them.

The teaching of Jesus was mainly about the Kingdom of God. Truly He founded the Church in the sense that there would have been no Church if He had not come. He was its origin and inspiration, but it is in the teaching of St. Paul, especially in the *Epistle to the Ephesians*, that we have the magnificent presentation of the Church which is Christ's body, the recipient of His divine gifts and graces, destined in the divine purpose to unite all mankind in Christ. Here it is not human unity which is merely aimed at, but human unity at the highest moral and spiritual level—human unity *in Christ*—a unity which can only be achieved by participation in His Spirit. This means that a Christian Church destined by its Founder to unite all mankind on the highest moral and spiritual level, must be the recipient and possessor of those moral and spiritual gifts that it ought, and indeed exists, to impart to mankind.

Now this brings us to the difficult question. What is the supreme possession of the Church? Some will answer the Holy Scriptures, others will answer an Apostolic Ministry, others will answer the Sacraments, others more judiciously will answer all three. The Modernist cannot make any of these answers in the light of his study of Church origins and history. The supreme possession of the Church is the Spirit of Christ. It is the Spirit which created the Church: instituted her ministries: inspired her Scriptures: gave efficacy to her sacramental rites: directed her policy: endowed her with moral and spiritual graces and virtues. The Christian Church is essentially Spirit-born and Spirit-bearing. The Spirit of Christ is her supreme possession. Unless we grasp this clearly we get a static, not a dynamic, view of the Church: we see her as an institution with fixed ministries and fixed rites, incapable of re-adjustment to new conditions, bound fast and tied down by a hard and rigid tradition.

The Modernist ideal of the Church renders the problem of reunion easier in some ways, but harder in others. Easier because the Modernist is not compelled to insist on a fixed constitution for the re-united Church, with a fixed type of ministry and certain fixed rites. Nothing in his view is absolutely essen-

tial for the Church, but the Spirit of Christ through which is given the Faith of Christ. Any body of Christians which possesses that Faith and Spirit is a true Christian Church, and any body of Christians which does not possess that Spirit is not a true Christian Church—even as the Apostle wrote: 'If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.' The test is stern, but it is simple. It is our Lord's test—the test of character and conduct. Judged by that test there is hardly a Christian Church or a Christian man that is worthy of the name of Christian. It is, however, a test which puts us in the right relation to God and man, and should put us in the right relation also to our fellow-Christians. It altogether prohibits Pharisaism and exclusiveness: it equally prohibits our attaching any supreme and absolute importance to rites and institutions as ends and not as means.

This does not mean that we shall dispense with all Christian institutions and rites—far from it, but that we shall regard them as all of less value than the Spirit who created them, and we shall judge of their present value by moral and spiritual tests. We shall be bound in certain cases to recognize that they have a value for us which they have not for others, and *vice versa*: that they have had in certain cases a value in the past which they have not in the present: that they are capable it may be of re-adaptation to modern needs and that it is highly desirable that they should be so re-adapted. This will mean that in a scheme of reunion we cannot insist, for instance, that those with whom it is proposed to unite must of necessity possess an historic episcopate or certain sacramental rites like Baptism and the Lord's Supper. We English Churchmen value these things and so we ought to retain them, but there are others like the Quakers who do not value them, and who, judged by Christ's test, the test of the Spirit, must seem better Christians than we are. It is impossible for the Modernist to refuse to such the right-hand of Christian fellowship, to decline co-operation with them, to hesitate to admit them to any Christian privilege which we share. The re-united Church of the future must be wide enough to include the Quakers, and also wide enough to include the Romanists, if they will. It will have to say to them, whether you insist on no sacraments and no ministry, or whether you insist

on seven sacraments and the Papacy, this shall not so far as we are concerned prevent your being members of the re-united Church. You can use or not use as you will, these institutional rites, but although our practice cannot conform to yours in this matter, your practice need not conform to ours. Whatever you desire in fellowship, co-operation, privilege, that it is within our power to give, we gladly give to you. The possession of the Spirit of Christ which produces Christian character and conduct is what we value supremely, because Christ values it. These institutions and rites are merely means towards this end. It is a pity we cannot agree about these minor matters, but at least they shall not separate us from you, unless you insist that they shall.

Just in so far as this Modernist spirit and policy permeated the different divided sections of the Christian Church, so it would help to bring about reunion. The first stages of reunion would be marked by great diversity, but this would probably not be of any very long duration in the presence of a rising standard of education combined with increasing intercourse between separated Christians. It would merely mark a period of transition before something approaching agreement might be reached in connection with a common ministry and Church rites, making of course allowance for considerable variation within wide limits both in the practice of those rites and in the precise significance attached to them. The policy proposed will seem very drastic to some, but that will be because they have lost sight of the essential nature of the Christian Church. Such should read again and again the opening paragraphs of Bishop Lightfoot's essay on 'The Christian Ministry.'

> 'The Kingdom of Christ, not being a kingdom of this world, is not limited by the restrictions which fetter other societies, political or religious. It is in the fullest sense free, comprehensive, universal. . . . It has no sacred days or seasons, no special sanctuaries, because every time and every place alike are holy. Above all it has no sacerdotal system. . . . Every individual member holds personal communion with the Divine Head. . . . The Gospel is contrasted with the Law, as the spirit with the letter. Its ethical principle is not a code of positive ordinances, but conformity to a perfect exemplar, incorporation into a divine life.'

Yet these are *ideals*: every society, as Lightfoot points out, must have an organization, officers, rules. All we have to bear

in mind is that these have no absolute authority, they are not essentials of the Christian Church, they may be abolished or altered if need so require. The insistence on this by the Modernist ought to make reunion a much simpler matter by making the negotiators the masters, not the slaves, of the Church machinery.

But the Modernist is concerned with more than theories and discussions of reunion. He believes that words must be combined with deeds. An American professor, Dr. W. F. Barton, wrote of the Lausanne Conference:

> 'The devil and I are going to Lausanne. We are not of the same delegation, and we are not to be booked as cabin-mates. . . . But I am sure he will take a vacation and attend. He can afford to do so. He has been over-worked and the Lausanne Conference will give him relaxation. He will not need to do anything there. He has induced the Subjects' Committee to accept a program on which the delegates can argue and debate all the summer with the complete assurance that they will never get anywhere. And it was not their infernal wickedness that made this possible, but, what the devil likes better, their sanctified stupidity.'[1]

This is, we may charitably opine, unjust to Lausanne, but it indicates what many have felt since the Lambeth Conference of 1920 with its really splendid 'Appeal to All Christian People,' that although we have talked much since then, yet we have really gone backward so far as action leading to reunion is concerned, and that because checks have been put upon action in a number of directions by which the lines of division have been tightened or hardened. When Bishop Brent, who presides over the Lausanne Conference, sailed for Europe, he said two things:

> (1) 'Church Unity is no longer a distant vision, but an immediate and urgent necessity,' and
>
> (2) 'I believe the era of Church controversy is over. We are living in an era of Church co-operation.'[2]

Now we all hope and believe this, but just because we do so, we feel that active co-operation must begin. It will be simply fatal to have any more talk of reunion without its being preceded and accompanied by practical co-operation.

What ought we as Anglican Modernists to do in this matter of practical reunion? Some will say: Wait until all English Churchmen are agreed upon a practical policy. If we do that,

[1] William F. Barton in *The Churchman* (New York), May 14, 1927, p. 10.
[2] From Headquarters, Press Committee World Conference on Faith and Order, June 22, 1927, New York.

we shall wait until Doomsday. There are, so it seems to me, four things we ought to resolve to do henceforth.

(1) We ought to admit to Holy Communion all communicants from other Christian bodies who desire to communicate at our altars, and we ought not to hesitate to communicate at theirs, if they are willing to permit us to do so. I am not here advocating spectacular united Holy Communion Services, but normal action in parish churches and chapels.

(2) We ought to do all in our power to advance modern Christian education, both among our clergy and laity, and if possible also interdenominationally. By this means we shall find ourselves steadily breaking down innumerable walls of partition, and eliminating countless inhibitions, which are separating fellow-Christians from one another. Ignorance, and prejudice based upon ignorance, have been most potent causes of division among Christians.

(3) We ought always and even at considerable cost to ourselves to adopt and support a Church policy which puts first things first—love, truth, freedom, the fruits of the Spirit; and second things second—positive institutions, rites and customs. We shall not despise the latter, but we shall not claim either that they are indispensable or unalterable. This policy, besides being essentially Christian, because it stresses the inwardness of Christ's Religion, will certainly inspire confidence in us on the part of free Churchmen and non-Churchmen. Many whom today we approach with proposals of reunion are filled with apprehension and repulsion by our injudicious and almost superstitious exaltation of secondary things.

(4) We ought to co-operate heartily with those of other Christian communions in philanthropic and humanitarian endeavour. Such co-operation awakens friendship and respect between members of the separate communions, and moreover it helps Christians to stress what our Lord stressed in His religion —practical action. There has been much advance in this direction of recent years.

As regards the stages of reunion, the Modernist would advocate that we begin with inter-communion and proceed through denominational co-operation to federation. Organic unity is necessarily the last stage, and will seem to demand submission

and absorption on the part of the smaller denominations. In the earlier stages we can have, except for the most lachrymose, reunion without tears, but not in the case of organic unity. It is open to question whether this organic unity is needful and desirable. It is necessary if we are to become one fold (*αὐλή*), but it is not necessary if we are to become one flock (*ποίμνη*), and it was that all His sheep might become *one flock* that our Lord prayed according to the correct translation of *John* x, 16. Unfortunately the Roman Church, and indeed the whole Western Church, has been influenced by the mistranslation *fold* (*ovile*) in the standard text of the Vulgate. This mistranslation, *fold* for *flock*, as Westcott remarks, 'has been most disastrous in ideas and in influence,' and he adds :

> 'It would perhaps be impossible for any correction now to do away with the effects which a translation undeniably false has produced on popular ecclesiastical ideas.' (*Commentary*, pp. 155, 162.)

The Church as a *flock* finds its unity in following its Shepherd, Christ : the Church as a *fold* finds its unity by being enclosed within the same encircling wall. But it is the first kind of unity for which Christ prayed, and not the second, and it is this unity which finds its cohesive force in Christ, not in ecclesiastical definition and restriction, which the Modernist advocates and for which he strives—a Christian Reunion which concerns itself far more with the centre than it does with the circumference.

THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF MODERN THOUGHT TO THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGY

By the Rev. Prebendary J. R. Wilkinson, M.A., Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Bath and Wells.

IF one carries one's mind backward half a century and thinks of the conditions of theological teaching then, and compares them with those that obtain to-day, one is impressed at once with the extraordinary change that has taken place. In those days the idea that the first five books of the Bible were not historical and were not written by Moses was almost universally regarded as a strange blasphemous imagination, and

some of the most respected dignitaries in the Church were ready to resign their office in the Church of England because it was proposed to allow a clergyman to omit the recitation of the Athanasian Creed. How far we have travelled forward since those days. Indeed, we may think only of days, well within the memory of most of us, when *Lux Mundi* was published, of the agitation it provoked in the Church, of the denunciations poured forth against the suggestion that the Old Testament was not infallible and that our Lord's knowledge was limited, of times when the very name of Wellhausen was unmentionable, when prominent scholars were scornfully denouncing the Gospel criticism of Weizsäcker and Holtzmann, and then consider the reception of *Essays Catholic and Critical* by the Church of to-day, in order to realise the gulf that separates us from the theological thought of the time when some of us entered the ministry of the Church. Thirty-six years ago, when I was ordained, the typical theological text-book was Harold Browne's *Thirty-nine Articles*, a book in which texts were marshalled indiscriminately from all parts of the Bible in support of the statements of the Articles under the assumption that they were thus sufficiently proved for every reasonable Christian. A teacher in a recognized theological college told me that if I disbelieved in the historicity of the story of the Fall, I denied implicitly the Incarnation and the whole plan of salvation; one of the examining chaplains at my ordination expected me to believe that the 110th Psalm was written by David because our Lord assumed that this was so. I wonder whether any theological student of to-day has ever even looked into or could have the patience to read Harold Browne's book, and whether any teacher in a university or recognized theological college or any examining chaplain could now say the things that were said to me before my ordination. In fact, during the last generation a veritable revolution has taken place, and measures for us the extent of the contribution that the Modern view has already made to theological teaching in all sections of the Church.

And yet we can by no means speak of a victory for Modernism. Views indeed that were once rejected with contumely are now generally accepted, but they are too often accepted with little appreciation of their implications, like pieces of new cloth

to patch the old garment. The Modernist is not concerned with views, with the mere acceptance of the results of modern research; he stands rather for the spirit of research which led to such results—the fearless spirit that searches for truth and cannot rest until it is found. Huxley used to warn his pupils against the unintelligent acceptance of the theories of Darwin of which he was so strenuous an advocate, declaring that these theories so accepted might well become as dangerous to the scientific spirit as were those he was striving against. Would that we had with us to-day a theological Huxley who would deal faithfully with some of the theological teachers and students who talk so glibly about P. J. E. Q. and, above all, our new acquaintance, Proto-Luke.

Modernism is a spirit, and being a spirit is not easy to define. The purpose of this paper is to deal with this spirit in connection with the teaching of theology. Its character will appear as we attempt to describe the Modernist approach to the various branches of theological teaching.

We consider, first, the Modernist approach to Biblical Theology. For the Modernist the Bible as literature does not stand apart from all other human literature. For him its writers are no longer the passive instruments of an infallible inspiration, their utterances are no longer expressions of absolute truth to be accepted without reservation. They, like all other writers, were men of their times, bound by the limitations of knowledge, of thought and feeling peculiar to the times at which they lived. For the interpretation of their message we must summon to our aid, as in the case of the interpretation of all other ancient writers, all that modern knowledge can tell us of the history, the thought, the language of their times. And this not simply that we may understand their message, but that we may know them; for it is in their personality, their living ideals, that the Modernist sees the essence of their message for him and hopes to seize the secret of that Divine Inspiration that, through the ages, has appealed to the hearts of men and caused that their writings should be regarded as sacred above all. The study of these books thus becomes something of a communion of soul with soul, not the study of a dead letter, and the teacher's function not the enforcement of statements and commands to be

believed and obeyed because they are written, but the introduction of the pupil to men who once shared in our human life and lived it in fellowship and deep communion with God.

Above all is this the case with the central theme of the Bible, the Gospel history. I believe indeed that it is only from the Modernist standpoint that this history can be so presented that it becomes the Gospel of God for the men of our times. The Modernist applies to the four Gospels with ruthless severity all the critical and literary tests of modern knowledge, and finds that in the process much that renders the traditional portrait of our Lord alien to the best thought and feeling of to-day simply drops away—miracle as a mere display of supernatural power, the crude self-assertion that has crept into the picture from the *Gospel of St. John*. He can now obtain a glimpse of the Life as it was actually lived, and of the teaching as it was actually received by the first disciples. But when all this has been done, the Modernist no longer regards this original teaching as inflexible law to be passively accepted by the believer. He regards it as relative to the circumstances, historical and psychological, of the times and of our Lord Himself, and of absolute value only in that it illustrates His personality and leads us to know the very soul of our Saviour. In fact, the Modernist's presentation of the Gospel is an attempt to repeat the experience that was the foundation of Christianity, again to show to men our Lord as He was, not to impose Him upon men, in the trust that if He thus be lifted up He will again draw all men unto Him.

It is best, perhaps, by an example to show what I mean—how, that is, the Modernist method differs from the Traditional method. I quote the story of the Rich Young Man from the *Gospel of St. Mark*:

> 'And as He went out into the way one ran to Him and kneeling down asked Him, Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life? Jesus said to him, Why callest thou me good; none is good save one—God. Thou knowest the commandments, do not kill, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not bear false witness, do not defraud, honour thy father and thy mother. But he said to him, Master, all these things have I kept from my youth. Jesus looking upon him loved him, and said to him, One thing thou lackest. Go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven, and come follow me. But he was downcast at the saying and departed in sorrow, for he had great possessions. And

> Jesus, looking about Him, said to His disciples, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God. And His disciples were astonished at His words. But Jesus again answering saith unto them, Children, how hard it is to enter into the kingdom of God. It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. And they were exceedingly astonished, and said to one another, Who then *can* be saved? Jesus looking upon them said, With men it is impossible, but not with God, for with God all things are possible.'

In the traditional exegesis of this passage stress is laid upon the two sayings of our Lord, 'There is none good but one—God' and 'It is easier for a camel to pass through a needle's eye than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.' Both sayings, because our Lord uttered them, are of absolute value; both are regarded as equally difficult. The first was, and is, regarded as in the letter inconsistent with the doctrine of the sinlessness of our Lord, and all kinds of expedients are and were employed to show that the words could not have this meaning; indeed, in the *Gospel of St. Matthew* the question and answer were actually re-written. Our Lord is asked, 'What good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?' He answers, 'Why askest thou me about the good—One is the good.' The second saying was found to be exceedingly embarrassing. On the one hand there were those who used it to prove that the possession of riches was in itself evil and that every good Christian ought to divest himself of all that he had and give to the poor. On the other hand, the great body of theologians adopted all kinds of expedients to show that the saying could not mean this. The camel does not mean camel, the needle's eye does not mean needle's eye, so that the infallible statement becomes reasonable; and in some MSS. of *St. Mark* the text itself was altered, so that we read to-day in our Authorized Version that our Lord meant by 'rich man' only a 'man who trusts in riches.' This is the method of a traditional exegesis that in spirit continues to-day.

The Modernist, on the other hand, takes the story as a whole, as an episode in the history revealing the character of our Lord. He sees the rich man approaching the Lord in an attitude of enthusiastic admiration, he sees our Lord specially attracted by the man, His desire to claim him as a special disciple, His bitter disappointment at the man's refusal. The sayings fall naturally

into their place in this picture. The first tells the Modernist that our Lord disliked adulation, the second only emphasizes for him our Lord's bitter disappointment at His failure to gain as a disciple one whom He loved. For the moment He thinks and says that no rich man could be saved; but then, though His purpose had failed, yet all might yet be well, 'for with God all things are possible.' Thus the story for the Modernist is a peculiarly beautiful revelation of essential principles in our Lord's character—a refined humility, a devouring love for souls, an absolute trust in the Father's power and goodness.

It is on these lines that the Modernist view transforms the exegesis of the Gospels.

He approaches in the same spirit the rest of the New Testament. Though in the light of modern research he may regard much of the content of the later strata of the Synoptic Gospels and the *Gospel of St. John* as unhistorical, they are not therefore for him less important. They bear testimony to the tremendous impression that the personality of our Lord made upon believers in the generation that immediately followed Him; and under Modernist interpretation they acquire a value that is appropriate to the need of our times. For instance, the portrait of our Lord as presented in the Fourth Gospel, if it is regarded as historically true, possesses many traits that are repellent to the better feelings of the man of to-day. It is far otherwise if we regard the book as a testimony to the influence that the personality of our Lord had exercised upon the writer and the Church of the end of the first century. The book has now the supreme value of the experience of a great mystic who had found in Jesus the revelation of God as Life, Light and Truth. The terms in which this experience is expressed are indeed often strange to the modern mind; but for the Modernist theologian, who sees these things in the light of the religious and intellectual thought of those days, such details fall into the background when compared with the central theme of the book —the revelation of the Father in the earthly life of our Lord and the continual presence of His Spirit as Comforter and Friend in the soul of the believer. And the Modernist theologian can still find in the spiritual experience of the writer and of those who accepted his gospel the most satisfying interpreta-

tion of the personality that is shown to us in the genuine history and can teach the man of to-day to find in this the supreme spiritual value of the book.

It is the same with the writings of St. Paul. St. Paul as presented to the world by the traditional theologian is encumbered by doctrines and theories that are often antagonistic to the highest religious feeling of our day, and yet are to be regarded as expressions of absolute truth. The Modernist, on the other hand, sees these as in form belonging to the mental and social environment of the Apostle, and finds spiritual value in them only because they lead him to know the very soul of St. Paul. They are the record of the spiritual experience of one of the greatest of human kind who had found forgiveness, peace, joy, strength and the inspiration of love in the knowledge of the love of God that had been revealed to him in Jesus Christ. The Modernist theologian's function is to bring men to realise this.

We pass from Biblical theology to dogmatic theology in the stricter sense, that is, the study and teaching of Christian doctrine as it has been formulated in the Church since the time of the New Testament writers. The Modernist approaches this study in a similar spirit. The creeds and dogmas of the Church are not for him statements to be enforced upon faith for ever; they are rather formulations of beliefs, firmly held and experienced, as the spirit of man in its onward movement was continually challenged by the personality of Jesus Christ. We can only understand these formulations in the light of the thought and feeling of the times at which they were made, and in themselves they often belong to forms of thought which we have long outgrown. Yet the human aspirations and beliefs that lie behind them are real expressions of the spirit by which the Church lives to-day; and it may well be that a truth enshrined in an old dogma, though unwelcome, may yet be necessary for the man of to-day. The Modernist sees this, and studies and teaches the creeds in this spirit.

But the peculiar characteristic of the Modernist spirit is its interest in modern thought. The tendency of traditionalist theology has been to draw a dividing line across the path of the history of Christian thought at a point either after the time of the New Testament or after the time of the Fathers of the

Undivided Church; to treat what was taught and received in the earlier period as essential to the faith, regarding all that has been taught and accepted in the later period as of the nature of opinion, right or wrong; and to assume that the office of the teacher in this later period has been, and is, to commend the faith, fixed and defined in the earlier period, to the minds of men whose outlook is constantly changing. The theologian's function to-day thus tends to be that of an apologist. The Modernist theologian, however, cannot draw these dividing lines; he sees the whole history of the Church as a living, continuous process of learning and teaching. He recognizes—he must be blind not to recognize — periods of extraordinary spiritual insight and revelation through the Holy Spirit, such a period as the times of the New Testament, yet he is convinced that the same spirit of revelation has been at work at all periods in the Church's history and is at work to-day. He approaches, therefore, the sincere thought of to-day not simply in the spirit of an apologist, whose aim is to commend a fixed faith and to meet difficulties which that faith may present when confronted with what men of to-day are thinking, but in the spirit of a learner, watching for a message, that he may enrich the faith with truths that are now perhaps being revealed. The difficulties that men feel to-day in traditional conceptions such as Almighty God, Creator, the Resurrection of the Flesh, Born of the Virgin Mary, Eternal Punishment, the Fall of Man, appear to him not simply as doubts to be explained away or silenced; he feels rather that they may be due to the leading of the Holy Spirit of God working towards expressions of truth fuller and more adequate perhaps than even those of the New Testament. And according to the Modernist view the theologian's business is to learn, render explicit, and teach what he feels to be true in the thought of to-day, in the firm faith that truth is there, and that the Church, the Christian mind and conscience, will be guided, as in the days of the formation of the Canon of the New Testament, to seize and confirm it.

It will be seen what one means by Modernism. It is an attitude of mind rather than a system of thought, and is not to be confused with the holding of Modernist views; though we Modernists exist to defend and propagate this attitude of mind

that faces facts, hungers to learn truth, and firmly believes that truth will be revealed to the sincere, humble and faithful seeker.

How far does this spirit prevail in the teaching of theology to-day? No longer do the majority of the theological students of our universities leave the schools, as we did thirty years ago, in practical ignorance of results of modern criticism that had been settled and accepted years before in the schools abroad. No recognized theological teacher of the Evangelical or High Church school now adopts the crudely traditional views in these matters that were prevalent in the days when I was at Oxford.[1] I have never taught in a university, and I am not in very close contact with theological teachers in the universities to-day, but one's impression is that somehow or other many of our theological students at the universities do not come into close touch with the spirit of honest and thorough scholarship that inspires the work of prominent university professors and teachers of to-day. Influences seem to be still at work which inculcate the unfaithful doctrine of 'Thus far you may go but no further'—a doctrine that vitiated the teaching of even the most enlightened teachers of my time. There is too much of the playing of the opinions of one great scholar against those of another, without a grip upon the essentials of theological problems and without clear knowledge of the sure results to which modern scholarship has attained. One speaks from one's own limited experience of students, but I find that many with more adequate knowledge agree with me on this point, and share with me the belief that the theological schools will not command the respect and exert the influence that should be theirs until it is universally recognized that they are thoroughly imbued with the Modernist spirit, the free yet reverent spirit of the honest seeker after truth.

The mere fact of the existence of Ripon Hall as a recognized theological college of our Church shows how far we have

[1] Dr. Gore is no friend to Modernists. Yet those who remember the early days of his work at Oxford, and above all the mid-day lectures on Sundays in the upper room of the Pusey House, owe to him a debt of gratitude which is immeasurable. Though he stands where he stood then, it is through him that many of us gained our first glimpse of the spirit of Modernism. In the opinion of the writer, the future historian of the Church of England will regard the courageous work that was done then, followed by the publication of *Lux Mundi*, as marking the beginning of a new epoch in theological teaching.

noved in the last generation. Who could have imagined such . phenomenon thirty years ago? Only a prophet! But what vould such men as Liddon, King and Moule have said had they :nown what pupils of other famous theological colleges would ›e taught to-day? Views, for holding which we lost all the haracters we ever had, are now mere platitudes in the lectures f the most respected teachers in all our theological colleges. 3ut all is not well!

When, however, one considers the teaching of theology in ur theological colleges it is necessary to remember the dis-bilities and difficulties under which many of them work. The deal function of the theological college is to prepare the student n habit and thought for the practical work of his calling as a lergyman. The purely intellectual education is assumed to ave been dealt with previously in school and university. As a natter of fact the theological college to-day has often to supply lso the place of secondary school and university, funds are ow, the teaching staff is inadequate in numbers, the teachers re simply overburdened with the work of lecturing in many ubjects that are not purely theological, and the students in the nort space of two or three years are expected to cover a ground hat a young man, after leaving a good school, would cover atisfactorily in some five or six years at a university and theo-ogical college. Is it to be wondered at that the knowledge that ney acquire is often very superficial, that their intellectual grasp f the fundamental principles of Christianity is weak, and that ove all their acquaintance with the text of the Bible is often ery slight indeed? It is commonly reported that a man can o quite well in the General Theological Examination, the ecognized examination for ordination candidates, with very ffective knowledge of the Bible text. Certainly you meet with tudents of theological colleges who know all about P. J. E. Mark and Q and yet have no real knowledge of the phenomena f the text of the Bible which the facts represented by these tters explain, nor of the historical, psychological and theo-gical truths implied in these facts. My old Scotch classical aster in a grammar school in the North used to tell us again nd again that the man who knew the English Bible thoroughly as an educated man. If this was felt to be true in the old

traditional days, how much more true is it to-day when the Bibl for the modern man presents in miniature the history of th development of the spirit of man from the days of barbarism t those of civilization, from Deborah to St. John, and forces th thoughtful man to summon to its interpretation almost ever branch of humane learning. The intention of this seemin digression is to emphasize the point that there is need that th teaching in theological colleges should be concentrated on few subjects, upon essentials, and especially upon the study of th Bible. We want from our theological colleges not men of view but men of faith and thought, men who know the real ground o their faith and have been taught how to go on learning the sign of their times. It is our conviction that an increase of the spir of Modernism in our theological colleges will supply this need

We pass in conclusion to the subject of the teaching o theology by the clergy themselves as a part of their ministry The Modernist is generally regarded as an intellectualist wit an appeal only to the intellectual. But one of the classic manifestoes of Modernism, the appeal of certain Italian pries addressed to Pius X, and translated with a preface by Arch deacon Lilley under the title 'What we want,' claims that th writers stood for a development that would commend the Christian faith not only to the scientist and philosopher, bu also to ordinary folk to whom the dogmas of the traditiona faith were incomprehensible. The note of Modernism is no only intellectual honesty but also simplicity. We claim tha the preaching of the Gospel in the spirit of Modernism is a direct appeal to the common sense of religion that lies beneath the accepted conventional phrases and symbols that cloud the minds of some and are repulsive to others. It matters no whether the clergy and people of St. Martin-in-the-Fields do or do not call themselves Modernists; the point is that we find our ideal realised there — the Gospel preached, in what seems at least to us the spirit of Modernism, and accepted with enthusi- asm; the clergyman regarding himself not as the teacher of defined and infallible truths, but as a leader in a united body of learners who are learning to know God in Christ and how in His spirit to carry on His work in the world. If we ourselves have not the same success, the fault lies not in that for which we

tand, but in ourselves—we have not, perhaps, the necessary ifts, we are not good enough. We are, however, sure that the pread of the spirit of Modernism among the teaching clergy the necessary condition for the revival of true, strong religion n our Church and nation.

The theological teaching of the Modernist clergyman often ouses bitter opposition among members of his congregation. Ie need not worry about this so long as it is quite clear to him- lf that he by his teaching is clearing away traditional views pout God that simple as well as thoughtful people ought not to old. I think, for instance, that no one to-day ought to be ft to stand in the belief that such a story as the story of the all in *Genesis* is historical. The clergyman needs, of course, ct and consideration for the feelings of others as well as ourage. He should preach in the Modernist spirit, as a dis- overer of truth rather than as a destroyer of error, denouncing id disproving, as it were, only when he is forced to do so. But l these difficulties vanish for him in his teaching of the young, ore especially the children in our schools. One can testify om one's own experience to the supreme value of the Modern- point of view in commending Christianity to the common nse of children. Certainly the happiest and, I hope, most uitful hours in the week are those when one teaches the Bible, id especially the Gospel story, to the children of the upper asses of a village school, quite unreservedly from the Modern- standpoint. The children certainly are appreciative and terested, and, so I think, they gain a view of the Bible, and ove all of the personality of our Lord, which helps them to now God and is not likely to be disturbed by the common talk unbelieving people in their after life. However, one is thank- l to note that the extreme importance of sensible teaching of ligion in our schools is occupying the serious attention of portant people in the educational world, and is to be dealt th in this Conference by persons more competent than I am. will close, therefore, with the expression of my conviction that e crying need of our times is the reform of theological teach- g in the training colleges of our teachers, and that here the irit of Modernism has work to do that will be of inestimable nefit to the cause of true religion.

THE MODERN MOVEMENT AND FOREIGN MISSIONS

By Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E.

THE part that I am asked to take in this Conference is t present in positive, popular manner the contribution which it is within the power of the Modern Movement to mak towards the solution of various pressing problems connecte with Foreign Missions. And by the Modern Movement I under stand the organized effort that is being made to maintain th cause of Truth, Freedom, and Comprehensiveness in th Church of England, and to affirm the progressive character o revelation.

If this is the aim of the Movement, it should be able to mak a contribution of the highest value towards solving the mo pressing of the problems which Foreign Missions have to fac to-day. For Foreign Missions extend over the whole worl and over the whole world there is at work another movement also Modern, which is vigorously and avowedly anti-religiou and anti-Christian—and anti-religious because it believes tha modern science and modern philosophy have superseded religion and that its duty is therefore to prevent the further spread o religion. Consequently, a movement such as this in the Churc of England, which keeps itself abreast of the latest advance in science and the most recent thoughts of philosophers, shoul be able to give an interpretation of Christianity which would b an invaluable support to Foreign Missions in their fight with th enemies of religion.

Marxism and its offspring Leninism aim at world-revolution in much more than the *political* field. By force and violence its adherents aim at establishing throughout the world a new order of things in which religion will have no part. They declare *war* on religion. Religion is an opiate which drugs the people, saps their virility, initiative and force. Religion is a poison, and the people must be warned against it. Religion has a brutalizing effect. It is an out-worn superstition, a mere fairy-tale. Men

must burst the bonds of religion, free themselves from spiritual subjection and stand free and erect. They must understand that the prime motive power does not issue from spirit but from the material conditions of life—that the basis of human development is material.

This is the contention of Marxists and Leninists. And so determined are they to strike at religion that in Russia they have executed, often in most brutal circumstances, eight thousand members of priestly orders. They have exiled or driven from their cures thousands of others. They have forbidden the teaching of religion in schools. They have established a censorship on sermons. And, while they have thus sought to destroy religion in countries where they are in power, in other countries, like China, they have stirred up such animosity among the people that Missions have been compelled to withdraw from the interior. Even in this country and America they have sought to undermine religion. And they have secured considerable support, even among the intellectuals.

Thus war on religion has been declared by Marxists—and war to the knife—and war all over the world. And this war on religion is of far deeper import to mankind than even the Great War. For upon its issue will depend whether man sinks back again towards animalism or continues to rise in the scale of being. In this war for the soul of mankind Christendom is now actually engaged. The Church of Russia has had to bear the first fury of the onslaught. But our Foreign Missions are suffering also. And it is with them that we are more immediately concerned.

Now war, if it has many evils, has certain great advantages. It promotes unity. It makes men sink differences and come together. It tightens the bonds of loyalty, it sharpens the faculties, braces the will, purges the soul, sweeps unessentials aside, forces concentration on a single aim, and clears the issue.

What then is the issue in this war on religion? What is the basic issue between upholders and deriders of religion—between those who would turn Asiatics and Africans into anti-Christians and those who would impart the Christian spirit to them?

Fundamentally, it is whether or not there is at work in the world a Power, a dominating Mind, a Personality or super-

Personality, a Supreme Self, making for Goodness, to which we have to conform our ways or suffer the consequence. The enemies of religion insist that there is not. The upholders of religion say there is. According to them the world process is a mechanical process and nothing more. What good there is on this planet is but a temporary glow, a mere flash in the pan, and in time the earth will be like the moon now is; and there will be an end of the matter. The upholders of religion admit that the world-process is a mechanical process. But they assert that there is something *more*, and that this something more is the essentially important thing about it. They maintain that the mechanical process directly implies a dominant mind as the directive agency in the process. They hold that we obtain our best conception of what is in that dominant mind by its highest products or manifestation or revelations. And we Christians believe that the highest revelation is to be found in the life and teaching of Jesus, and that the more we study His life and teaching, the better we shall understand God.

This is the issue which has to be fought out fairly and squarely between us. And we who pin our faith on goodness will have to stake our all upon it. And it is a big issue and we shall have to run big risks. For upholding the finer, the more delicate and sensitive in the face of the rude, the callous and brutal is painful and dangerous work, and we must expect much suffering. But in the fight on so stupendous an issue, Christian bodies can rely upon the support of one another, though each will be expected to make its own special contribution towards winning the common victory.

And the special contribution the Modern Movement can make to the common effort is what Modernists gather from their study of philosophy and science. They are not singular among Christian bodies in studying these two great branches of human activity, but they have perhaps more than others devoted particular attention to them. They have recognized the *progressive* character of the revelation given by the Holy Spirit in the spheres of knowledge and conduct. They are therefore specially armed for coping with a counter-movement confessedly basing itself on philosophy and science as Marxism does.

Issue being joined, then the one thing necessary is to con-

centrate on clearing our conception of God—on removing misconceptions in others and sharpening our own conception, both of God and of Christ, as His highest manifestation—and on presenting God and our relation to Him in such a way as may best appeal to men. For having done this we can then picture the Kingdom of God in such glowing colours that men will see it is worth fighting for. We can give men a clear-cut vision of a *heaven upon earth* which will charm even our foes, cause widespread desertion in their ranks, and dry up their sources for recruitment. A world in which men would still work for material things, food, raiment and shelter, but would rightly regard these as only means and not ends, and would chiefly treasure things of the spirit, such as love; love of beauty in all its forms in nature and in art; love of truth; love of holiness; and would have their hearts set where their treasure was laid up. A vision of a state of things where men, while retaining the wisdom of experience, would be born again with the freshness, the purity and innocence, the engaging candour and the winning ways of a little child.

Foreign Missions have to deal with many different types of people, from highly-cultured Chinese and Indians to savage tribes in Africa and Polynesia. And to these types, according to their needs, different pictures would have to be presented. The special contribution which the Modern Movement could make to Foreign Missions would be a series of pictures of the Kingdom of God painted in words, both written and spoken, by artists who had in them, in addition to religion, something of the philosopher and the scientist.

Modern artists could paint such pictures as would appeal to the simplest village folk of China and India and Africa, as well as to the highly educated people of the towns. But it is to the cultured Asiatics that the Modern Movement would perhaps most readily make appeal; and it is the cultured Asiatics who most need help. For Western culture has wrought havoc in their religious beliefs; and in their hearts they are disgusted at the materialism of the West. They have learned to believe that science has supplanted religion, and that the material things of life are more to be prized than the spiritual. But in the depths of their souls they revolt against this barbarous idea and would

gladly welcome whatever would make them turn again to God. They might not wish to become baptized members of the Church of England. But they could easily be made to see the value of the Kingdom of God; they would appreciate the life of Christ; and, whether or not they adopted the name of Christian, they would thirstily drink of the spirit of Christ.

These cultured men of the East are endowed by nature with fine intellects and exquisite taste. The Chinese have not the aptitude and feeling for religion that the Indians have, but are of a stronger, bigger intellect and have a finer appreciation of beauty. Yet both stand in need of religion to hold them together, and give purpose and direction to their lives. And the tragedy is that both Chinese and Indians have absorbed their Western learning outside the religious setting it has in Europe. True, in England that religious setting is far less stimulating than it should be. Still, it is there in some small measure. At school and at the University there is always a religious background, and the literature of the Bible, the Prayer Book and the Hymn Book forms an important part of what an Englishman learns. A Chinese or Indian student may or may not be instilled with religion in his home, but in the school or university where he receives his Western learning—unless it be a mission school—he will receive no impetus towards religion. Towards religion his teachers will display an impartiality which must often seem like indifference. So the student gets the impression that it forms a not very important part of life—certainly a less important part than a knowledge of the history of England or of English poetry or of English political theory. Consequently, these students grow up with their souls atrophied; and about their intellects, there comes a hard, metallic ring. They give out no deep, bell-like note. They ring sharp and cold. The warm spring within these Asiatics has been quenched. And they go about dissatisfied, with the deepest part seared and stunted, and with no spiritual mooring.

Often, too, they are estranged from their home-folk. Their parents and their women-folk cling to the old faiths; and to these it is pain and grief to see their sons deriding what they themselves have treasured so dearly, and built up their whole lives on. Bitterness ensues. Bitterness on both sides. And event-

ually this bitterness is directed against those who are responsible for their estrangement.

The upshot of it all is that these cultured Asiatics feel that they have been robbed of something for which they are still inwardly craving. For their spiritual yearnings are not yet crushed. The divine spark we find in all men burns within Asiatics with peculiar heat. And still among the Western-educated it hungers for what it can feed on.

And precisely here it is that the Modern Movement can make its contribution. The fuel the spiritual fire is needing the Movement can provide. Put these Western-educated Easterners in touch with the men and literature of the Modern Movement and they would greedily absorb the teaching. They would feel themselves in contact with men who were spiritual like themselves—with men whose natural bent was towards spiritual rather than material things—but who did not disdain science, and, indeed, sedulously took into account its latest results and were convinced that increasing knowledge could only strengthen and could never weaken religion.

Already there are signs of a swing-back in Europe from the present demand for more and more special *scientific* and technical instruction, and for satisfaction of *material* needs, to a demand for *religious* instruction and for the satisfaction of *spiritual* needs. A reaction from specialization is setting in. Specialists themselves are wanting to get back to the common ground—to what is fundamental to every specialization and common to them all. A demand for religion is arising—for what is concerned with the fundamental activity of the Universe. And those who now undertake to satisfy the demand will not think of supplanting the scientists, but will show the way to that unifying and directive Power which all feel the need of.

By none will the reaction to religion be more warmly welcomed than by the people of the East. For they are naturally disposed to be religious, and all the great religions have sprung from Asia.

But the cultured Asiatics are not the only persons to whom the Modern Movement would appeal. A missionary, nowadays, is generally in contact in his mission field with some of his own

countrymen. Probably where he is working there is also a Government official of some kind—a consul or an administrator —and perhaps some traders, planters or engineers. Often they may be a thorn in the flesh to the missionary. Occasionally the missionary may be a thorn in the flesh to the official. Yet it is all-important that, in the eyes of the people, they should be in unity and not at variance. They should all of them be obviously working together, with a common understanding and a common purpose, namely, the welfare of the country they are in—even the trader realizing that the more the country prospers, the more will his trade flourish.

Quite candidly, there is much in what may be termed official Christianity with which the trader, planter, engineer and administrator does not agree. It does not grip him. And when he is away from the home country he becomes indifferent to Church services. He seldom goes to church. And he gives the impression to the people of the country that he cares nothing for religion—that his only concern is his business; and, when that is over, sport. Spiritual matters are nothing to him, it would seem.

Now this, when added to the materialism which Western-educated Asiatics and Africans acquire in the schools, is a disastrous state of things and may yet lead to terrible calamity. For this indifference is contagious. Seeing the Europeans indifferent, the people of the country become indifferent. And being indifferent they become open to the influence of those who are now actively waging war on religion. In time these indifferent ones may become enemies of religion, and especially enemies of Christianity. And with their minds set only on satisfying their own particular needs, and only their material needs, and with their faith in goodness destroyed, they may lapse back into sheer barbarity. All moral restraints may be loosened, all reverence for holy things, all respect for the sanctity or even the decencies of life, all compassion for the aged and the helpless, all regard for the young, all appreciation of the beauty of things may be blotted out in blackest paint. There may be an orgy of cruelty and murder, starvation and pestilence. These things have happened in Russia. They are happening in Russia to-day. They may very well happen elsewhere to-morrow if religion now fails to make a stand.

This is the danger the missionary has to face. And from my experience as an official and as a traveller, in both of which capacities I have come across missionaries in the mission field in China, in India, and in Africa, I should say that the first step a missionary should take should be in the direction of his own countrymen. And if he would point to the peril which lay ahead if religion were neglected, if he could give a convincing vision of what might be done if religion were pursued; and if he made appeal to their better nature to give him their aid in his fight for religion, I believe they would readily afford it; for they are not so indifferent to religion as they appear.

And here again the Modern Movement should prove of value. For in making such an appeal a missionary would be greatly aided by it. To be able to say to these administrators, business men, and engineers that there was working in the Church of England a body of men who considered it the duty of the Church to re-state her doctrines from time to time in accordance with the progressive revelation of the Holy Spirit, and who were even now actively engaged in clearing away misconceptions of God and of Christ, and frankly stating their own views and openly discussing them with others, would be a great assistance to the missionary. He could very well say that if leaders of the Church were doing this it was only fitting that they, too—especially in face of the imminent danger ahead—should put aside objections on superficialities and get down to essentials—get down to what really mattered, to an understanding of that God

> Who is in all and over all,
> Himself both Source and End,

of that Power behind the Universe which everywhere encompasseth us about, of that Power upon which we are all, whether we will it or no, whether we know it or not, absolutely dependent. And if the missionary made such an appeal he would be sure of a hearing and would be able to induce his fellow-countrymen at least to show an interest in religion by coming to his church.

And then in church he might more fully declare his vision. He might tell how in Christ we have the completest embodiment of that Spirit which is the impelling motive Power of the whole

universe; and how by studying His life and teaching we have the best indication of what we ourselves should do to conform to the will of God. He might go on to say that in ourselves, too, we may also find God, and by obeying all the highest promptings of our natures can learn to do His will; and by emulating the best of our fellowmen, by observing nature, by learning what poets, philosophers, and scientists have to say of the world can further add to our knowledge of God. And he might show that the more we study the matter the more we shall realize that the world about us and we ourselves are manifestations of a Power whose vital essence is something so awe-full and yet so attractive that the words Holiness and Love combined are utterly inadequate to express it, and if the word Love is employed it must be understood as meaning a quality far beyond what even Jesus was able to convey to His disciples—love of a power and an intensity of joy almost past human endurance; love of a capacity for cleansing and redeeming that can wash us even whiter than snow, can make us positively shine with radiancy; love of a buoyancy which sets men soaring irresistibly upward, carrying others upward too; love with a sweetness of fellow-feeling which melts our whole selves, sets us running in tears of compassion and fills us with craving to throw our arms round the world in closest embrace and make everyone share in our joy.

Love of such redemptive, cleansing, healing, entrancing power can only be known through actual personal experience, the missionary might have to say. But he would have to add that even that must be only a glimmer of the Love that is the very essence of the Power which drives and directs the Universe; and that our relation to that Power is closer even than the relation of a son to his father—that it is more like the relation of a patriot to his Fatherland; that as a patriot is born of and imbued with the spirit of his Fatherland and ever remains part of it, and on occasion represents it and expresses and manifests it, so also is a man born of and imbued with the Spirit of that Mother-world of which he never ceases to be a member; so does he in some measure express It and manifest It, and become a responsible agent for bringing It into effect; and so also are some men on some occasions in a high degree representative of that Spirit and specially responsible for imparting it to others, for quicken-

ing what of it there is in them to intense activity, and for acting vigorously in accordance with It to bring Its purpose into full practical effect *here* and *now*.

If the missionary in some such way as this could make his fellow-countrymen realize the weight of their responsibility; if he could hold up before their eyes a picture of the Kingdom of God in which the actual men around them would have their sensibility to spiritual things intensified by religion into a passion for perfection till they longed and craved and cried for power to put this love of perfection into every detail of their lives; if he could show them a vision of a state of things in which love of Truth is continually removing errors and misconceptions, probing deeper into essentials, and making integrity and honesty, purity and innocence more and more prevail over deceitfulness and falsehood, ignorance and prejudice; in which love of Beauty is making grace and graciousness increasingly oust the ugly and nasty, the brutal, the coarse and ungainly; in which love of Goodness is continually producing harmony out of discord, goodwill and good temper out of rancour and vindictiveness, making men more and more disposed to work together and develop *ésprit-de-corps* in all its forms—love of home, love of country, love of firm or profession, and thereby overcome selfishness, jealousy and covetousness; and in which this same love of Goodness is making character, ability and efficiency win their way through infirmity of purpose and idleness, display, ostentation and extravagance; if he could in addition make his hearers understand that as the value of mental labour is to manual labour, so is spiritual work to mental work, that equality is an unrealizable dream and that the ambition to excel and to lead is better than contentment with the level, the mediocre and the average, that followers can show a manly independence without being rude and can be obedient to authority without being servile, and that leaders can exercise the necessary and effective control without being harsh and tyrannical and show consideration and courtesy without loosing discipline, and that men with such gentle ways and tender feelings and fineness of touch can yet be strong and brave, venturesome and daring; and that in the high adventure of working for their own living, men striving for the highest kind of life will experience the thrill

and joy that great endeavour never fails to bring—if a missionary could hold such a vision before his fellow-countrymen (and this it seems to me, is precisely the kind of vision a Modernist *would* have to show them), and if he could appeal to their own common-sense to confirm it, and call on their innate loyalty to lead Godly lives before the people, he may be sure that his fellow-countrymen could not fail to respond.

If, further, in friendly conversation he could say straight and fairly to them: 'I sorely need your help. I have an uphill task before me fighting antagonists of religion and rousing the indifferent, and your support will make all the difference to me. You can see that the Modern Movement in the Church is using philosophy and science to help it in reaching broader and deeper truths about religion. And if you do the same and interest yourself in religion as you do in business and sport, you will find it the finest stimulant to action as well as the purest refreshment of soul in the worries and vexations of life, heightening your efficiency and trebling your power and influence. Try it in your practical work and you will find it nothing vague and dreamy and ineffectual, but something that can be applied directly and at once to everyday problems. You will discover that it gives to your life something fundamental and enduring that you can hold tightly on to—that it gives you a definite purpose, and that purpose the highest conceivable, for it is nothing less than the purpose of the whole world-process. If you test it for yourselves you will realize its value to the Empire and the world. And then, if in your own way and your own work among the people you can show the importance you attach to religion, you will find from that very fact that they will work more willingly and comfortably with you; and you will be giving me invaluable support in my own work'—if the missionary could speak in this way to administrators, soldiers and business men in his mission field, most of them would eagerly respond to the appeal and together with him they would give a new direction and set a new temper to the district or province in which they were working.

And if he could thus carry a Rhodes or a Curzon with him, both of whom were sons of clergymen, both of whom were of strong religious disposition at heart, both of whom were estranged as young men from conventional Church Christianity,

ut both of whom would have been attracted by the truth-seeking efforts of the Modern Movement; and if he could induce uch men to put into encouraging the spiritual life of India or Africa the same energy, ability and devotion that they put into he economic and political development, he would increase their apacity for good many times over. With his whole heart, his whole mind, and his whole soul burning with zeal for religion Rhodes might have saved South Africa from war, united its eople and given them a definite impetus towards spiritual hings, and Curzon might have united British and Indians in he common task of developing the rich spiritual heritage of ndia. That these two great Englishmen, so devoted to their ountry's cause, did not achieve a tenth part of what they might ave accomplished if they had been more distinctly and deidedly inspired by religion, and more thoroughly at home and t one with the Church, is a tragedy the like of which must never e allowed to occur again. And if the Modern Movement can ucceed in attaching such men more whole-heartedly to the hurch and in giving them a religious basis and end for all their ctivities, it will have done a work of supreme value both to the Empire and to the world.

My conclusion is, then, that the chief contribution which the Modern Movement in the English Church can make towards the olution of the most pressing problem connected with Foreign Missions is a new picture of the Kingdom of God, a new picture ainted from a new point of view, a picture in words which will ake appeal to the British official and mercantile community as ell as to Western-educated Asiatics, and should be the means f winning over the forces of anti-religion and of stirring the different into fresh and fervent life.

In the great world-war for the soul of mankind which is now eing waged, it lies with the Modern Movement to say the desive word and do the decisive deed.

A CHRISTIAN BASIS OF NATIONAL EDUCATION

By R. B. Henderson, Esq., M.A., Headmaster of Alleyn's School, Dulwich

IF dogma is teaching, I suppose a schoolmaster need not apologize for being dogmatic, but if dogmatism means assertion without proof then it is something to be avoided, and I fear that in a short paper dealing with highly contentious subjects I have made many unproved assertions. Time and space forbid any fuller and more adequate method.

At the beginning I have made many assumptions with confidence, because I know that I am on ground common to all of us. At the end of the paper I have ventured to state conclusions which represent some of my firmest convictions. I am of course prepared to defend them, and it would not surprise me to learn that they were peculiar to myself.

There is one other preliminary statement I ought to make by way of explanation. For the defects in our scheme of National Education I have not suggested remedies, and this for two reasons—first, I was not asked to do so; and second, there is only one remedy, the spread of a wider, deeper, truer, Christianity.

In a society such as ours the proposition, that there is pressing need for a Christian basis of National Education, surely needs neither proof nor defence, and any discourse with this as its text must necessarily present itself as preaching to the converted. Yet even the converted may find it useful to make an examination now and again into the meanings of the terms used and also to take stock of existing conditions with a view to some concerted action to bring 'present fact' a little more into harmony with 'eternal truth.' So much loose talk and loose thought are met with on every side—and often from people who, from their position and training might be expected to have clear and accurate information—as to the very meaning of education that it can hardly be waste of energy to explain once more just what is, or should be, understood by the word.

Education is training, not instruction. It is training for the whole of life, not merely for the intellectual side of it. It is not

book learning, but learning how to live; nor is its object to produce *mens sana in corpore sano*. Neither a well-informed and well-read man nor a good athlete—nor yet a combination of the two—is necessarily a well-educated man. Both a well-stocked mind and a vigorous body are good, but they do not either separately or combined, constitute the supreme good, and to mistake the lower for the higher is to prepare the way for inevitable disaster. Disaster usually comes with middle life. Who is not familiar with the disillusioned man of forty whose bodily powers have begun to decline, whose mind is even more active than it was before, but with whom the visions of youth have faded slowly away? Their name is Omar or Ecclesiastes—it is also legion, for they are many—they are to be found in every street, a nuisance to themselves and a danger to others. It would not be fair to lay all the blame for these failures on the doorsteps of the schools: many of the spiritually dead have only themselves to thank for the condition in which they find themselves, and, moreover, there are other cooks, besides the schoolmaster, who prepare the death in the pot from which these poor souls feed. Greed and ambition, bad business methods and class distinctions, the suspicions of the poor and the arrogance of the rich account for more deaths than can be laid to the charge of the schoolmaster. Nevertheless the school can do much, and he would be a bold man who would dare to maintain that our schools, as at present conducted, are doing anything in the least degree approaching the ideally possible.

English schools are probably in advance of those of most, if not all, other nations, because, from Arnold onwards, it has been recognized that the building of character is of greater importance than the imparting of learning, and although this ideal of character-training has been only fitfully and unevenly pursued, although it has often been misunderstood and sometimes wholly ignored, its mere existence at the back of every schoolmaster's mind has had a formative influence which has gone far to protect us from the worst forms of materialism and intellectualism. In particular it saved us from a threatened crash when it seemed that science had destroyed the Bible, for at that time many schoolmasters would have confined their activities to the classroom and neglected some of their more important

duties if they had not been so sure that, Bible or no Bible, boy must be trained to grow into true men.

But the ideal is often forgotten—it is forgotten when schools are built without any provision for chapel or playing-fields; when masters are ill-trained, ill-equipped and badly paid, when parents allow their family convenience to interfere with school discipline and, worst of all, when headmasters give way to such interference. What schoolmaster is not familiar with the request for extra-holiday on the plea that the examinations are over?

It would be an incalculable gain if every citizen, but especially every parent and every schoolmaster, were to realize that a school does not exist primarily to teach Latin, Mathematics, Greek or Science, but to provide a full-time course of training for the whole of life; and by the whole of life is meant not only every side of it at the beginning when the boy goes out into the world, but every side throughout youth, middle age, and old age. We must have life and have it more abundantly, and once this is realized we shall never be content so long as there remains a single school that is incapable of surrounding its members with all those influences, religious, intellectual, artistic and social, which will promote growth into life with eternal values.

A school is a bundle of influences—if we know how to give good gifts unto our children, we shall surround them with all the best influences known to mankind, and the school will become a small but well-ordered society where the reign of goodness, truth and beauty can begin. A school is essentially a society—man cannot live to himself or by himself, and it is clear that such a society, if it is to be built on the best and surest foundation, must have a religious basis; moreover, it is quite impossible to separate religious from secular education. There is no such thing as secular education—it is either religious or nothing. The effect of a master with the wrong attitude towards life is both immediate and cumulative, and in its total result destructive. It is not quite true to say that boys copy their masters—the process is rather more complicated and there are actions and reactions, but the truth is that, with the wrong kind of master, a boy finds encouragement in just those ways of thinking that are at once most natural and most harmful. *Facilis*

lescensus. There is support for the contention that a good man eaching history badly is to be preferred to a bad man teaching t well. If it were not that in teaching, as in every other art, here is a certain technique to be learnt, it would not be far from he mark to say that a man with right ideas of God and the niverse could not be a wholly unsuccessful schoolmaster. It is ertain that a man's philosophy will profoundly affect his teach- ng whatever the subject taught may be, and it must never be orgotten that the teaching of class subjects is but a small part f a schoolmaster's work. His business is to train boys, and ooks are one only of the instruments of his craft.

The picture we form, therefore, of the ideal school is that of small, vigorous, much-alive community in which all the boys re, unconsciously, preparing themselves for life in the only ossible way, namely, by living with ever-increasing intensity as hey grow up in surroundings artificially chosen to give them very possible opportunity of growth in the fullest sense. The asters in such a school will be leaders with qualifications akin o those of the deacons in the early Church, and like them will ive up their whole lives to their work. In fact of all modern ommunities, perhaps a good school comes nearest to the pic- ure of the early Church at Jerusalem. Well ordered discipline ith its correlative of experimental freedom, love of the brother- ood, sacrifice of personal to communal interests; and even the pocalyptic element is not without its counterpart, for every oy at school is continually looking forward to the 'end of the ge' and thinking of the wonderful things he will do when the me comes for him to turn the world upside down.

The hopes of youth are doomed to disappointment—or ransformation. The interim ethic of the apocalyptic age was ound to have a permanent value, so also may it be with the nterim ethic learned at school. So will it be if schools can be rought nearer to that perfection after which we are bidden to rive.

The actual is not quite the ideal—let us take a look at the arious kinds of educational institution existing in England at ie present time. It will be convenient to deal with them under our headings: Elementary Schools, Secondary Schools of two inds, Day and Boarding, and Universities.

Now with the possible exception of the Universities, which in this matter necessarily stand somewhat apart, in all these communities it is acknowledged that the aim should be character-building rather than book-learning, and although the real meaning of this formative principle is certainly not always grasped, the mere presence of the admitted ideal is of very great importance. It renders possible much that could otherwise not even be attempted. Jahveh is ruler in Jahveh's land, and although Jahveh may sometimes bear a strong resemblance to Baal, the acknowledgment is a real gain. Those who would carry on the true Mosaic tradition, though not promoted to be headmasters are at least not burned at the stake as heretics or stoned as malefactors.

In the Elementary Schools a very strange state of things is to be found, and one which in any country but our own would probably be not only unworkable but unthinkable. It has come about as a result of the unhappy divisions among the Churches, and the resulting attempted division of education into secular and religious—a dichotomy which is utterly false and baseless and which to-day would find very few defenders even among secularists (if there are any). In every elementary school in the country, the first period of each day is devoted to Scripture teaching. What an opportunity! As to what use is being made of it, no one can say. The Government and School Inspectors are forbidden to inspect it—their purview is confined by law to other periods of the day—so much for the ideal of character-building! In the denominational schools there is usually inspection by the Church concerned, and most of the local education authorities receive a report on the work done in all their schools. These reports are universally favourable—in fact the unanimity is remarkable and one is compelled to wonder whether all the praise given has been well and truly earned. Of course, the great majority of elementary schools are council-owned, and it is clear that the use made of this very considerable part of the school time-table must depend almost entirely on the attitude of the headmaster, and, even when this is all that it should be, the willingness and the ability of the staff has to be considered. The attitude of the headmaster is sometimes one of indifference, the willingness of the staff is hampered by regulations and the advice

of the National Union of Teachers, and the equipment as regards knowledge and ability of both headmaster and staff is usually lamentably deficient. But while it would be difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the opportunity offered for good work, it would be wrong to draw too gloomy a picture of the results achieved. Much good work is being done, and there is no appreciable opposition from the parents. It happens far too often, however, that the schoolmaster is unaware of the positive results of modern Biblical criticism, and is therefore under the impression that in the Scripture period he is expected to teach much that he knows to be at variance with modern knowledge. In many cases the result is that the period is spent in a barren reading round verse by verse of some chapter of the Bible, and any and every interruption of the lesson is welcomed as a relief by teacher and class alike. This is not a healthy state of affairs, and the Churches have it in their power to end it. When will they?

Secondary Schools are of two kinds—Day and Boarding. In the Day Schools the position is, generally speaking, thoroughly bad. There are many exceptions, of course, but, as a rule, very little attention is paid to religious matters in the Day Schools of England. It is unusual to find more than one period a week devoted to the teaching of Divinity and sometimes there is none at all, especially in the higher forms where it is most needed. There are two main causes of this lamentable state of affairs, and if anything is to be done to improve matters these two causes must be fully understood and definitely removed. The first is the overcrowding of the curriculum. It is not necessary here to go very deeply into this matter—the facts are obvious and not to be disputed. A good case can be made out for every subject taught in Secondary Schools and a case equally or nearly as good could be made out for many others, but the authorities —Universities and the Board of Education—which ultimately control so much of the teaching have apparently forgotten the principle of character-building and gone hot and strong for all manner of modern subjects. The underlying idea of teaching utility subjects is false. Neither the calculus nor Latin grammar is of immediate use to the great majority of people. In plain fact, neither is so useful as a knowledge of the New Testament, but,

in the present congestion, subjects with no obvious commercial value have been ruthlessly sacrificed and commerce itself is the poorer. Divinity does not win scholarships and it does not impress inspectors, for they have no more right (though they are more often invited, sometimes without success) to inspect the Scripture teaching in a secondary than in an elementary school. Religious instruction is thrust into the background and ignored. It must not be supposed that a remedy could be found by instituting prizes and scholarships for young Divinity experts—*μὴ γένοιτο*—or by any system of inspection. What is wanted is a complete change of attitude on the part of all authorities concerned with the matter so that, when time-tables are submitted for approval, no proposals will be considered acceptable unless sufficient time is to be allotted to the teaching of the most important of all subjects. As regards the time spent, or allowed for, in the work, the elementary school is some five or six times better off than the secondary school.

Of course there are the school prayers, and when these are properly conducted there can be no doubt that the cumulative effect on those who daily take part in them is very great and very good, but it must be remembered that hardly any day school is in possession of a chapel and that it is not always easy to preserve the right atmosphere in a school hall which is designed and used for very different purposes. It would, however, be fair to say that the daily corporate service is the brightest part of the picture.

Now for the other cause of the low esteem in which religious teaching is held in the day schools. This is the attitude of a very large number of the schoolmasters themselves. Many—though probably a decreasing number—are definitely hostile to the Christianity which has been presented to them; some are frankly indifferent, but the great majority are neither one nor the other; they are themselves so much puzzled by the present religious outlook that they seize on any respectable excuse for throwing on to the parents the responsibility for training the boys. No doubt this is cowardly but, after all, when everybody is more than satisfied with the schoolmaster who does not interfere, as it is said, in matters which concern the parents only; when in fact he can win the approbation of most good people by keeping

himself free from a very difficult job, he is hardly to be blamed for leaving undone a task the wisdom of doing which is to himself somewhat doubtful. And that brings us to the crux of the whole matter. The schoolmaster is in a state of doubt, and he has every reason for it. It must be remembered that schools are usually a generation or so behind universities in the matter of learning. Controversies that have long ago lost all interest at Oxford and Cambridge are still raging fiercely in the common rooms of schools, of which the senior and leading members came down twenty-five years ago and have been far too busy in the interval to keep in touch with movements of thought in any subject except their own special one. A quarter of a century is perhaps a moderate estimate—the battle of Colenso is still being fought in many schools to-day. Not a few schoolmasters are under the impression that, if they undertake the teaching of Divinity, they will be expected to teach Genesis i as history and Genesis iii as theology, to defend Jael and Samuel, to believe that God sent down fire on innocent soldiers at the request of a bloodthirsty prophet and that—when it comes to the New Testament—God is a Being whose justice demands that someone shall suffer when any wrong is done, but to whom it does not matter much on whom the suffering falls. This passes for the Christianity of the ages, and its existing form as often presented to him seems to be a more or less exalted form of magic.

Much of this applies to the boarding school as well as the day school, but the position in a boarding school is better because there it is impossible to shelve the responsibility for religious teaching. The boys are taken away from their parents during term-time, and the religious problem must be faced. In some boarding schools the work is really well done, in most it is done much better than in former times. Improvement has been steady though not very rapid: the chief enemy is ignorance. Masters in boarding schools find it even more difficult than those in day schools to keep abreast of the times, and it is to be feared that some extraordinarily antiquated and inaccurate information is being passed on to successive generations of boys.

Now the masters in both boarding and day schools come from the Universities, and to them attention must now be paid. It may be doubted whether one whose own University days are

distant by more than a quarter of a century can have much of value to say, yet this is clear: the Universities are not sending the best men to the schools, and the men they are sending are poorly equipped in knowledge of the essentials of our religion. It is in the day secondary schools that help is most urgently needed, and to these schools men who were as boys themselves trained in boarding schools simply will not go. There are exceptions, but generally speaking this is the truth; and it surely indicates something wrong in the presentation of life's problems to these men, both when they are in the sixth form at school, and afterwards at the University. Here is good, useful and most interesting work being ignored by the very men whose training and qualifications should enable them to do it better than anyone else.

There are, moreover, in all our Universities education departments where men are trained for a schoolmaster's work. How much is being done to put before these men the real nature of the responsibilities they are about to undertake? Short courses on the Scriptures such as the excellent ones provided every year by the Board of Education would be invaluable, and if attendance at them were voluntary both on the part of teacher and taught, perhaps so much the better. The Universities might in this way and also by the publication of books, do much to dispel the clouds of ignorance hanging over the schools of England. But this will not be enough. The key to the whole problem is to be found in the University and Training College, and a determined effort should be made in the one to put before undergraduates the greatness of the opportunity open to them, and in the other to prepare them fully for the work they will be called upon to do.

Here this very brief and inadequate account of the position of religious education in our country must end, but the title of this paper speaks of a *Christian* basis, and it has been said that the English people are deeply religious but their religion is not Christianity. If this is true, it may be that there is some misunderstanding as to the meaning of Christianity. That Christ has a message for this as for every age will be a truism to all professing Christians, but to discover that message for our own generation will not be an easy matter. If the task were easy, it

would not be worth the essay. Men have sought the elixir of life in all manner of ways. A Code of Laws, a multitude of Gods, a Book, a Church, a State, a Man; each one of these has been set up in the place of the one and only God. Each one of these will serve as guide for part of the way, but to everyone who puts his trust in any guide in which fallible humanity has a share, there comes at length the question, 'Lovest thou me more than these?' for God is more than any of them. Boys are like men: they ask for a rule, a guide—for anything which will save them from the fearful peril of choice. They seek a sign from heaven. It was a higher stage that was reached by the disciple who said 'Show us the Father and it sufficeth us,' and a higher yet by him who could devise the answer. There is no infallible guide to the mystery of human life and Christianity does not provide one, and that is one reason why Christianity is not only a difficult but a dangerous way—dangerous to teach and dangerous to practise.

Three of man's greatest enemies are ignorance, magic and fear. Jesus Christ overcame these three. Orthodox Christianity therefore must banish them from the world, and any Christianity which fails to do so must fall short of orthodoxy. The tragedy is that men who profess and certainly believe themselves to be Christians have, in all the subsequent ages, been anxious to bring them back again, and so to destroy the glorious freedom of the Good News. There are those who oppose the advance of knowledge in every direction, forgetting the promise that the Holy Spirit would guide us into all truth. There are others who bid us pin our faith to a scheme of salvation which did not form any part of the teaching of Jesus Himself, and which seems to those who do not understand it or who, thinking they understand it, nevertheless reject it, to be tainted with magic in essence and to be pagan in origin; and there are others again who would save the world by fear, and among these must be placed all those who would circumscribe life with a set of rules for conduct, for in the attempt to safeguard life they kill it.

He is the Way, the Truth and the Life, and it is this life-giving spirit that must be brought into our schools if we are to pass on to the coming generations the heritage which we have received from the past.

A NATIONAL BASIS FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

By the Rev. E. J. MARTIN, D.D., author of *The Emperor Julian.*

I.

THE broad question before us is this. Supposing we were working to get religious teaching included officially in the Education Code, what are the difficulties? We have to face the problem of how to organize a muddle. Religion is already taught in the enormous majority of our schools, elementary, secondary, and public. But its teaching is so irregularly fixed in the school system that hardly two schools agree in aim or scheme. In the voluntary schools the religious teaching is under diocesan direction and examination, in the provided elementary schools it is occasionally directed and more rarely examined by the L.E.A., but more usually is entirely at the discretion of the head teacher; in the grammar and secondary schools, except where provision is made under ancient trusts, it occupies a minor place on the time-table, as must happen to every subject devoid of examination value owing to the unhappy ideals of those schools. So that it would probably be true to say that in every type of school a hymn and prayers are used at the morning assembly, and in most schools a lesson is given on the Bible one or more times a week. The schools with no religious or Bible teaching are a minority.

Religion is an attitude to life and not a Bible lesson. Nevertheless we should like to see that attitude embodied in a scheme and universally adopted for teaching in all kinds of schools (including the voluntary schools), graded from the primary department up to the sixth form of the grammar school, and entered on the syllabus of every training college, while remaining outside the examination subjects.

II.

The whole approach to religious teaching has been blocked with the *débris* of the voluntary school controversy. Hitherto the vital thing—religious teaching—has been used as a weapon in the warfare about the relatively unimportant thing—the con-

trol of the voluntary schools. I looked again the other day at a book published only in 1911, *The Religious Question in Public Education*. It is a series of solutions suggested from many sources. How dead most of it seemed! Page after page discussed control, buildings, rates, rights, tests—scarcely a word is said of what religion is or what is to be taught in its name. Can we agree that religious education has nothing to do with rates, with control, with buildings, or with rights? Can we get out of the political arena?

Practically every scheme that has been put forward has been based on the idea of a deal, roughly that the control of the voluntary schools shall be surrendered in exchange for an undertaking by the L.E.A. that religion shall be taught in varying forms in all schools under its control. Little as yet has come from this policy. Little is likely to come from it. It is not an exchange in *pari materia*. You cannot barter property for ideals. I therefore plead that the problem of the voluntary schools should be entirely dissociated from that of national religious teaching.

At the moment this may look like asking for the moon. Yet it is these ghosts of the past that make our hopes seem vain. In actual fact there seems nearly a general consent to the importance of religion in the school. There is even a large measure of uniformity in what is taught in all elementary schools, both voluntary and provided. What then are the difficulties? All human action, and consequently most human difficulties, can be resolved in terms of persons. Who are the persons concerned in this problem, and what is their attitude?

III.

Of the general public, which includes the parents of the vast majority of the children of the country, it is probably fair to say that they have a strong but vague sentiment towards religion, but are heartily sick of controversy. In political circles the former sentiment may be as much weaker as the latter is stronger. Nonconformity is open to any straightforward, friendly relations. The most valuable work we can do immediately is to develop friendly intercourse with Free Churchmen. Clergy and ministers, the officials and leaders of all denominations should meet on an equal footing in every way possible. Our

weakness as Churchmen hitherto has too often been that we have been self-conscious, giving the impression either that we are condescending or are deliberately giving an exhibition of the breadth of our minds. In co-operation with the Free Churches we have still a long way to go before we find how significant is what we have in common and how unimportant is much that leaves us at variance.

But the persons with whom contact is vital are those directly concerned with education, the members and officers of the L.E.A. and the teaching profession. Dr. Hort with his extraordinary penetration as long ago as 1870 was convinced that it was in the Boards (now L.E.A.) and the teachers that the religious difficulty lay, and not in the schools.[1]

The L.E.A.'s first interest is administration. The curriculum of the school touches them less directly. On the religious question they stand more or less where the general public stands of whom they are the representatives. On technical matters and on administration generally the permanent officials are an important factor. They include the directors and other officers of the L.E.A., and ultimately the Board of Education itself. It is not likely that any united or national religious policy will originate in official quarters. It is not desirable that it should. The end we desire ought to come through the wish or consent of the public and the teachers, before it is imposed by authority. It would be a useful work to inform public opinion especially when possible through our representative on the various education authorities.

The nerve-centre of the system is the teacher. Religious education is really a question for teachers. The teaching profession has been put into an unfair position. In many of the training colleges religion is not a subject of the teachers' course. In school the Bible is used as a text-book, while a vague impression prevails that the truth of the Bible has been severely shaken. Little of the progressive interpretation of the Bible has been made available for teaching. The stories of Cain and Abel and of the Flood are still told. The Bible lesson too often moves in an atmosphere that isolates it from the rest of life. As with the Sunday School teacher who thought that St. Peter while praying on the housetop did not fall off because with God all

[1] *Life and Letters.* Vol. II, p. 124.

hings are possible, the Bible story is made subject to special dispensations of its own. Life there is like playing a game of which nobody knows the rules, and its spirit can only be described in the phrase of William the Waiter, 'You never can ell, sir, you never can tell.' Even behind the teaching of our own Church schools there are often desperate quibbles. I have heard teachers explain that Joseph was our Lord's earthly father, while God was his heavenly Father, unconscious that this was an explanation that did not explain.

What is needed is that our teachers should see that there is but one life, and whether it is described in the Bible or in the ext-book of geology, it answers to the same laws, that religion s not a departmental lesson but an attitude to all life. Much is vanted in the way of text-books and papers to explain the Bible nd the Christian religion in terms of life. Fundamentalism has oots in this country. It is the teacher's worst enemy, because e often obeys it subconsciously.

What do we want to teach? We want to teach that religion s dynamic, the driving-power of life, and that life is the impression of the inner self upon outside things or the expression of that self through outside things. We want to refute the materialistic conception of history, to emphasize the supreme alue of personality as the outstanding social factor. Our object s the enrichment of personality for social ends. We believe hat that can be achieved only by a feeling for the unseen piritual background of the universe. 'When thou hearest the ound of a going in the tops of the mulberry trees . . . then hou shalt bestir thyself.'[2]

We shall remember that even in the highest forms of econdary schools it can never be our task to teach the whole of eligion. The thoughts of a man are not and cannot be the houghts of a child. There must always be something still to earn. Indeed the school cannot teach religion. It can do no nore than open the eye and guide the look.

IV.

Can we then give any indication of the content of the actual eaching? Only in the most general way. We might define our mmediate purpose as leading children to recognize the Lord-

[2] II *Samuel* v, 24.

ship of Jesus. There will be three methods, (*a*) Information, (*b*) Stimulating constructive thought, (*c*) Expression of the sentiment, *i.e.* prayer and worship. Up to the ages of thirteen or fourteen the first method will hold the field, from fourteen there will be some attempt at the second, while the third will be used at all ages.

The information we are to give will be the Christian Facts, the life of Christ. The background of Old Testament history and of the spread of Christianity might (as is done in some schools) be related to general history, and taught in the same spirit as general history. Stories like Elisha and the Bears cannot be used at all in the lower groups. They can fitly come in to illustrate the development of religious ideas which would be part of the scheme for older scholars. Simple Christian principles of life and conduct would fall in both periods. They could be illustrated by or derived from the lives of Christian heroes not necessarily Bible characters. There are countless figures of all centuries who are a possession not of their own sect but of the universal Christian ethos, like Vincent de Paul or Mary Slesser of Old Calabar. This part of the scheme would naturally relate itself to Citizenship and Conduct. The two Duties from the Church Catechism might find a place here. It is the only part of the Catechism really suitable for children and as a summary of Christian ethics it is excellent.

The most important part of the scheme is self-expression in prayer and worship. This can be taught by example and not by precept. The prayers and hymns are of an importance that cannot be exaggerated. Selected Collects from B.C.P. like Trinity VII (Lord of all power and might), II Good Friday (Almighty and everlasting God) strike the note of nobility and simplicity. Selina Fox's *Chain of Prayer* is a storehouse from which every teacher can take something. Some prayers besides Our Father should be learnt by the school. Variation within limits (not too wide as yet) are a guard against formality.

The hymn book is the finest instrument the teacher has—and the most dangerous. I would urge the merits of the recent hymnal *Songs of Praise*. In music and words it is sane, wholesome, and attractive. What I mean by bad hymns are those like 'Thy kingdom come, O God,' sung to the tune *St. Caecilia*. The impression this creates is weary failure. It

always gives me the feeling that we are saying, 'Thy kingdom come,' but we know very well that it won't. Most hymn books are full of mis-readings of Christianity, false or morbid in sentiment, like 'We are but little children weak'; grotesque in phraseology or imagery like 'Gracious Spirit, Holy Ghost,' or the St. Bartholomew hymn in A. and M.; insipid in music like Dyke's *Hollingside* ('Jesu, lover of my soul'). Far too many hymn books might aptly have for their motto Browning's lines:

> With the slothful, with the mawkish, the unmanly,
> Like the aimless, helpless, hopeless, did I drivel.

On the other hand there are magnificent hymns. Witness the collection I have cited. Take for example 'City of God how broad and far,' to the tune *Richmond*; 'For all the saints,' to Vaughan Williams' tune; 'Children of the heavenly King' to a little melody named *Melling*, and hundreds of others. When there are so many fine things at hand, it is a tragedy that in the very field where children are most willing learners they should be subconsciously poisoned with the trivial and the false.

I have said nothing of the Bible. It is debatable what part the Bible can play in the school. It should probably be subordinate to the lesson. Much of it might be read as English literature apart from any religious use. Psalms and select passages should be learnt as repetition. But as a text-book it will probably be reserved for the older scholars and the top forms in secondary schools. Otherwise it raises problems of interpretation prematurely, and if the problems are not handled (and they cannot be handled in a way that young children can understand) then subconsciously the very impressions we do not want are sown.

What I have said, especially on the syllabus of teaching, is sketchy and tentative. I am trying only to establish a single principle—that *for religious education we want something simple, which will remain true when later years brings more knowledge.* We are not asking that elaborate and abstract dogmas shall be handed out to young children, or that tests shall be imposed on teacher or scholar, but only that everyone in England may learn to take his part in the joyful and heroic fellowship of which Jesus is Lord, and the essence of which, as Matthew Arnold says, is grace and peace.

THE BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE: A SURVEY

By the Right Rev. E. W. Barnes, D.D., Sc.D., F.R.S.,
Lord Bishop of Birmingham.

Jesus said: I am among you as one that serveth.—*Luke* xxii, 29.

THE past week has been noteworthy in that for the first time the Modern Churchmen's Conference has been held, not (as almost invariably) in Oxford or Cambridge, but in Birmingham. As Bishop of the Diocese I welcomed the Conference at its opening meeting on Monday last; to-day it is fitting that, at the service in this Cathedral which marks its close, I should attempt some survey of its activities.

A mere list of speakers at the Conference would suffice to demonstrate its importance to anyone familiar with the contemporary religious thought of England. A group of representative theologians has endeavoured to survey the history, to estimate the past and future progress, and to examine the influence of English Modernism: with them have been associated typical parish priests who have spoken of the spread of modernist ideas among the church-going laity and have borne witness to the religious enthusiasm which Modernism can create. Some of those who have read papers differ widely, one from another, in outlook. What they share in common is not a compact dogmatic system but an attitude of mind. All recognize the vast change in our knowledge of the physical Universe, its structure and history, which is due to the scientific progress of the last century. All realise how significantly critical scholarship has enlarged our understanding of the Bible and changed the use which we can make of it. All have a profound conviction of the importance of religion in human life. All believe that the worship and formularies of the Church can be so adapted as to interpret the Christian faith in a manner satisfactory to those who accept the new body of truth which scholars and men of science have created.

But it must be confessed that it has proved easier to review the past than to forecast the future. The leaven of the new knowledge is visibly working: it is spreading even to conservative religious circles. Modernism would not be so feared

y those who dislike mental change if it were not already ıfluential and plainly destined to increase in power. For this ɛason those to whom it is a sacred cause look hopefully to its evelopment. As to the nature of that development expecta- ons vary widely. Perhaps those are wisest among us who ɔnfess that they are unable to anticipate the nature of the ettlement which will follow the end of the religious evolution ɔw in rapid progress. In brief it may be said that modern tellectual progress has precipitated anew a conflict between uth and falsehood in religion: modernists are satisfied that .e victory for truth is, in the long run, certain.

I have personally been somewhat surprised by the quiet ɔnfidence manifested alike in papers and speeches during the ɔnference. It is but a few years since Modernists were sus- ɛcted in the Church of England. It is clear that now they feel emselves not merely tolerated but necessary—necessary in ɛder that the Church may win once again the respect of ducated opinion. Modernists, moreover, recognize that the nglican Communion since the Reformation has seldom lacked ɛn who were truly their spiritual forefathers. For instance, .ch divines as Hooker, the Cambridge Platonists, Butler, some the Tractarians, and Hort sought in divers ways and with rying success to bring honest learning to the service of the ɔurch. Modernists are their heirs. Within the Church they ɟe needed: within the Church they should and will remain. In ɗe end their work will not be in vain.

It is the more surprising that Modernists should be thus peful in that they plainly realize that the spirit of the present e is in many ways antagonistic to their aims. During the st week the superficiality of much popular so-called thought s not escaped condemnation. The present readiness of some igious teachers, who ought to know better, to connive at the owth of superstition has not been stressed; but at the same ɲe there has been no tendency to ignore that amazing increase superstitious beliefs and cults which is impudently defended religious progress. The motive forces in false religion, it s well been said, are ignorance, magic and fear; though ıorance is decreasing, magic and fear are stronger in their il influence now than they were half a century ago. Further,

during the Conference the need for some degree of austerity in the true Christian life has several times been emphasized. Such austerity is in direct conflict with the hedonism popular and fashionable to-day. In so far as the modern spirit is thus superficial, superstitious and luxurious, modernists have no desire to come to terms with it. Some types of credulity are morally degrading: mere pleasure-seeking impoverishes both the individual and the community. For credulity and selfish luxury the true modernist feels the scornful indignation shown for like evils by the prophets of Israel. So it comes about that modernists, of all groups within the Church, have the most sympathetic reverence for the prophetical books of the Old Testament.

Their desire for reality in religious practice causes modernists to shun such asceticism as is mere formality yielding empty service to an ecclesiastical rule: but for the sort of aspiration which is embodied in the higher types of Puritanism there is real enthusiasm. In fact, in the papers and in the discussions to which they have given rise there has been no tendency to exalt truth above goodness: and the Conference has been noteworthy in that Christian leaders, whether Catholic or Protestant, have been impartially judged by their deeds. William James' criterion of the value of spiritual achievement has been generally accepted: the lives of the saints are to be tested by their fruits and not by their roots.

For genuine mysticism, the immediate intuition of God by the soul that seeks Him, the warmest regard has been expressed. All have recognized that in such experience, corrected and strengthened by reference to the similar experience of Jesus, we reach the bases of the Christian faith. Church, creeds and sacraments rest on the life hid with Christ in God: that life must be strengthened by prayer and find its outcome in lofty motives or the worship which pretends to nourish it will be a sham. Different speakers have naturally differed as to how far direct intuition of God comes into the individual life: but all have urged that increase of knowledge is, in itself, a revelation of God. Further, it has been repeatedly affirmed that there can be no antithesis between true mysical illumination and rational understanding. This fact should never have been obscure to men who put in the forefront of their faith a

elief that the Holy Spirit would guide them into all truth. But or its clear recognition we owe not a little to the Quakers, whose octrine of the Inner Light has never been used to defend rational credulity.

There is, however, a spurious mysticism against which odernists rightly feel that they are called to wage battle. In s name men oppose faith to reason, defend fantastic superstions and claim the right to ignore truths which they dislike. When dearly-held beliefs happen to be false or degrading and et are emotionally satisfying it is difficult to condemn the man, r woman, who holds them as dishonest. He, or she, is more uly described as spiritually undeveloped : and especially at a me of religious decadence we need to teach that emotional tisfaction is not by itself a witness to true mysticism. Man's storical progress through the lower regions to the higher is rewn with the *débris* of degraded cults which once gave notional satisfaction. We should now agree that it is better have no religion at all than a faith which encourages sexual cence : and we feel happy that the danger of the revival of centious worship is not serious among the European races. t the spurious mysticism which incites to cruelty and leads en to regard persecution as service to the loving Father of hrist's revelation is still a danger within the Christian Church. he intolerance of the chaste and self-denying nun we have ways with us. The sway of bigotry extends even further than om Rome to Tennessee.

It is remarkable how often during the past week discussion s turned on the attitude of modernists to the Catholic and otestant traditions. A few years ago, when the Catholic retion in our own Church was at its height, the Reformation was dom mentioned without an apology or a sneer. But its sigficance for modernists has grown as the need for a further formation has appeared. We may be critical of details, but the main movement we are warmly appreciative, for we are ced to recognize that the great religious reform of the early teenth century was a much-needed contribution to the process moralizing and rationalizing religion. It was, however, more luable on the ethical than on the intellectual side, for by the formers much was taken over from earlier systems which

belonged to mental and emotional processes which we to-da can barely comprehend. The result of such acceptance of tradi tion is that we now need an extensive reformulation of dogm and of the language of many of our prayers if we are to appea successfully alike to the spiritual instincts and to the reason o our younger people. Words like *substitution* and *satisfactio* in connection with the atonement have lost significance. The doctrine of the Cross requires revision: the doctrine of the Incarnation is often so presented that its rejection is natural How to present the Incarnation in the light of modern critica scholarship is evidently a cause of much perplexity. It is clea that Unitarianism, with its doctrine of a purely transcenden God, has no attraction for Modern Churchmen.[1] Equally they can find no connection between the spiritual event and such a physical circumstance as the Virgin Birth. I personally would say that the Incarnation implies that the thought and life of Jesus are standards by which we must test all spiritual intuition and moral principles. We need such standards in the realm of the spirit, for scientific method is only supreme in the physical world. Within its own range, that is to say so long as it deals with measurable processes, science is free from the uncertainty attaching to qualitative judgments. Unfortunately, aesthetic and moral principles cannot be justified otherwise than by such

[1] This sentence, which attempts to sum up the murmurs of approval which greeted a statement by Professor Bethune-Baker, must not, of course, be taken as an adequate Modernist estimate of Unitarianism. Modernists cordially recognize that representative Unitarian divines have placed fine mental powers at the service of religion. Not a few of them highly value the writings of some Unitarian teachers and, in particular, of James Martineau. As fair-minded citizens they cannot fail to acknowledge how conspicuous has been the public spirit of Unitarians during the last two centuries, and how much they have done for social welfare in England. Though the Unitarian movement probably owed its main development to the influence of eighteenth century Deism, some of its leading divines have put forth a type of ethical theism on which Modernists could rear what they hold to be a satisfactory doctrine of the Incarnation. Perhaps the best epitome of the difference between Modernism and Unitarianism is contained in a witty remark attributed a few years ago to an English Bishop: 'Socinus accepted the Virgin Birth and rejected the Incarnation: Rashdall, while rejecting the Virgin Birth, accepts the Incarnation.' Unitarianism, in fact, was primarily a philosophical movement, a metaphysical break-away from the orthodox tradition. Modernism is merely a practical consequence of new knowledge, the necessary result of Biblical criticism and scientific progress. —E.W.B.

judgments. Of necessity, therefore, a personal element which we may call faith enters into the determination of our standards of goodness and beauty. Yet such faith must be reasonable and not arbitrary: we must permit it to be continuously criticized and tested by human reason. In accepting the Incarnation we make a venture of faith, as we assume that the teaching and the life of Christ will give us perfection of moral beauty and spiritual truth. We confirm this faith by applying the standards which it yields to the valuation of human life. No solution of the riddle of existence is entirely satisfactory; but Christ's teaching awakens such response in the soul and His personality is so powerful an inspiration that it is reasonable to believe that He revealed the true nature of God and showed us the life of God lived under human limitations. Along such lines we can preach sincerely and simply; and I do not think that if we preach such a Gospel of the Incarnation we need fear its inability to withstand attack.

Our younger educated people are increasingly critical of creeds and confessions in which statements occur which once were accepted as simple fact and now require to be explained as symbol or allegory. While restatement tarries, defections increase. If one may judge by reports from Lausanne, the representatives of the Churches there assembled to consider Faith and Order did not find it necessary to pay much attention to the consequences for faith of modern critical scholarship. Working with the presuppositions of a generation ago, they devised ambiguous formulae for general acceptance. Lausanne may thus unite the Churches, but, if opinions widely shared at the Birmingham Conference are sound, the Churches when so united will have few educated members.

Reformulation is urgently needed. Yet the attempt at Prayer Book Revision now before the nation does not encourage the hope that any process of restatement at the present time would be satisfactory to modernists. The new Prayer Book could hardly fail to be in some respects more suited to modern needs than a Book several centuries old. Yet a laborious investigator from another planet might examine its pages with care and fail to discover that those who revised it had any knowledge of present-day New Testament criticism. Its con-

cessions to superstitions rejected at the Reformation rightly alarm our older Evangelicals: Modernists also deplore its failure to remove many of those stumbling-blocks to faith which are common topics of conversation whenever religion is discussed in college rooms. Because it appears impossible at present to get a satisfactory restatement of faith, modernists have to be content to reinterpret old formulae in the light of modern knowledge. But young men and women widely regard the need for such interpretation as a scandal. It is a barrier to Church membership; and it continues to prevent many suitable men from coming forward for ordination.

The Churches—for it is not only in the Church of England that modernism is needed—have not yet learned the power of truth. By simple devotion to truth they would win a respect now too often withheld. In truth they could find unity. On any basis other than truth and goodness unity is impossible: were is possible, it would be a danger to civilization.

What is the outcome of this necessarily hurried survey of the Birmingham Conference? We must, I think, conclude that modernism has reached a stage where those who accept its principles and methods must steadily persevere in commending it to the Church. They can hope for a toleration which will change into respect and regard as the value of their work becomes clear. They cannot hope at present for anything of the nature of final success. They must needs make use, or at any rate live under the sway, of formulae which once were satisfactory but are so no longer. In every Church those who 'run the machine' tend to be content with the standard of aspiration and knowledge which generally prevails. Modernists must raise this standard in the Anglican Church before they can get the restatement of doctrine which they know to be inevitable. They must thus serve and wait. May their service be loyal and their patience great. When a contest arose as to which of His followers should be accounted the greatest, it is well to remember that our Master said, 'I am among you as one that serveth.' We have to serve our generation. If we set other aims than service before ourselves—position, power, notoriety or fame—we do ill. Let us be content to give our message and may God bless its spread.

THE EXTENSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT

By the Rev. T. J. Wood, M.A.,
Organizing Secretary of the Churchmen's Union.

The immediate necessity of the intellectual re-statement of doctrine has peatedly been urged as the task of the Modernist Movement. We have eard it at this Conference; it was alluded to in the *Modern Churchman* r July ('The task of the Modernist is to create the system that will grip e modern mind.'); Kirsopp Lake is emphatic in stating its urgency, in *he Religion of Yesterday and To-morrow.*

> 'The question is whether the educated men and women who are still within the Church and also understand something of science, can work out, before it be too late, a theology which will provide satisfactory intellectual expression for the religious experience of the next generation' (p. 71).

The first thesis of this paper is this: that while not denying the necessity an adequate synthesis of Christianity and modern knowledge, there is undant work for the Churchmen's Union in informing the multitude on e critical and scientific knowledge which make a theological re-statement cessary, and which must be the basis of that re-statement. It has been peatedly pointed out this week that there is a vast gulf between the leaders religious thought to-day and the people whom they ought to be leading o truth and life. People cannot wait for the task of re-statement to be itically and philosophically perfect before they are initiated into its ysteries. The man in the pew is, theologically, still living in the world of 90, while the man in the street is often half a century behind him.

Archdeacon Lilley told us on Tuesday that one of the chief causes of the lure of the Modernist Movement in the Roman Catholic Church was that was clerical; it did not become popular; and this is a fact which we of e C.U. ought to lay to heart. It is extremely unlikely that the synthesis, ich we seek, will be reached in this generation, if indeed it ever will be ached; for the principle of Moderism is that the synthesis between owledge and religion is a perpetual process, and that religious stagnation d decay are the inevitable consequences of a cessation of the process. is is abundantly clear in the history of religion in the centuries which lowed the systematisation of religion and knowledge by St. Thomas uinas. A complete synthesis is not to be looked for, and meanwhile 'the ople perish.'

The failure of the Clergy to inform the people of the results of modern ticism is a serious offence against truth and pure religion. Too often the gard for tender consciences is merely the excuse to avoid the paramount ty of sound teaching, and parsons are content to preach ethical idealism plift' sermons) rather than face the problem of eradicating false ideas out God, Jesus, and the Bible, from the minds of their congregations, d substituting truer and more inspiring conceptions.

Modernism, as I understand it, namely in the sense of the acceptance of dern Biblical criticism and scientific knowledge, is almost universal ong the clergy. Only the Fundamentalists and a few other uneducated sons reject these things. But what is *not* common is the willingness to

face their consequences for theology, and to share their possession with the laity. The people therefore believe that the clergy still hold views about God and the Bible which very few of them possess. The clergy, on the other hand, think that the faith of the laity rests still upon those views, and that to undermine that foundation would be to deprive the laity of their religious convictions and Christian morality.

It is true that the new doctrinal structure is not yet ready for occupation but its foundation is laid, and we believe, truly laid. The foundations of an infallible Book, or an infallible Church, have crumbled under the weight that they had to bear, but the spiritual basis of religion still remains, and will for ever remain, unshaken by science or philosophy. Those who have seriously studied the modern criticism of the Bible, the history of Christian institutions, or modern science, and estimated their effect upon the content of Christian truth, assure us that, although much wood, hay, stubble may have perished in the process, yet what remains is pure gold, and that is what the people need. Far more people have left the Church of England than are within it, as a comparison of the number of communicants with those confirmed will convince us; and it is to them and to those who, while unsatisfied by conventional theology, still love the Church enough to remain within it, that the mission of the Modernist lies.

Modern criticism will not be destructive for them, for their hold upon traditional theology has already been destroyed or weakened. These are they for whom the Modern Churchman has a gospel, and it is for the Churchmen's Union to discover how that gospel can be conveyed to them.

Dr. Kirsopp Lake points out that 'the teaching of the Bible on modern lines has only just begun. But though the labourers are few the fields are white unto harvest, for such teaching can be very successful if it is carried out *unreservedly*.' Most Modern Churchmen can bear witness to the vistas of truth and inspiration which was opened to them by their reflective understanding of modern criticism, when they had discovered that it could set them free from the incubus of irrational beliefs and enable them to call themselves Christians without sacrificing their intelligence, and there are many others to whom acquaintance with the modern position would be, as Canon Streeter has said, 'the liberation of life.'

I am not suggesting that courses of instruction in the detailed results of modern criticism are what is required. Any student is aware that for a full appreciation of them far greater knowledge is required than most of us possess, and an ability to date all the chapters of the Bible is no guarantee of the power to appreciate and appropriate their spiritual value. It is the attitude of approach, mentally and spiritually, and the transformed view of God's relations with man that results, which constitute the achievement of modern criticism, and that which we must communicate. Emphasis must be laid upon the grounds on which a Modernist can still hold the Christian faith, rather than upon the grounds on which he has departed from the traditional presentation of the Christian Gospel. 'Why I am a Christian' is a better apologetic than 'What is wrong with the Church?'

The parochial system is a serious handicap in the task of disseminating information as to the results of modern scholarship, but I believe that the task can be undertaken by the C.U. by means of courses of lectures in various localities, and still more by the conduct of study circles in connection with local branches.

May I indicate two special spheres of work which might be explored?

(*a*) *The Students of the Universities.* The Student Christian Movement is already doing part of our work for us, but if I may be allowed to venture a

criticism of that valuable movement, it necessarily confines its activities to that period of a man's life when he is at a University. It is precluded from providing for his needs subsequently, and its work is in a sense incomplete. Not infrequently, by introducing a student to a conception of religion which transcends the doctrines of any particular denomination, it makes him somewhat impatient of the limitations of all denominations. In attracting him to a higher loyalty, it tends to weaken the claims of loyalty to the existing institutions. Whereas the aim of the Churchmen's Union is, while urging the greater loyalty, to find the sphere of its activity within the lesser loyalty of a particular Church. I am sure that the S.C.M. recognises this tendency and does its utmost to correct it, and its methods and ideals open our eyes to one of the most fruitful fields of activity for the modern movement.

(*b*) *The Teachers.* The value and importance of acquainting teachers, both in secondary and elementary schools, with the modern presentation of religion has been sufficiently emphasised at this Conference. It is evident that the teachers themselves realise their own insufficiency for the task allotted to them and the tremendous nature of its opportunity, and that they would welcome any efforts which the C.U. could make to help them in it. We cannot remain indifferent to their appeal. We must organize methods of assistance.

The second thesis of this paper is this: That no representation of religion has the slightest chance of success unless it is accompanied by, and indeed is the expression of spiritual power. No merely intellectual conception will ever satisfy that craving for God which St. Augustine has so adequately expressed: 'Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee.'

A passion for truth may furnish the philosopher and the scientist with sufficient incentive to labour and to suffer; 'science and mysticism' may hold up the Platonist in his ways, 'that his footsteps slip not'; but these are not the possession of the average man. Religion has flourished for centuries without the assistance of any of them, save perhaps a little mysticism in the form of an instinctive awareness of the numinous and that to some seems to ground religion in the irrational and to be the foundation of all kinds of superstition.

The dynamic of religion at all times rests upon some other foundation than intellectual perception of truth or the sense of the numinous. Am I wrong in saying that the basis of religion has been, not so much belief in God, as the necessity of securing his favour? Primitive man did not endeavour to understand, still less to get to know his god, but to propitiate him, and much as we may deprecate the magic which he invented as the method, the desire for the peace which results from the belief that we are 'at-one' with God is so instinctive in man and inherent in religion, that no faith which ignores it can hope to persist.

Eliminate the false conceptions of God which have been associated with it; eradicate the superstitious belief in the efficacy of sacrifices and rites, which accompanied it; and there is still left the earnest desire of the religious man to be assured in some way of the love and forgiveness of God. The power of the mystery-religions rested, so far as my small knowledge of them enables me to perceive, upon the assurance of purification which they gave their devotees, a purification which would not only give them peace in this life, but immortality in the life beyond.

And the power of the Christian Church has depended upon its capacity to give this assurance to its members. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus,* said St.

Cyprian, and ever since, the Church has maintained its authority and enlarged its borders by this guarantee of salvation. The Catholics based their assurance upon the divine authority of the Church, and the confessional has been the method of appropriation of this assurance, and the Mass the magnificent symbol of its realisation. The peace which burst upon Luther when he first understood the meaning of St. Paul's 'righteousness of God by faith unto faith' is shared by Evangelicals when, at their conversion, they realise forgiveness of sins 'through the blood of the Lamb.'

The crude language of redemptionist hymns may be nauseating;

> 'There is a fountain fill'd with blood,
> Drawn from Emmanuel's veins,
> And sinners plunged beneath that flood
> Lose all their guilty stains,

may seem to us more like a reference to the *taurobolium* of Mithraism than to any genuine Christian experience; theories of the Atonement may have proved incapable of philosophical definition; but the realisation of the Atonement and the new power and life, which follow it, are facts of experience, not merely in the case of drunkards and neurotics, but of normal healthy-minded persons.

There is perhaps no more inspiring figure in history for the Modernist on the intellectual side than Erasmus, and no one will furnish a better warning. His life was a tragedy of lost opportunity. He forbore to throw his influence upon the side of practical reformation, and when the Reformation came it was founded, not upon the Humanism for which he had stood, but upon the need for salvation which he had neglected. This is what Lindsay says in his *History of the Reformation.*

> 'It is also to be feared that the Christian Humanists had no real sense of what was needed for that renovation of morals, public and private, which they ardently desired to see . . . What the multitude wanted was a sense of God's forgiveness for their sins, and they greedily seized on Indulgences, pilgrimages to holy places, and relic-worship to secure the pardon they longed for. The aristocratic and intellectual reform, contemplated by the Christian Humanists, scarcely appealed to them. Their longing for a certainty of salvation could not be satisfied with recommendations to virtuous living according to the rules of the Neo-Platonic ethics . . . The Reformation needed Luther.'

The moral teaching of Christ, His faith about God (which has been described this week as the kernel of Christianity), His devotion to truth, His sincerity, the power of the Spirit (which is the sign of His followers also), all that is true, good and beautiful in Him, the reflection of God Himself, find their necessary culmination and their expression on the Cross. The key to the power of Christianity is surely the vision of the utter self-sacrificing love of God, revealed in Christ, and pursuing the soul of man, even through suffering and death, 'this is the victory that overcometh the world.'

I make no apology for appearing to end this, the last paper of this Conference, with a sermon. If we are to fail as Modernists, far better that we should fail in presenting Jesus as 'The Truth' (as the modern world sees Truth), than in setting Him forth as 'The Way, and the Life.' The re-statement of truth is a task which each generation can attempt and leave unfinished, if necessary, to the next, but the re-statement of the Gospel of self-sacrificing love is one which must be lived here and now.

'THE SCHOLAR-SAINTS OF ANTIOCH'

An address given at St. Mary's Church, Selly Oak, August 23rd, 1927.

By the Rev. Leonard Patterson, D.D., Vice-Principal of Queen's College, Birmingham.

'The man Christ Jesus.'—I *Tim.* ii, 5.

This short, striking phrase, which may be taken as representing the thought of St. Paul if not his actual words, is a clear and unequivocal affirmation of the real, concrete, and individual manhood of our Lord. Yet no sane thinker would assert that St. Paul intended to dispute, still less to deny the fact, that God was in Christ. As one of the ancient theologians, whose teaching will be discussed in this short address, pointed out very pertinently, the title mediator, as used in this connection, signifies both the Divine and human natures. Our Lord could not have been the mediator between God and man unless He were God and man, or rather God-in-man.

As the aim of this address is expository rather than controversial, an attempt will be made to present a view of the truth which may be acceptable both to the devout Modernist and the rational Catholic. We must endeavour to speak the truth as it is in Jesus, but always in His spirit, which is love. All sincere Christians believe that our Lord is perfect man, but they are not always in entire agreement about the implications of their faith.

It is almost a commonplace of Christian doctrine that the Antiochenes laid special emphasis on the manhood of Christ. But such teaching was needed in the first centuries of Church history against the attacks of mythologists, Gnostics, and heretics of many kinds. Who can say that it is not needed just as much at the present time, when modern mythologists like my friend Mr. J. M. Robertson, theosophists, and others are denying the real existence or minimizing the manhood of our Lord?

The three great Antiochene defenders of the Catholic faith in the first five centuries of the history of the Christian Church were St. Eustathius of Antioch, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and Theodoret of Cyrrhus. It is proposed, within the limits of this address, to give a brief sketch of their characters and teaching.

All scholars must be grateful to the Dean of Salisbury, Dr. Burn, for his concise but illuminating discourse on St. Eustathius of Antioch, pronounced on the occasion of the Commemoration of the Council of Nicaea. It establishes the reputation of St. Eustathius for piety and orthodoxy, though it exposes at the same time the false claims of Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, to such qualities. We owe the little we know about St. Eustathius to later writers such as Theodoret of Cyrrhus and Facundus, Bishop of Hermiane.

St. Eustathius was a man of stern and uncompromising character. He was no polished courtier like Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia, and would have been incapable of pronouncing the fulsome eulogy on the Emperor Constantine which is rightly attributed to Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea. If St. Ambrose reports his words correctly, he incurred the displeasure of the imperial court by describing the Empress Helena as a former barmaid.

This was certainly a tactless and somewhat uncharitable remark, if Eustathius intended to cast any aspersion on her moral character. But at any rate his blunt straightforwardness was preferable to the smooth-tongued sycophancy of Theognis, Bishop of Nicaea, and Eusebius, Bishop of Nicomedia. Eustathius was no place-hunter, and tried to avoid his elevation to the see of Antioch, as he foresaw the ecclesiastical strife which would probably ensue. When Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, attempted to conceal his own heterodoxy and gratify his personal animosity by trumping up vague charges of immorality and Sabellianism against Eustathius, the latter bore his deposition and exile with dignity and fortitude. No more fitting panegyric could have been pronounced on him than that of St. Chrysostom, that he had been 'a martyr in will if not in fact, entombed in the hearts of the people of Antioch.'

St. Eustathius was a staunch supporter of St. Athanasius and a fellow-champion of the Catholic faith against the attacks of the Arians. The part which he played in this controversy has been overshadowed by the dramatic figure of St. Athanasius, but it is equally important for the history of Christian doctrine. While Athanasius asserted that the Divine Word was truly one with God the Father, Eustathius declared that our Lord had a human soul, which, we know, Arius had rejected. Eustathius points out very clearly the moral and theological consequences of this error. 'Why do they (the Arians) make much of proving that Christ assumed a body without a soul? In order that, by attributing moral change to the Divine Spirit, they might persuade men that the changeable (Word) is not begotten of the unchangeable (God the Father).' As man, Christ is one with us. 'The soul of Jesus is rational and consubstantial with the souls of men, even as the flesh born of Mary is consubstantial with the flesh of men.'

Jesus, as man, is distinct from and yet united with the Divine Word or Spirit. We are inclined to agree with Dr. Burn, as against Dr. Raven, that Eustathius did not hold that the human personality of Christ was separate from the Divine Word. Distinction is not the same as separation. For instance, we should all agree that our Lord's soul was distinct from His body, but it was never separate except for the period between the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, according to orthodox tradition.

The mode of union may be described as dwelling together, or association. 'The man,' says Eustathius, 'lives by God's power, when associated with God's spirit'; or again, 'The soul of the Christ dwells together with the Word and God.' Eustathius does not seem to distinguish clearly between the action of the Word or the Spirit upon the human soul of our Lord, and that may have afforded Eusebius of Caesarea a plausible pretext for his malicious accusation of Sabellianism; but, on the other hand, his vigorous defence of the human soul probably influenced Athanasius, so that he was able to write his formal letter to the Church of Antioch after the Council of Alexandria in 362 and assure them that the members of the Council accepted the belief in the human and rational soul of Christ.

Unfortunately this triumph of orthodoxy was shortlived. Another and more subtle attack upon our Lord's perfect manhood was launched by Apollinarius, Bishop of Laodicea. He accepted the threefold division of man into body, animal soul (or principle of life), and rational soul, and argued that the Divine Word had taken the place of the rational soul. Apollinarius was excommunicated at the Council of Constantinople in 381, but his arguments were refuted by Theodore of Mopsuestia in a work probably composed about 413.

Theodore of Mopsuestia must have possessed an attractive and lovable character. His friendship for his former fellow-student, St. Chrysostom, was not altered or impaired by the latter's misfortunes and disgrace. Chrysostom declares in one of his letters that he 'can never forget the love of Theodore, so genuine and warm, so sincere and guileless, a love maintained from early years, and manifested even now.' Theodore was not afraid to welcome and protect Julian of Eclanum and the other Pelagian leaders when it would, no doubt, have been more worldly-wise to ignore or disown them. His treatise on Original Sin shows that he appreciated their positive teaching on free-will and grace, though he avoided their extreme conclusions.

Theodore's reputation for orthodoxy has suffered from the posthumous condemnation of his doctrines by the Council of Constantinople in 553. But we find that modern scholars who are competent to judge are less ready to condemn him. So impartial a scholar as the late Dr. Swete expressed the opinion that Theodore was entirely unconscious of deviating from the doctrine of the Catholic Church. It is, however, gratifying to cite witnesses to Theodore's orthodoxy from other schools of thought. Fr. Kent, O.S.C., reviewing my book on *Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought* in the *Tablet* (Saturday, July 9th), says that Theodore's commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul 'contains much sound and excellent doctrine, . . . and there is nothing in it to offend the pious ears of a meticulously orthodox Catholic reader.' Whether Fr. Kent would extend his approval to Theodore's other works we cannot say; but at any rate we may be thankful for this well-deserved meed of praise. We would venture to suggest that the Bishops of Rome were more willing at certain times to favour the Church of Alexandria than the Churches of Constantinople or Antioch—but we must now return to the doctrine of Theodore.

In contrast to Apollinarius, who denied the human rational soul and (*ex hypothesi*) the human will, Theodore showed that a rational soul and human will were indispensable for the truly human experience of our Lord. If Christ had no human soul, He could not have felt the spiritual temptations to pride and self-assertion, which, in Theodore's judgment, must have been harder to bear than the bodily pangs of hunger and thirst. The temptations of Christ would then have been a phantasmagoria or dramatic display. The human soul implies a human will, because the will is the self acting, or, as Dr. Temple puts it, organized for action. A free human will is needed for our Lord's moral progress, which is definitely affirmed by St. Luke. Theodore asserts that the integrity of our Lord's purpose was preserved by the co-operation of the Divine Word. It seems clear from this statement that he regarded the human will as really operative in Christ's earthly life. The human will is not absorbed or annihilated by the Divine will, but freely co-operates with it. We can heartily endorse the statements of Dr. Temple and Dr. McNeile that Christ is 'the Man whose will is united with God's,' or 'the one Man who has made His human will identical with God's will.' This, stated in concrete terms, simply means that Christ acted always as God His Father would have Him to act.

Again, Theodore conceived the Incarnation as the perfect indwelling of Christ as in a son. This means, according to Theodore, that God or the Word united the whole of the man that was assumed to Himself. To adapt the words of St. Paul, God dwelt in Him as fully as He could in a human body and soul. The human personality or manhood is assumed or taken up into God, as we find it stated in the so-called Creed of St.

Athanasius. This, of course, does not mean that Christ was a mere man who became God or was deified after the manner of the heroes of pagan mythology. Nor can it be suggested that Christ is perfect man simply as a human individual; but, as the late Dr. Weston, Bishop of Zanzibar, truly said, 'Perfect manhood is manhood indwelt by God.' Yet manhood is a cold, lifeless abstraction unless it is realized in concrete individual men, and most of all in the perfect man, Jesus Christ. The theory of indwelling, though it is supported by the previously quoted words of St. Paul, is sometimes misinterpreted as if it signified a merely moral relation of God to man. But it would be just as unfair to stigmatize the theory of the indwelling of God in Christ as a merely moral relation as to abuse the Incarnation as a materialistic view of God's operation in the world.

This truly spiritual view of the Incarnation is more closely defined and expounded by the last true representative of the Antiochene school, Theodoret of Cyrrhus. It must be frankly admitted that the character of Theodoret is inferior to that of Theodore. Theodoret was vacillating in his purpose and ungenerous in his behaviour. He had frequently assured Nestorius that he would never desert or betray him to his enemies; but he yielded to theological intimidation, and pronounced the prescribed anathema on his former friend at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Such a want of moral courage might be pardonable in view of the violence which characterized these synods of the Church, but it is impossible to excuse or justify the vulgar abuse which he heaped on Cyril of Alexandria shortly after his death, and his absurd travesty of Nestorius' opinions in the *Compendium Haereticarum Fabularum* (Summary of Heretical Profanity), though he had previously defended the same views against the anathemas of Cyril.

The best example of Theodoret's theological method is found in the dialogue called *Eranistes* (or the Scrap-collector) which purports to be a conversation between Orthodoxos (representing Theodoret) and an opponent, who seems to hold opinions very similar to those for which Eutyches was condemned. The dialogue, which is divided into three sections, deals with various aspects of the Incarnation, which are indicated by the titles Ἄτρεπτος (unchangeable), Ἀσύγχυτος (unconfused), and Ἀπαθής (impassible).

O. begins by denying any conversion into flesh. The phrase 'The Word became flesh' cannot imply a change in God, because God is unchangeable in nature. It was the firm conviction of Eastern theologians, from Origen onwards, that God could not change in nature or substance. That statement would seem to need some qualification to avoid misunderstanding. God cannot change in His essential nature of holiness and love, but He does change in His relation to man by becoming incarnate. However, O. prefers to say that God assumed flesh, together with a rational soul. The idea of assumption is vouched for by the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 'He took on him the seed of Abraham,' which connotes a body and a rational soul. O. quotes Athanasius as saying in his letter to Epictetus, Bishop of Corinth, 'He (Christ) is said to have become flesh, not because He was changed into flesh, but because He assumed flesh on our behalf. . . . This is the same as saying "the Word became man."' Christ was not God only, but man also: man as born at Bethlehem, but God as existing before the ages. So, in the words of the *Quicunque vult,* there was no conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but a taking of the manhood into God.

Secondly, O. insists that there must be no confusion of the two natures or substances. This was the sheet-anchor of the Antiochene position, that the Divine and the human were united in Christ without mixture or con-

fusion. Eutyches was guilty of mental as well as metaphysical confusion in asserting that there were two natures before the Incarnation but only one afterwards. Pope Leo had no difficulty in exposing his absurd muddle-headedness. In the same way, O. points out to Eranistes that there was only one nature, the Divine, before the union or Incarnation, but after the union it was right to speak of two natures, that which assumed and that which was assumed. The analogy of human personality is helpful up to a certain point. Man consists of body and soul, but the soul is the superior element. Yet there is this difference between the union of soul and body in man and the union of God and man in Christ. In the former case it is a natural union, but in the latter it is a voluntary union. The whole process must be attributed to God's will and love for men. Still, however they are united, God and man retain their respective characteristics, just as soul and body have their distinct qualities or properties. Cyril and Leo propounded the theory of the interchange of properties or qualities. If this meant that certain qualities of God and of man might be attributed to the one person of Christ, such a theory was permissible. But if it were suggested that the qualities of God could be attributed to Christ as man, the absurdity is obvious. Strictly speaking, we can no more say that God died, or that the man Jesus was Lord of the Universe, than we can say that the soul of the boy sneezed when Elisha restored him to life, or the body of Christ rejoiced and was sorrowful unto death. There can be no confusion of natures or interchange of the properties of God and man, but there must be spiritual interaction between God and man in the person of Christ.

The same argument holds good of the sufferings of Christ. O., following the majority of Eastern theologians, declares that God cannot suffer. The whole subject has been fully treated in Dr. Mozley's book, *The Impassibility of God,* and it can only be treated very briefly in this address. Unfortunately there is a tendency, both among Modernists and Catholics, to speak of a suffering God. Unless such an idea is very carefully safeguarded, there is danger of a relapse into the heresies of Patripassianism and Theopaschitism. The alternative lies not between a suffering God and the apathetic deities of Epicurean or Stoic philosophy, but between a sympathetic God and the crudely anthropomorphic God of the earlier parts of the Old Testament. We may ascribe personal feelings of a higher kind to God, but not physical infirmities. Bodily suffering and death can be attributed to the body of Christ, but not to His soul, and still less to the Divine Word. As O. rightly remarks, even the soul does not share in all the experiences which belong to the body. The soul may have suffered sorrow together with the body, but it does not die with the body. O. emphasizes the fact that the sufferings of Christ were voluntary. He suffered willingly, and underwent death of His own accord. That is the essence of the Incarnation, the union of the human will with the Divine will, of man with God.

What then can the Antiochene theologians teach us men and women living in the twentieth century, whether we be Catholics, Evangelicals or Modernists? We can learn anew the real and permanent value of human personality in three ways.

(1) We must cherish a profound respect and a lasting hope for all men, even the humblest and most degraded. Every man is destined to become like God in character, because God has endowed him with free will, and God acts upon every man if he will only respond to the Divine influence.

(2) Every man must try, by God's grace, to reach the ideal which Christ has set before him by His example and life. None of us will ever reach any degree of holiness without God's grace, but Christ was perfect man because from the first moment of His conscious life He was one in will and love with God.

> 'Thou seemest human and divine,
> The highest, holiest manhood thou:
> Our wills are ours, we know not how
> Our wills are ours, to make them thine.'

(3) Christ was true man, not in appearance but in reality. He lived and still lives as perfect man, with a spiritual body and human soul; He acts upon us in prayer and communion, that He may bring us, imperfect men and women, into union and fellowship with God, His Father and ours.

JOHN FREDERICK DENISON MAURICE

By the Rev. H. G. Mulliner, M.A.

'There came a man, sent from God. . . . The same came for witness, that he might bear witness of the light.'—*St. John* i, 6-7.

Maurice was born in 1805. His main work was done during a negative period in English Church history—a period when the Evangelical revival was losing its force and had grown more contemptuous of its opponents than sure of its mesage—a period when the Tractarian movement had called its first halt after Newman's reception into the Church of Rome and ordinary men had become impressed with the gulf between themselves and such ecclesiastical minds—a period when partial scientific knowledge was eagerly used to attack the faith of Christians, and educated men were alienated by the strife of churches and sects, and bewildered by the multitude of opinions. At such a time Maurice bore his witness to the living God, a witness arresting in its deep sincerity though sometimes obscure in its utterance. He had, owing to peculiar circumstances, to fight out within himself the spiritual battles of his age. Compared with the Evangelicals, he knew redemption not as a theory of his forefathers but as a present experience; he was far too certain of the existence of the living Church to need to support his faith by dwelling upon its past; he had won through to such an assurance of God, and conscience, and sin, and was so filled with a love of truth, that the scientific studies of his day brought to him no fears. No educated man was more revolted than Maurice by the rivalries of Christian sects, but seeking faithfully to possess the truth which lay behind the many opinions, he built up for himself a definite philosophical position.

If Maurice has any claim to greatness, that claim lies not so much in his being a thinker as a prophet. Like his teacher St. John, his gospel was a spiritual gospel. He complained that men talked about God but did not confess a living God. He described Wordsworth's *Prelude* as the expression of that self-building process in which God is still the agent

only fitting men to be world-wise, men of genius. The men of his age, he complained, were trying to become independent of the government of God and to set up themselves as gods.

> 'I have a very strong feeling,' he wrote, 'of the duty of testifying for the name and Kingdom of God: a very deep conviction that Protestants and Romanists alike are setting up religion in the place of God. I feel that if ever I am to do the work I was sent into the world to do, I must much more earnestly call upon the Church to believe in God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and not to confound Him with the Evil Spirit.'

Maurice was a man with a deep sense of mission. Like all such men his convictions were strong. He was dogmatic, yet in his writings and in his speech this note is not in evidence. In manner he was shy, diffident, retiring. He was humble almost to a fault. He was ever-ready to believe that the Truth was in the other man, that God was speaking to him through the other man. In his writings he sought to do full justice to those from whom he differed. Moreover he was deeply conscious of 'atheism,' as he called it, in himself—of disbelief in God and wilful blindness to His leading. Evil was a great reality to Maurice. The Evil Spirit was ever prompting him and all men to pride, selfishness, and sin; all goodness was of God alone. He found that the deeper truths came slowly, and he thought that uneducated people had often a surer grasp of them than the more learned. Above all he valued and practised the command, 'Judge not'; and describes himself as judging, and then being ashamed of having judged, and then seeing the greater evil in himself. This sense of sin and fear of judging are notes which appear constantly in his private letters.

But humble and withdrawing as he was, he was a fighter. His controversies mark the stages of his life. He was bitterly attacked by large and influential groups nearly his whole life through. Moreover he provoked attack, not because he liked to provoke it, but because he was from his earliest years devoted to truth. This devotion to truth led him out into the arena. Life was to him a battle between the forces of Good and Evil, of Light and Darkness. He did not fear to put himself against the popular opinion of his day, not on one or two carefully chosen subjects, but wherever he felt lies were taking the place of truth. He was reckless of the cost to himself. A deep chivalry combining with this devotion to truth often made him go to the support of those attacked for holding some unpopular truth, even when he did not agree with them on other important points. Hence he was often identified with views he never held. His son has written that there was no form of heresy with which he was not at one time or another identified by some reverend and learned person.

Maurice refused to seek high office, believing that it would hinder him in his true vocation. And his friends always found many willing to oppose his promotion. Chaplain of Guy's Hospital, then at Lincoln's Inn, and later, minister at St. Peter's, Vere Street, he was on the staff of King's College, London, until he was dismissed from the Chair of Theology in 1853. The Council of King's College had been uneasy for some time on account of his Christian Socialism and the constant attacks on him in the press. In his *Theological Essays* he expressed views on the future punishment of the wicked, quite usual to-day, but which the Council regarded as of 'dangerous tendency.' Gladstone proposed that the Bishop of London

be asked to appoint a Committee of Divines to inquire into the orthodoxy of the views, but the laymen on the Council rejected the proposal, and Maurice was dismissed with a tribute to the 'zealous and able manner' in which he had served the College for thirteen years. In 1866, thirteen years later, a compensating honour came when he was elected Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Theology at Cambridge. It was then the autumn of his life, and he died six years later, at the age of 66.

As the offices which he held suggest, Maurice's mission was to the educated classes. He spent ten years among the poor patients at Guy's and was deeply concerned for the well-being of the working classes, and he attracted those who were prepared to continue their education in the evenings of busy days; but his chief work was among the then increasing number of educated men and women who were perplexed by the mental turmoil of their day, and to whom he spoke through his books and sermons and lectures. He left a deep impression on many of his pupils at King's, such as Canon Ainger. He was one of the few clergymen to be friendly with Thomas Carlyle and J. S. Mill. The latter once described him as a terrible example of intellectual waste. Alfred Tennyson, on the other hand, loved him as 'the truest Christian he knew in the world,' and asked him to be his son's godfather. During the crisis at King's College, Tennyson sent him a poetic invitation:

> Come, when no graver cares employ,
> Godfather, come and see your boy:
> Your presence will be sun in winter,
> Making the little one leap for joy.
>
> For, being of that honest few,
> Who give the Fiend himself his due,
> Should eighty-thousand college-councils
> Thunder 'Anathema,' friend, at you;
>
> Should all our churchmen foam in spite
> At you, so careful of the right,
> Yet one lay-hearth would give you welcome
> (Take it and come) to the Isle of Wight. . . .

Maurice was not an easy man to know, but the more intimately men knew him the more they felt his influence. It is the great service of his son's biography[1] that he has made that knowledge possible to a wider and later public. Gladstone, who had found Maurice at Oxford 'difficult to catch, and still more difficult to hold,' confessed after reading the *Life and Letters* that Maurice was indeed 'a spiritual splendour,' and that the failure to understand him 'must be greatly my own fault.' Arthur Hallam wrote to Gladstone that Maurice as an undergraduate at Cambridge 'moulded men like a second nature, and these, too, men eminent for intellectual power.' To Kingsley he was ever 'The Master,' to whose angel's trumpet, Kingsley said, he played his penny whistle. Maurice gathered round him a small group of men of varying gifts and professions, and to them he was the Master-Spirit. They met weekly at his house for Bible-reading. There Maurice sought to draw the truth out of each, and had 'the highest confidence that a higher wisdom than theirs or mine

[1] *The Life of F. D. Maurice, chiefly told in his own Letters.* Edited by his son, Frederick Maurice. 2 Vols. 2nd Ed. (1884).

would impart itself unto them.' He would give no man formulae in which to believe; he blamed himself for having suppressed men's doubts; he sought to encourage them in their search, and to assure them of God's leading. He attracted men not only by his wide sympathy and fine culture, but chiefly by his genuine piety. When Maurice died, George Macdonald in a poem spoke of 'the trembling fervency of prayer by which he led our souls the prayerful way.' Men went to Lincoln's Inn to hear him pray. 'He never read prayers,' says his son; 'he prayed.' His influence, like that of others, came through the silent night-watches of prayer.

His Teaching.

Only the roughest sketch can be given of Maurice's teaching. It was in the tradition of St. John. Plato he had learnt under Julius Hare at Cambridge. We can trace, too, the influence of Coleridge and Erskine of Linlathen. His was a mystical and metaphysical mind. He appealed constantly to the heart, being sure that in the deepest and highest desires men were not deceived. He took great pains to discover the exact meaning of words, and, as Canon Ainger has said, suffered the fate of all such conscientious philologists and was accused of using them in an arbitrary sense.

His father was an Unitarian minister, and Maurice was nearly twenty-six years old before he openly abandoned Unitarianism. He came to feel the need of an Incarnation which should reveal God, of whose perfectly spiritual nature he 'had no idea,' and the need of an indwelling Spirit 'in my heart to enable it to think rightly and pray rightly to Him.' He died with the threefold name upon his lips. His theology springs from his sense of the nearness of God. Revelation was the great fact of God's movement to man. Thus Mansell's Bampton Lectures, which taught that man can only have 'a regulative knowledge' of God, seemed to him to strike at the very root of his faith, and to deny that man could have direct knowledge of God. This knowledge of God is eternal life, to be entered into here and now. The Kingdom of God is within: Christ is the head of every man, the source of all good. Men's fault is that they fail to acknowledge this headship. Their sin is their self-will.

Above all, God is love. The sovereignty and holiness of God were too real to Maurice to permit him for a moment to confuse love with mere good-nature, as many do to-day. He was ever conscious of sin which was separating him from God. God, who loved men, must for that reason ever be at war with the sin in them. The consuming fire of His love can never cease to burn up the evil. Also, to love is to suffer. Kingsley recounts how, when he and Maurice were looking at Da Vinci's fresco of the Last Supper, Maurice complained of the effeminate and girlish face which the painter had given to St. John. 'Why?' asked Kingsley. 'Why,' Maurice replied, 'was he not the Apostle of love? Then in such a world of hate and misery as this, do you not think he would have more furrows on his cheeks than all the other apostles?' And to Kingsley he spoke truly both of St. John and himself.

The Cross was to Maurice the declaration of God's love, but he vehemently opposed the view that it changed the will of God. Christ redeemed men from sin, which separates from God, and not from the punishment of sin. This universal redemption was a fact, and not something brought about by baptism or conversion. As Erskine taught, God's forgiveness is an eternal fact, and salvation is in the acceptance of that forgiveness. Maurice went on to hope that God's mercy was not exhausted

in the three-score years and ten of this earthly life. But, while sin eternally separated men from God, yet God was ever willing to receive the repentant.

In all such views Maurice opposed the popular faith of his day, which stressed Christian salvation as escape from hell-fire in a future life obtained by faith in Christ's propitiatory sacrifice. To many of his opponents Maurice was simply incomprehensible. The bitterness and force of their attacks in the *Record* and other Christian newspapers reached its climax, but not its end, in his dismissal from King's College.

'All through my life,' Maurice said in later years, 'I have been haunted by the desire for unity.' He had had a very curious upbringing. His elder sisters had at first been more dogmatic Unitarians than their father, but they had been converted to Calvinism, as was their mother. Even then some went to the Church of England, and others to the Baptist Chapel. In a modern family such changes might mean little, but the Maurices were a family with a real corporate Christian life, finding its centre in daily Bible reading, and continued in not always happy discussion of the Bible. I refer to this point because it throws light on Maurice's attitude towards unity and his peculiar hatred of all sects, parties, and systems. He thought people were mostly right in what they affirmed and wrong in what they denied. He hated people who tried to find a common basis or an inclusive formula. Common Christianity he declared to be the '*caput mortuum* of all systems'; an attempt 'not to unite in Christ as members of His body, but to unite as holding certain notions about Christ.' 'I was sent into the world,' he wrote, 'that I might persuade men to recognize Christ as the centre of their fellowship with each other, that so they might be united in their families, their countries, and as men, not in schools and factions; through forgetfulness of this truth I have been continually separating myself from relations, letting go friendships, and sinking into an unprofitable solitude.' He believed the Family, the Nation, and the Church to be part of the Divine Constitution of the universe. All parties within these groups he felt to be a dangerous dividing force.

I fear Maurice would not be pleased if we claimed him to-day as a Modernist prophet. He would disown us, as he disowned the title of Broad Churchman. But he would be willing, he added, to bear any disgrace with the Broad Churchmen in regard to 'their protest against any cowardice or deceit in handling God's word, against any misrepresentation of sceptics' (by the orthodox), 'against any traditional hardness or formality.' He thought they were helping to break down 'the orthodoxy which covers our atheism.' If he appeared to sympathize more with them than with other parties, yet he said of them that 'the greatest disease of our time, that we talk about God, and about our religion, and do not confess Him as a living God . . . is characteristic of no school so much as this.'

His Christian Socialism.

No account of Maurice can omit his part in Christian Socialism. There he tried to apply his principles, and found the social problem, as so many have done, a burying of his hopes, although not of his principles. Dr. Raven has made clear that Ludlow was the real leader of the movement. Maurice was its prophet, and the Christian Socialists were a group,[2] 'standing high above the ranks of social thinkers and workers,' largely

[2] *Christian Socialism*, 1848–54. C. E. Raven. p. 370.

drawn out of Maurice's Bible-Class and held together by their loyalty to him. The blunt friendship of Ludlow and Maurice was the foundation of the movement. Maurice was a strong and a cautious leader. But his party and system phobia made him often anxious to withdraw whenever he perceived that they were a party, which they could not help being, or whenever their economic experiments required a greater measure of systematic organization. Maurice did not wish to Christian-socialize the universe by a powerful party, but to encourage the development of its spirit and methods in all neighbourhoods. In that belief in a natural organization, growing from below and not an artificial one imposed from above, Maurice has been followed by later thinkers. So, too, the Christian conscience has consistently borne witness to its distrust of competition, and to the primary importance of right human relations in industry. 'Competition,' Maurice writes, 'is put forward as a law of the universe. That is a lie. And the time is come to declare it to be a lie in word and deed.' He preached co-operation and they tried schemes of joint-ownership. They largely failed because men were not equal to the moral calls the system made on them. The movement has survived on its educational side in the Working Men's College. Further, Maurice writes: 'Reorganizers and conservators of society are at war because both tacitly assume that lands, goods, money, labour, some subjects of possession are the basis of society, whereas human relations should and do lie beneath all.' 'To set trade and commerce right, you must find some ground not for them, but for those who are concerned in them, to stand upon. That is my formula.'

With the memory of the General Strike still with us, it is of interest to recall that this Christian Socialism came into being with the Chartist dangers of 1848. Maurice and his friends came forward as the wiser leaders of the working men, sympathizing with them in their desire for reform, but asserting the folly and wrongfulness of violent methods, and the need for the reformation of men's hearts as well as of the nation's laws. They wished to Christianize Socialism as much as, and even more than, to draw Christians to a sense of their social duties.

Dean Rashdall has pointed out[3] that Maurice was perhaps the first to suggest the application of Christian principles to social relations. And it is his approach to the social question, even more than the insight of his remarks, which is interesting and very characteristic. Some later Christian thinkers can be accused of bringing a few texts to the support of extraneous economic theories. Not so Maurice. His theology came first, and his Christian Socialism follows from it. He started with the primary theocratic doctrine of God's sovereignty, from the proclamation of Christ as everlasting Lord, King of Kings. He had no use for the sovereignty of the people; it was a kind of blasphemy to him. The people could have the franchise if they regarded it as a ministry, as an obligation. If they grasped at power, it was the devil's voice. He applied the principle of service to the monarchy and the aristocracy, which he believed were also needed for an organic Christian Society. The former witnessed to the kingship of God, and the latter to the lordship of the Spirit over the flesh.

Conclusion.

It is not within my power to estimate Maurice's importance in theology. Much that he taught is the orthodoxy of to-day, and many positions which he attacked are no longer defended. His influence has suffered from an

[3] *Principles and Precepts*, edited by Major and Cross, p. 154.

obscure style. And also it has doubtless been lessened by the fact that the course of theological development has been away from his temper and approach. Theology has been on the whole concrete and historical, while Maurice was mystical and metaphysical. Possibly the theology of the future will value him more. He was at times misty, though he could never be fairly dismissed as 'a muddle-headed mystic.' He was also sometimes over-subtle. Early in his career he argued that subscription to the Articles at the universities was no kind of intellectual bondage, and he always argued that the Athanasian Creed was to be interpreted as a message of God's love, a basis for future hope. There was occasionally, as Tulloch puts it, 'an absence of plain sense.'

Maurice was curiously blind to the value and future of historical criticism. His own interpretation of the Bible was, as Dr. Major has pointed out,[4] in the allegorical tradition of Alexandria. Colenso was a real friend of his, but Colenso as a higher critic filled him with 'unspeakable surprise and terror,' for he made out Samuel to be a 'horrid scoundrel' and the Bible a 'book of fictions and forgeries.' Maurice reverenced history, but in the end he did not feel the need for it as others have felt it. He spoke often of the facts of history, but to him God was a fact more real than aught else. The unseen eternal world was his living world. He was sometimes dazzled by its light.

Nor can we in justice fail to note that he had a pastor's spirit. His zeal for truth was balanced by his care for men's faith. He was both prophet and priest, and both intensely, if not always in perfect unity. It was the priest in him which made him distrust the negative work of the Broad Churchmen. He did not object to them in theory, but in practice he felt that the increasing godlessness of the age required responsible leaders to build up men's faith, not to shake it. And although he ever taught men to know God in themselves and in their own time, he held to the historical authority of Christ, the Bible, and the Creeds as the means of leading men to that knowledge, and as witnesses to the continuing revelation of God.

To his friends Maurice was not only a prophet but a saint. He reminded them of St. John. Certainly few have with his lowliness of mind spent their days in such persistent self-effacing service of their fellows in small domestic detail and in far-reaching issues of national and spiritual life. Possibly we can perceive in his over-diffidence the same temperamental weakness, not quite conquered, as is seen in his under-estimate of the historical approach. He was other-worldly; more certain of God within than God without. Be that as it may, at no small cost and with refreshing achievement Maurice made his daily life, as he made his theology, a witness to God in whose presence he lived.

[4] *English Modernism*, H. D. A. Major, p. 28.

DEAN HASTINGS RASHDALL*

'The words of the wise are as goads.'—*Eccles.* xii, 11.

It was a happy and inevitable choice to select the late Hastings Rashdall, Dean of Carlisle, for commemoration at this Conference, as one of the pre-eminent leaders of progressive thought within the Church of England. It would be difficult to over-estimate the value and influence of the Dean's theological teaching, originating as it did at one of those great crises which arise when modern thought impinges sharply on the presuppositions of Christian tradition and the demands for reconciliation become acute.

Dr. Rashdall had unique qualifications for this great work of meditation; which, notwithstanding his versatility and the variety of his intellectual interests, he made it the chief purpose of his life to develop. The key to his character and the motive underlying his life's work were undoubtedly his devotion to and unwavering belief in Christianity in the first place, and his affection for the Church of England in the second. Thus we can think of him as a great Churchman and a great Christian, deeply convinced that the Christian revelation was true and unique, and keen to show that Christianity is not only free from contradiction with modern thought, but is actually enriched and illuminated by the accepted results of science and criticism.

It is a great experience for me to have been closely associated with Dr. Rashdall for many years, particularly as Fellows of New College, Oxford. What that meant only his intimate friends can appreciate. He was an extremely attractive personality. There was nothing small or repellent about his character. He was singularly free from purely personal motives and egoistical limitations. His mind was of great capacity, and he devoted himself to researches in history, philosophy and theology, in all of which he became a leading authority, for he had tireless industry and a great capacity for work.

But above all he was a Churchman, and he brought all his researches into the service of the Church. There was an intellectual integrity about him which led or forced him to be consistent in thinking. He could never have thought 'in compartments.' His philosophical creed (based on Berkeley's Spiritual Realism) supplied a foundation of thought for his Theism, and his moral philosophy rested on a common basis with his Christian ethics, so that each reinforced the other. This is conspicuous in his book, *Conscience and Christ,* and in his famous work, *The theory of Good and Evil.* How closely interwoven his theology was with his philosophical system is apparent in his writings, whether popular or technical. It is not too much to say that the doctrine of the Trinity followed as a necessity of thought with him from his acceptance of Christianity as the unique revelation of God. He insisted that there must be a constant development of the ethical ideal, and that a supreme ethical revelation is impossible which is not also a continuous and progressive

*An address delivered before the Modern Churchmen's Conference by the Rev. P. J. Kirkby, M.A., D.Sc., Rector of Chorley, Lancs., in Harborne Parish Church, on August 26th, 1927.

revelation. 'On ethical grounds alone we may say that the doctrine of the Son requires, as its indispensable complement, a doctrine of the Holy Ghost.'[1]

His Candour and Courage.

The Dean was throughout his life candid, outspoken and sincere. He detested obscurantism as the greatest disservice that can be done to religion. He was jealous for the reputation of the Church, and saw how the influence of Christianity was being undermined by the crudities of traditionalism, from which modern thought and criticism so happily deliver us. Meanwhile rationalism was winning its cheap victories over ignorance by the weapon of ridicule, and little was done to rouse the Church to the sense of what he perceived was 'its greatest need,' namely, the teaching of the newly accepted results of O.T. and N.T. scholarship, and how to reconcile them with the faith.

His courage and frankness were conspicuously shown in his lifelong affirmation of the right of clergy and laymen to remain within the Church while holding views necessitated by modern science and criticism. The same qualities were shown by his protests at the misleading silence which was cultivated by so many of the leaders of the Church who had the opportunity to throw light on such questions if they had only taken it, as Bishop Moorhouse, of Manchester, had so excellently done.[2] These qualities ultimately carried the day. Rashdall's work had more influence than was apparent, and there were more fellow-workers and sympathisers with him than he thought. We can now see how Broad Churchmanship won an enlarged position under his leadership and inspiration (notably through the work of the Churchmen's Union). And eventually his theology was appreciated and recognised as a new and important interpretation of the Faith tenable within the Church of England.

His earliest Apologetic Work.

Among Rashdall's great services to the Church his earliest apologetic work must not be forgotten. This took the form chiefly of University sermons. They were published in his book, *Doctrine and Development*, in 1898. The earliest was preached at Cambridge in December, 1889. Its title is 'The Limitations of Knowledge in Christ.' It was delivered the year before Bishop Gore's celebrated article, 'The Holy Spirit and Inspiration,' appeared in *Lux Mundi*. Thus Rashdall was the earliest pioneer in our Church of that important development of the doctrine of the Kenosis, as it came to be called. He used to express freely, both in conversation and in writing, his gratefulness to Dr. Gore for his eminent services to liberal theology in this connexion,[3] but thought he had not gone far enough. His own treatment was naturally less free than it might have been if he had not been moving on an untrodden path. But it remains a striking testimony to the clearness of his insight into the theological exigencies of the time, and to his happy instinct for mediation between scientific criticism and Christian belief, which cannot be in the nature of things in irreconcilable opposition.

Sanday made an interesting allusion to Rashdall's pioneer work in his *Christologies, Ancient and Modern*, (1910, p. 77).

[1] *Theory of Good and Evil* II, p. 184.
[2] See *The Teaching of Christ*, by Bishop Moorhouse (1891).
[3] See, e.g., *Doctrine and Development*, p. 231, and *Jesus Human and Divine*, p. 83.

'Bishop Gore deserves full credit for the directness and boldness with which he grasped a difficult problem, and I for one believe both he and Dr. Rashdall were justified in refusing to prejudge questions of criticism on the ground of an abstract doctrine as to our Lord's Person. Nor should I question their right to base this refusal on a doctrine of Kenosis, if they prefer to call it by that name; in other words, to bring it under the conditions assumed by our Lord in his Incarnation. But it seems to me that of the two practically simultaneous utterances, Dr. Rashdall's was the more judicious in keeping to general terms and declining to press them into the mould of a particular theory. I should like, if I may, to take the opportunity of expressing a hope that Dr. Rashdall's volume, *Doctrine and Development,* may not be forgotten, as occasional volumes of sermons of that kind are apt to be. I believe it to be specially fitted to place in the hands of a layman who desired to see Christian doctrine restated in a fresh, independent and untechnical way. And, although I should perhaps go further on some points myself, it would be ungrateful not to recognise the amount of clear and positive teaching which the book contains.'

Doctrine and Development is indeed a remarkable work. It is more than a series of disconnected sermons. They form something of an organised whole, or, as Rashdall modestly put it, 'they represent a consistent point of view.' They are specially fitted to enlighten thoughtful laymen, as Sanday said; they were written in the first place for that purpose, for which the book probably remains unsurpassed. But they are stimulating and inspiring to students and clergy also. And they give an admirable reflection of the Christian homogeneousness of Rashdall's personality.

Limits of his Broad Churchmanship.

But wide as his sympathies were, he drew the line at any form of latitudinarianism which obliterated the distinction between the Church of England and Unitarianism. He suggested that the liberalism permissible to the clergy should be determined by 'spiritual expedience.' There were many opinions which would make it extremely undesirable for one holding them to take orders. (*E.g.*, he named non-belief in immortality.) The question is one of the degree of divergence between 'the individual's opinion and the dominant opinion' of the community of which he is a minister.[4] The intending clergyman need not 'make the present opinions of average Churchmen into his really operative stardard of doctrine. That would involve the negation of all progress, of all intellectual honesty, of the very idea of a teaching ministry.'[5]

His own Case.

These principles may be illustrated in his own case. He could not accept the doctrine of the Virgin Birth. But he neither concealed his views nor insisted on them. He informed Bishop Lightfoot of Durham of his attitude on this question previously to his ordination by that prelate. But he never preached against the doctrine.

Apart from this question, he claimed that the views he advocated were both orthodox and precedented within the Church, and showed that his

[4] *Anglican Liberalism*, p. 102. [5] *Ib.*

critics were sometimes holding Apollinarian or tritheistic views when they imagined themselves to be quite orthodox about our Lord's Personality and the Holy Trinity.

His Consistency.

Rashdall was, in fact, throughout his life extraordinarily consistent. An eminent[6] Churchman once suggested that he might perhaps have lost his bearings occasionally during his adventurous voyages through unexplored seas of truth. On the contrary, it may be questioned whether any modern scholar in our Church has been more sure than he of his intellectual bearings, or has had a firmer grasp of the guiding principles of duty and truth by which to direct his life. Consistency of outlook was a principal constituent of his character, just as consistency of thought was an indispensable postulate with him. Not that his views either of philosophy or about religion or theology were petrified. But he had the gift of grasping a problem in its wholeness, and perceiving where its general solution must lie. This is probably why his earlier writings are so consistent with his later. The views, which early in life he had perceived to be a necessary consequence of modern thought and of critical conclusions, he continued to hold throughout his life, but in a developed and consolidated form. The Rashdall who preached in Balliol College Chapel in 1894 is the same Rashdall who preached in Carlisle Cathedral twenty-seven years later, repudiating the attacks on his orthodoxy. 'I have tried—not only in that little paper at Cambridge, but in all my teaching during the last thirty-seven years of my clerical life—to help people to see some intelligible meaning in these formulae, which so many repeat without meaning anything definite by them, and which so many cast away as worthless because they cannot find a meaning for them.' Thus Rashdall had before him a definite purpose in life, the purpose, namely, to commend the Catholic Christian Faith, given in tradition and enshrined in the ancient formulae of the Church—to commend that faith as reasonable to the mind of those who wished to remain in the Church. That great purpose meant an unceasing labour of love and loyalty for the Church of England. And it meant the difficult task of translating the conceptual systems of ancient Church thought into modern conceptual systems, which he perceived to be the only method of retaining as a living force the Catholic formularies.[7]

Attacks on his Orthodoxy.

Naturally, therefore, the malicious attack on his orthodoxy after the Cambridge Conference of 1922 hurt his feelings deeply. To have spent his life with consistent devotion to the Church of England, advocating views which in the main had won recognition as the necessary equipment of modern-minded Christians in common with modern scholarship, and then suddenly to find that he was the target of abuse and misrepresentation, was an experience which gave him a great shock. He felt his authority as a preacher was undermined, and that his position as a dean of the Church was prejudiced.

It was with these feelings that he wrote the sermons of *Jesus, Human and Divine*. If anyone compares them with corresponding sermons in *Doctrine and Development* he will see how thoroughly consistent they are

[6] The Archbishop of York in a charming sermon at the dedication of the bells, some given and some re-hung, in memory of Dean Rashdall, by his widow, on Thursday afternoon, November 12th, 1925.

[7] See *Principles and Precepts*, p. 39.

with the earlier treatment. He was attacked not because he had advanced in 'heresy,' but because of the incredible ignorance about progressive thought in the Church of England of those who pose as being well informed. 'When by some accident,' he said shortly after the famous paper was read, 'some view long quite familiar to scholars finds its way into the newspapers and becomes the subject of popular controversy, it soon becomes evident that the ideas even of the most orthodox and conservative scholars are still not accepted by many clergymen, and are quite unknown to the letter-writers and leader-writers in newspapers, who come forward on such occasions as champions of the Church.'[8]

Freedom from Ambition.

Rashdall, with all his great gifts, was singularly free from ambition, except the great ambition for service in the Church, which he so beautifully recommended to young men as the worthiest of all.[9] He knew that the prominent part he took as a Liberal theologian would not lead to promotion in the Church. He was, therefore, the more gratified on being made Canon of Hereford by Bishop Percival, who, I think, did not know him personally. 'This is the first episcopal recognition I have received,' he said to me with sombre satisfaction. He was still more pleased by his appointment as Dean of Carlisle. This was undoubtedly because it meant the formal recognition of the Liberal theology which he had made his own. To promote Liberal Theology was always his primary concern, because he rightly regarded it as the greatest need of the Church, as the *sine qua non* of maintaining the influence of Christianity. For the same reason he was always ready to encourage those who were inclined towards taking holy orders but felt intellectual difficulties in their way.

His Personal Influence.

Rashdall's personal influence was deep and wide and lasting. To know him was to like and trust him. No one could see much of him without perceiving him to be a great defender of Christianity, especially of that type of reasonable Christianity to which the Church is tending as the inevitable goal of modern Anglican Christianity. Nor was it possible to live with him without being influenced by his opinions and convictions, and by his solid and responsible outlook on life. But these qualities were never obtrusive. They were clearly indicated by his attitude and actions. For he was a true Christian: he *lived* Christianity.

To his religious convictions he gave practical expression on all occasions. The revelation of Christ being unique, its application must be universal. He accordingly always supported foreign missions. He was a leading supporter of the Christian Social Union, and took a prominent part in the Oxford University Branch in the closing years of the last century, the practical principle of that society (now merged into the Industrial Christian Fellowship) being the application of Christianity to all departments of social life. And he insisted on the vital importance of regular attendance at Church on Sundays, for he held that the disappearance of Churchgoing would ultimately mean the disappearance of Christianity as a great moral and social force.

The Dean was a liberal in politics, but was opposed to his party in the matter of Welsh Disestablishment. He keenly supported the principle of

[8] *Jesus Human and Divine*, p. 88.
[9] See e.g., *Principles and Precepts*, p. 53 *f*.

an established Church, holding it to be good both for Church and nation, and because it added to the authority of Christianity as a social force. For the rest, he was a warm supporter of all the generous movements of his time, of woman-suffrage, degrees for women in Oxford, of opening the Oxford theological degrees to laymen—in fact, one could count upon his support for all humane and progressive movements, including such a cause as the humane slaughter of animals.

His Churchmanship.

His Churchmanship was as liberal as it was essentially orthodox. It is true he disliked sacerdotalism. But he was always a thorough ecclesiastic by instinctive feeling. It was the Church as an historic and organic whole, with its ordered development of life and doctrine, the instrument of Christ's unique revelation, to which he was so deeply attached. He understood the significance of bygone forms of expression, and was thus able to appreciate their value and to translate them into modern language. This was true in particular in the case of the mediaeval thinkers, with whom he was thoroughly at home, for he had made the middle ages one of his earliest objects of research; and he seemed to have an affinity of spirit with the great schoolmen. Certainly he had great sympathy with some of them because he recognised that they were endeavouring to solve problems for their time equivalent to the problems pressing for solution in the Church. 'The restatement—let us say frankly the reconstruction—of Christian doctrine is the great intellectual task upon which the Church of our day is just entering, and with which it must go on boldly if Christianity is to retain its hold on intellect as well as on the sentiment and the social activities of our time. And, depend upon it, the Church that has lost its hold on the first will not long retain its control of the last.'[10]

Fundamental Teaching.

The uniqueness of the revelation of God given by Jesus Christ was the keystone of Rashdall's preaching and teaching. This uniqueness consists not in being distinct in kind from other revelations given to men, but in its quality or pre-eminence or finality.

> 'If we feel that to think of God by the analogy of what is highest in the universe is at once more rational and more reverent than to liken him to what is lowest, or to the simply unintelligible, we must admit that in a very real sense indeed every human soul reveals God. God is in a manner reproduced in every man; so far he is a son of God. And in a still higher sense every good man in proportion to his goodness reveals God to his fellow-men. The highest that we know in man is the highest that we can think of God. . . . In Jesus Christ humanity attained its highest moral development, and, just because of that perfect Humanity, the conscience of mankind has recognised in him a supreme, a unique, in a sense a final revelation of that God who all through the world's history had been by slow, successive stages revealing himself to the human spirit.'[11]

The alternative to an enlightened anthropomorphism is 'the mere fetishism of conceiving God in terms of matter or of force.'[12]

[10] *Doctrine and Development*, p. 144 *f*.
[11] *Doctrine and Development*, p. 80, 1894.
[12] *Ib.*, p. 80.

These views are so fully reflected in the famous paper read at the Cambridge Conference, which produced the storm of futile criticism, and in the sermons which that criticism provoked, that they must be regarded as his lifelong mode of viewing the Christian revelation. And they are agreeable to modern thought and science, which has learnt to reject alike strictly uniform continuities and violent discontinuities, both in physics and in biology. Moreover such a conception of revelation requires the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, since it is one 'which is still being continued and further developed by the work of God's Spirit in other human minds and particularly in the society of Christ's followers.'[13]

Rashdall's expositions of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, extending over thirty-seven years, exhibit his usual consistency of treatment. They are derived from the teachings of St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The Trinity of Persons in the Unity of the Godhead are best explained through the analogy of distinct mental activities of one human mind. St. Augustine 'compares the relation between the Persons to the relation between Memory, Wisdom and Will or Love (for the Will of God is always a loving will) in one and the same human mind.'[14] 'From the time of St. Augustine orthodox theology did not think of this distinction (between the Father and the Word) as implying that the Son or Word before His Incarnation in Jesus was a distinct mind or will side by side with the Mind or Will of the Father, as distinct from Him as one human being is from another, and capable of entering into conversations or dialogues with the Father.'[15] Such implications as these would have been regarded by orthodox scholastic thought as 'sheer Tritheism.'[16] Again, 'God is Power and Wisdom and Love' (*i.e.* in one Divine Mind). 'God is revealed fully and perfectly in Christ. God is revealing Himself ever more and more perfectly in the souls of men. That is the sum and substance of the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as defined by the most unimpeachable exponents of orthodox Theology.'[17]

But it is important to remember that 'all the difficulties of the doctrine of the Trinity have arisen from thinking of that relation between God and the pre-existing Logos as if it were of the same kind as the relation between God and the Incarnate Son.'[18] For Jesus, the man assumed by the Word, was not pre-existent in Catholic theology.

If pulpit teaching of these great doctrines had been of this intelligible and simple character, there would be fewer Unitarians in England, as the Dean said.

Teaching about the Atonement.

Throughout his ministry the Dean had devoted great attention to the Doctrine of the Atonement. The views he advocated were strictly related to his teachings on the subject of the Trinity, and were in agreement mainly with what he called the Abelardian Doctrine of the Atonement, after the great Schoolman, who had disengaged it from contemporary Scholastic thought.[19] In this theory there is no notion of vicarious punishment, expiation or satisfaction, or objectively valid sacrifice. The atoning efficacy of Christ's work is not limited to His death, but is not confined

[13] *Jesus Human and Divine*, p. 26.
[14] *Jesus Human and Divine*, p. 62.
[15] *Ib.*, 61 *f.*
[16] See *D. and D.*, p. 22, note.
[17] *D. and D.*, p. 26; see also Jesus *Human and Divine*, p. 69 *f.*
[18] *D. and D.*, p. 22, note.
[19] *D. and D.*, p. 128 *ff.*

to teaching or example. The whole life of Christ, being a revelation of the nature of God, excites the love and gratitude of man, and enables him to be imperfectly what Christ was perfectly, and so makes that at-one-ment with God which sin alone has destroyed.[20]

These views involve no suggestion of mental opposition or distinction between the Father and the Son in the work of redemption, as the vicarious theories do. Thus they are in harmony with the orthodox teaching about the Trinity.

Rashdall's researches on the Atonement were embodied in his learned Bampton Lectures, published in 1919. The same line of thought runs through them. In order to give up expiatory, transactional or objective theories of redemption and yet retain the doctrine of the redemption of the world through Christ, it is necessary to merge the idea of the atonement in that of the Incarnation, and not to attribute Christ's saving influence only to His death.[21] It is also necessary to give up the Aristotelian conception of an impassible Deity, since we may say that the suffering Christ reveals a suffering God.[22]

Rashdall's writings on the Atonement constitute in themselves at once a liberating achievement of scholarship and a monument of his learning.

In selecting material from the rich mine of Rashdall's personality and works, I have been guided by an obvious purpose, namely, to exhibit him as a great and enthusiastic and contagiously keen Christian and Churchman. That was his true self. But this purpose has involved the surrender of any attempt to draw a living portrait, as it stands out so vividly in my mind, of his rich, charming and charmingly original self, so attractive to his friends. His companionship was stimulating and liberating. It was always entirely wholesome. By his simple and unadorned restatement of Catholic belief, so frequently repeated on public or private occasions, he revealed the living power and *indispensable Truth for Church people* of Catholic doctrine, which had become for so many merely a millstone round their necks.

His Style.

Rashdall's style (he told me once it had been criticised by his friends) was a perfect instrument of his thoughts. It is dignified, pure and transparently clear. It is almost entirely free from decorative effects; which, after all, disturb the reader's concentration on a subject. How closely his subject is fused with its expression may be perceived by trying to quote from him: it is difficult to know where to begin and stop. This literary art of his was built on natural gifts of expression by taking the greatest pains to present his thoughts clearly. His correction of proofs was untiring. Thus it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that Rashdall himself speaks to us in his writings.

What ought we to think as we come to the end of our commemoration of this great man? The best memorial that we can raise to his memory is the continuation of the work he had always near his heart and to which he devoted himself laboriously throughout his ministry. That work is the effort to supply what he so well described as 'the greatest need of the Church.'[23]

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 136 *f.*
[21] *Bampton Lectures*, p. 454.
[22] *Ib.*
[23] *Jesus Human and Divine*, p. 71, 1921.

FENTON JOHN ANTHONY HORT*

The name of the retiring scholar of whom I am to give some account is perhaps best known in connexion with the critical edition of the New Testament text in which he collaborated with Westcott. The preparation of this text occuped forty years of his life: yet, when the project was formed, he had no intention of devoting more than about a tenth of that time to its execution. This task he undertook as the necessary preliminary to exegesis of the New Testament books and the history of Christian origins, while he looked forward also to making some solid contribution to contemporary thought on fundamental problems of religion. He died at the age of 64, having published, besides the Greek Testament, no contributions to theological literature except two dissertations and sundry articles in the *Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology* and the *Dictionaries of Christian Biology and Antiquities*. From the materials which he left have been brought out fourteen posthumous volumes, which include, besides sermons, three valuable exegetical fragments on *St. James*, I *Peter*, and *Apocalypse* i—iii, lectures introductory to *Romans* and *Ephesians*, four volumes of lectures (one popular) on Early Church History and Literature, and last, but very far from least, *The Way, the Truth, the Life*, a book which may be said to have become a classic of English theology.

It will readily be understood that, even if I had the knowledge, I, as my father's son, could not adopt the detached attitude necessary for a critical estimate of his position in the history of religious thought. Thirty-one years ago, with the indispensable aid of my mother and of many friends, I ventured to write his biography. I hoped that his letters, with brief narrative passages to introduce and connect them, might give a true, if necessarily incomplete, impression. The motto on the title-page of the *Life and Letters*, a sentence of his own,

> 'A life devoted to truth is a life of vanities abased and ambitions forsworn,'

may help to explain why one who lived the life of a scholar produced comparatively few books and was little known outside academic circles. Yet, to judge by the constant references to his authority in recent theological literature, now, almost one hundred years since his birth, his influence still grows.

In the few minutes available I feel that my best course will be to attempt a biographical sketch, sufficient to indicate the formative influences under which my father came in boyhood and youth, and the circumstances which in later years affected his work. I shall not scruple to quote from the published *Life*, however unworthy of the subject was the language which I used a generation ago. I cannot now better it; while memory then was fresher. I will assume that some of my hearers are not familiar with my father's work: if by this rapid survey any are induced to seek further acquaintance with his thoughts, I think that they will be rewarded, while my difficult task will not have been essayed in vain.

* An address delivered by Sir Arthur Hort, Bart., M.A., before the Modern Churchmen's Conference on August 25 in St. Mary's Church, Selly Oak. Some passages were omitted in delivery.

Fenton John Anthony Hort was born in 1828, the son of excellent parents of the Evangelical school: his father, a man of leisure, devoted himself largely to public service, educational and philanthropic: his mother had good natural ability and was well educated, according to the standard of the times. The home régime was strict but sympathetic: though the gifted boy outgrew his early education, there was never anything like a revolt against narrowing traditions. At Rugby, at the age of eighteen, he formed the resolution to make the ministry his profession. The death of Arnold, when the boy had been less than a year in the school, made a profound impression on him: his last four school years were under Tait, who recognized his deep earnestness, his ability, and his high promise. The teacher to whom he considered that he owed most was Bonamy Price: to him he said, long years afterwards, that he owed 'all scholarship and textual criticism.' As a boy he seems to have been remarkably mature in mind, but by no means self-centred or priggish. His natural seriousness was deepened by the death of his only brother in the same year as that of Arnold.

In 1846 he went up to Cambridge as a Commoner of Trinity: he did not become a scholar till three years later. Nor did he obtain a university scholarship: though his reading had been unusually wide and his power of thought was at once recognized, he was never brilliant in classical composition, which then counted for much in scholarship examinations. He took his degree as equal third classic in 1850, and in 1852 he was elected Fellow along with Lightfoot. In the interval he had taken both the 'new Triposes,' in Moral and in Natural Sciences, obtaining in each a First Class, with distinctions in Moral Philosophy and in Physiology and Botany. He continued to reside till 1857, reading and taking pupils, having made up his mind to a student's life, though he looked forward to combining it bye-and-bye with parochial work. In this post-graduate period he became a much respected member of the dialectical club called The Apostles, was President of the Union, helped to found the Alpine Club, and did a great deal of climbing and of field botany. He examined for the Moral Sciences and Natural Sciences Triposes: it is noteworthy that he acquiesced not very hopefully in the establishment of a Theological Tripos. In this period he wrote numerous and voluminous letters, chiefly to his intimates, Gerald Blunt, the well-known rector of St. Luke's, Chelsea, and John Ellerton, afterwards famous as a hymnologist: in these letters it is interesting to note his admiration for Jowett, who however seemed to him to have abandoned Christianity, and his approval of Campbell's book on the Atonement, though it did not seem to him to say all that was to be said. An anthology of the poetry evoked by the Crimean War might well contain Hort's only poem (apart from translations of hymns), the beautiful stanzas called 'Tintern.'

These instances I cull to illustrate the variety of his interests. Meanwhile in 1853 he formed with Westcott the plan for a joint revision of the New Testament text, and this, with his researches into Early Church History, now became his chief work. He was ordained in 1854. Three years later he married and took the college living of St. Ippolyt's, near Hitchin. It was a severe wrench to leave Cambridge, where at the age of 29 he was already an important figure. He was even now consulted by all sorts of men on all sorts of subjects: 'Your letter,' wrote a correspondent, 'confirms me in the impression which I had formed, that it would be difficult to consult you on any subject that you would not throw light upon.'

I turn back to consider the development of his views in this critical period. Rugby had begun the liberalizing process: at Cambridge it was natural, in view of his upbringing, that he should first be attracted by teachers of the Evangelical School, who then represented what was best in the religious life of the University: chief of these was the scholarly Dr. Carus. Before long he came to regard the Evangelical teaching as 'sectarian,' and henceforward he occupied an independent position: at no time of his maturity could any section, political or ecclesiastical, have claimed his undivided allegiance. Another cause for his early break with Evangelicalism was the distrust of the reason which at that time prevailed in that school. Even at Rugby he had fallen under the spell of Coleridge, attracted perhaps unconsciously by the breadth of intellectual interest which in him he found combined with spiritual earnestness. As the fruit of a thorough investigation of his works, at the age of 28 he published in a volume of *Cambridge Essays* a long and singularly mature monograph on the poet, the philosopher and the man. The study of Coleridge introduced him to the writings of Maurice, of whom he became a devoted, though by no means a blind, disciple. At the age of 21, during a period of great spiritual stress, he wrote to Maurice asking for guidance in his eschatological difficulties: Maurice's famous answer is printed in his *Life*. This correspondence led presently to intimate friendship. It was on Maurice's advice that Hort stayed on at Cambridge after taking his degree, and the fact that Maurice had come to live at Cambridge was one of the chief attractions of the place when Hort was himself recalled thither in 1872. I remember his saying to me that Maurice was 'on the whole the best man that he had ever known.' A youth brought up in the forties at Cheltenham and Arnold's Rugby was not likely to be prejudiced in favour of the Oxford Movement. His attitude to it was however rather critical than hostile: its influence on him may perhaps be traced in the loyalty of his churchmanship. For Newman he had a very real respect, even veneration, but a letter written just after Newman's death shows what a gulf in matters of thought divided the two men.

Through Maurice he came to know the 'Christian Socialists,' especially Kingsley, for whom he had a warm affection: of the movement itself he was a very candid friend. His interest in social questions was early awakened and took practical shape: he was one of those chiefly responsible for the foundation and management of the Cambridge Working Men's College. Neither now nor later was he a mere student or recluse: enormous reader as he was, he deprecated the idea that books were his life. 'I have never,' he once said, 'cared much for books, except in so far as they might help to quicken our sense of the reality of life and enable us to enter into its right and wrong.' Or again: 'Such entities as scholar, author, clergyman, and the like are worthless and worse for all except so far as they are rooted in the entire *man*, first of all, and last of all.' His marriage meant, not a break with life as he had hitherto known it, but its enrichment and completion.

He was a country clergyman for fifteen years, but this period was broken by bad health, which necessitated at first long pilgrimages to the Alps and later an absence of nearly three years. He entered thoroughly into the new life and was happy in it, teaching in the schools, improving the church services, especially the music, and throwing himself with enthusiasm into the most humdrum *parochialia*. His preaching drew many visitors to the little village church, especially from Hitchin, where he had

interesting neighbours. Still, it may be doubted whether a country parish was the right place for him, not however because the lives of village folk were alien to him, but because his extreme sensitiveness and shyness prevented his being to them all that he would have wished to be. The most conscientious performance of parochial routine did not involve giving up literary work: he felt strongly that one in his position who continues his own studies 'is not robbing his flock of their due.' Work on the text went steadily on, and the first draft of the *Introduction* was written during a so-called holiday in the Alps. The proposal for a joint New Testament Commentary with Westcott and Lightfoot took shape, the Synoptic Gospels, *St. James, St. Peter* and *St. Jude*, being assigned to Hort. Almost simultaneously appeared *The Origin of Species* and *Essays and Reviews*. To the latter volume Hort had been invited to contribute: his letter to Dr. Rowland Williams declining the invitation gives an interesting account of his reasons for refusal in spite of the fact that he

> 'can go all lengths with the essayists in maintaining absolute freedom of criticism, science and speculation; in appealing to experience as a test of mere *a priori* dogma, and in upholding the supremacy of spirit over letter in all possible applications.'

He drafted a proposed protest against the agitation which assailed the book: and, this being dropped, discussed with Westcott and Lightfoot a proposal to issue a 'mediating volume,' which was also abandoned. His letters to Westcott show, cautious of statement as he was, how far he stood from popular Christianity, which he was nevertheless unwilling to subvert by any untimely declaration. For some time indeed he contemplated writing himself an essay to be called *Doctrine, Human and Divine*: this project was to some extent realised in his Hulsean Lectures, delivered in 1871, revised again and again and enlarged, and eventually published after his death.

Darwin's book, he said, 'has completely flung me back into Natural Science. Not that I had ever abandoned it either in intention or altogether in practice. But now there is no getting rid of it any more than of a part of oneself.' A letter of this period relates an interesting conversation on Darwin with Professor Owen, which shows that Hort had at once accepted the idea of development, but did not consider that the hypothesis of natural selection completely accounted for the facts: 'the scientific question,' he said, 'is far more complicated than Darwin seems to have any idea.' He reluctantly declined to write a magazine article: 'if I do write at all,' he said, 'it will be a very serious matter and will give great offence. . . . I can only, in discussing the theory, go into it on pure grounds of science with minute scientific details, and in discussing the results go regularly in for theology.'

Of his own ecclesiastical position he wrote thus in 1865:

> 'In Theology I am obliged to hold a peculiar position, belonging to no party, yet having important agreements and sympathies with all, and possessing valued friends in all. What I am chiefly is no doubt what Rugby and Arnold made me. In other words, I have perhaps more in common with the Liberal party than with the others, through a certain amount of agreement in belief, and because in these days of suspicion and doubt I look upon freedom and a wide toleration as indispensable for the well-being of the Church. At the same time I

feel most strongly that there can be no higher aim than to help to maintain a genuine Christian faith, and a reverence for the Bible at once hearty and intelligent.'

The unorthodoxy of his Liberalism sometimes surprised his Liberal friends, as when he criticised proposed University reforms, or the scheme of the Church Reform Association, of which his friend Llewellyn Davies was a prominent member.

Among many other activities, he gave immense help to Ellerton in his work on hymns, and he worked hard at geology and botany, especially during his enforced absence from the parish.

Six years after his return to it there came an opportunity for public utterance on fundamental subjects through his appointment as Hulsean Lecturer. It gave him special pleasure that at the time of the delivery of these lectures, founded with an apologetic aim, he was also examining for the Natural Sciences Tripos. Not that Hort's Hulseans were apologetic: in the, unfortunately fragmentary, Introduction to the Lectures as published after his death, his position is explained. I venture to quote what I wrote of this now famous book in the *Life and Letters*:

'Composed at the time under great pressure, they were afterwards in part re-written, and both enlarged and compressed: . . . year after year he tried unsuccessfully to get them finished. They were in some sense the fulfilment of his long-cherished idea of a book on Christian philosophy, an opportunity of expressing some of his deep convictions on the highest subjects, subjects on which his thoughts were ever set amidst work which seemed to be chiefly concerned with settling details of linguistic and historical accuracy. They were his chief contribution to theological thought, as distinguished from theological learning and scholarship. Such being the case, it was natural that he should find it hard to satisfy a mind singularly receptive of new light, from whatever source it came, and a taste singularly fastidious in expression. Still it is rather pathetic to think that to most of those who knew his name during his life-time he was known far less as a thinker than as a minute scholar. . . . The Lectures (or rather Essays) even in their imperfect form, give a remarkable picture of a mind both scholarly and philosophic. . . . In form they are an exposition of *St. John* xiv, of which they contain a wonderfully fresh exegesis, noteworthy for the scrupulous fidelity with which every word is interpreted. . . . This belief in the trustworthiness of language was a leading principle in Hort's, as in Westcott's, exegetical method. . . . Not the least remarkable feature in these compressed and difficult discourses is the absence of overt allusion to the works of theologians, scholars English and foreign, and men of science, while yet a familiar acquaintance with and appreciation of "the best that has been thought and said" on the great and various subjects dealt with can be read between the lines.'

Of the 'apologetic' value of these discourses a discriminating critic said:

'I was inclined at first to wish for more reference in the book to the special difficulties of our time, but, as I gather up the impression it has left on my mind, I feel that to be lifted up above these difficulties and shown them like rain-clouds below the mountain-tops is a truer help for meeting them than any direct reference.'

'The book,' said another, 'contains the germ of a new Reformation.' Before leaving it, may I quote a few words from the Introduction, which I have heard described as 'the boldest that have ever been uttered in the Church of England':

> 'It is from the credulity of Christians that the Christian faith suffers most in days of debate; and it is well when any who might have helpfully maintained its cause among their neighbours, had they not been disabled by too facile acquiescence, are impelled to plunge into the deep anew. There is not indeed, and cannot be, any security that they will emerge on the Christian side: in human minds truth does not always win the present victory, even when it is faithfully pursued. But whatever be the present result to themselves or to others through them, it is not possible that they or that any should fall out of the keeping of Him who appointed the trial: and to the Church any partial loss that may arise is outweighed by the gain from those whose faith has come to rest on a firmer foundation. Truth cannot be said to prevail where it is assented to on irrelevant or insufficient grounds; and the surest way to evoke its power is to encourage the strenuous confronting of it with personal life and knowledge.'

At the end of the volume are printed some 'Notes and Illustrations' apparently intended for further revision of the Lectures: they are a mine of aphoristic wisdom, not as yet worked out.

In the year of the Hulseans, Hort became Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Ely, after a candid explanation of his views on the Atonement to which he thought that Dr. Harold Browne might object: he also felt it necessary to say that he had not made up his mind about certain difficulties in the Old Testament, and that he had been deeply influenced by Maurice's books:

> 'For myself,' he said, 'it seems that I owe to them chiefly a firm and full hold of the Christian faith: but they have led me to doubt whether the Christian faith is adequately or purely represented in all respects in the accepted doctrines of any living school. Further, I have not merely a keen interest in criticism, physical science, and philosophy, but a conviction that their vigorous and independent progress is to be desired for the sake of mankind, even when for the time they seem to be acting to the injury of faith. I have friends of various creeds and creedlessness, from whom I believe I should do wrong to dissociate myself.'

In his later years at St. Ippolyt's he added to his labours, among other things, seventy articles on the Gnostics for the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. In 1870 began the revision of the New Testament, and attendance at Westminster was to consume much time and energy for the next ten years. The recension of the Greek text was pushed forward so that the revisers might have it before them, and it is well known how powerful an influence Hort exerted on the Committee: a critic estimated that 'he talked for three years out of the ten.' His main part was to expound questions of reading, combating, if necessary, the 'conservative' views of Dr. Scrivener. A reviser recorded that:

> 'Many no doubt differed from Hort, but his noble simplicity of character raised him above all temptation to argue for aught but the true, or to look at counter-arguments otherwise than as they bore on the true.'

In 1872 he returned to Cambridge, having been elected to a Fellowship and Lectureship in Theology at Emmanuel College. Westcott had returned two years before; Maurice, now a Cambridge professor, died just at the time of Hort's move. For the next six years he gave college lectures, and presently became rather overwhelmed with College and University business: he served on twelve Syndicates, as well as on the Council of the Senate, the General Board of Studies, and the Councils of the Philosophical and Philological Societies. In 1876 the publication of the *Two Dissertations* composed for the B.D. and D.D. degrees was warmly welcomed by men so different as Newman and Thompson, the Master of Trinity. He renewed his connexion with the 'Apostles,' and joined a senior discussion society called the 'Eranus': at a meeting in his rooms a philosophic paper by Mr. Arthur Balfour was discussed by the host, Westcott, Lightfoot, Henry Sidgwick, Clerk Maxwell, Coutts Trotter, Henry Jackson, and V. H. Stanton: at another meeting Hort criticized the Lyellian doctrine in geology, claiming the authority of Darwin against a too rigidly 'uniformitarian' view. He attended with impartial interest the meetings of the scientific Ray Club and of the Church Society. His days were now, as always, extremely full, and, in spite of occasional ill-health and fits of depression, he enjoyed life with an almost boyish zest.

After six years of college lecturing he was elected Hulsean Professor of Divinity, and henceforth addressed a larger audience. The removal of Lightfoot to Durham was a severe blow, and in this period he lost by death two dearly-loved friends, Clerk Maxwell and Henry Bradshaw. The last work in which he took part with the latter was the drawing up of a temperate memorial against Disestablishment. Of Clerk Maxwell he wrote in words which reflect something of his own mind:

> 'The testimony of his unshaken faith to Christian truth was . . . of exceptional value on account of his freedom from the mental dualism often found in distinguished men who are absorbed chiefly in physical enquiries. It would have been alien to his whole nature to seclude any province of his beliefs from the exercise of whatever faculties he possessed: and in his eyes every subject had its affinities with the rest of the universal truth. His strong sense of the vastness of the world not now accessible to human powers, and of the partial nature of all human modes of apprehension, seemed to enlarge for him the province of reasonable belief.'

The year 1880 saw the end of the New Testament revision: the W.H. text was completed under pressure to get it out before the Revised Version, which it just anticipated. The Introduction (vol. ii) followed in a few months, and the small school edition of the text four years later. A Cambridge committee, consisting at first of Hort, Westcott and Lightfoot, were occupied for the next eleven years, meeting weekly in term-time, with II *Maccabees* and *Wisdom* for the Revised Version of the Apocrypha. Moreover Hort devoted much time to his share in the editorship of Tregelles' *Prolegomena*, and revised and rewrote the Preface to Scrivener's edition of the text used by the revisers. The New Testament revisers, and especially Westcott and Hort, who were supposed to have forced on them a fancy text of their own, were the object of a furious attack by Dean Burgon: Hort, as author of the Introduction, was considered the chief criminal. His decision to make no reply has surely been justified by time: unassuming as he was, this was a subject on which he had acquired, so to speak, the right to dogmatize, and he here had absolute confidence

in his position. Now that others are building on the well-laid foundations, it may not be out of place to quote once more the closing sentences of the famous Introduction:

> 'It only remains to express an earnest hope that whatever labour we have been allowed to contribute towards the ascertainment of the truth of the letter may also be allowed, in ways which must for the most part be invisible to ourselves, to contribute towards strengthening, correcting, and extending human apprehension of the larger truth of the spirit. Others assuredly in due time will prosecute the task with better resources of knowledge and skill, and amend the faults and defects of our processes and results. To be faithful to such light as could be enjoyed in our own day was the utmost that we could desire. How far we have fallen short of this standard, we are well aware: yet we are bold to say that none of the shortcomings are due to lack of anxious and watchful sincerity. An implicit confidence in all truth, a keen sense of its variety, and a deliberate dread of shutting out truth as yet unknown are no security against some of the wandering lights that are apt to beguile a critic: but, in so far as they are obeyed, they at least quench every inclination to guide criticism into delivering such testimony as may be to the supposed advantage of truth already inherited or acquired. Critics of the Bible, if they have been taught by the Bible, are unable to forget that the duty of guileless workmanship is never superseded by any other. From Him who is at once the supreme Fountain of truth and the all-wise Lord of its uses they have received both the materials of knowledge and the means by which they are wrought into knowledge: into His hands, and His alone, when the working is over, must they render back that which they have first and last received.'

Letters of this period illustrate the writer's wide view of the possibilities of the English Church: among the most interesting are those to Benson on his elevation to the Primacy. He wished Queen Victoria's Jubilee to be commemorated by the Church by the constitution of a worthy central assembly. A pungent note on the practice of non-communicating attendance has often been quoted.

For the last five years of his life Hort held the Lady Margaret Chair of Divinity. He was now well recognized as a leader, at least in academic circles. He was given or offered an honorary degree by three other universities, while at Cambridge, as the present Dean of Wells said, there had grown up among younger workers a 'kind of cult.' He was regarded as an oracle: 'Hort,' it was said, 'knows the solution, if he would only tell.' He did, of course, give constant and invaluable help to enquirers, but he would not furnish anyone with a ready-made opinion: in Dr. Armitage Robinson's words, 'he seemed to regard the formation of opinion as a very sacred thing: he refused to prejudice by arguing with one who was beginning the study of a subject.' The 'cult' is well illustrated by a character sketch, one of a series of *Letters to Lecturers*, written by a young disciple, who is now Regius Professor of Divinity. Speaking of Hort's method of lecturing, he said:

> 'One does not at the time always feel that there is any particular depth in what you are saying, and yet, when the hour is over and the note-book is shut, and we are out in our silly world again, we find that at least one point that you have been telling us about has become

a sort of living creature in our minds, has made itself a home in us, and will not leave talking to us.'

As his authority came to be more widely recognized, there was disappointment that he did not speak out on the pressing questions of theology. Dr. Sanday in a magazine article challenged him to 'come out of his tent.' In the private letter which was his only reply, written with deep distress, he gave a valuable piece of autobiography:

> 'It is only by accident, so to speak, that I have had to occupy myself with texts, literary and historical criticism, or even exegesis of Scripture. What from earliest manhood I have most cared for, and what I have at all times most longed to have the faculty and the opportunity to speak about, is what one may call fundamental doctrine, alike on its speculative and its historical side, and especially the relations of the Gospel to the Jewish and Gentile Preparations, and its permanent relations to all human knowledge and action.'

He went on to say that he had hoped to work up his Hulsean Lectures ('unpretending little discourses,' he calls them) by way of some fulfilment of this aim, but that he had never had the requisite vigour and freedom from distraction.

> 'Perhaps,' he adds, 'it would have been less difficult to try to complete them but for an increasing sense that, as things now are, they could help little if unaccompanied by a thorough discussion of problems needing a different kind of treatment: and that would be a task still more hopeless to attempt without some considerable pause from distraction. While every year seems to bring some fresh reason for trying to speak, every year brings also fresh responsibilities in regard to speech.'

The Lectures, as posthumously published, with full explanation that the author had not satisfied himself with them, show clearly how with him an unshaken grasp of central truths could co-exist with openness of mind. But it should be remembered that they do not give his whole nor his latest mind.

His foreign correspondence became very considerable: in fact, he used to say that his work was better known on the Continent and in America than in England. Of men like Harnack and Zahn he spoke as of familiar friends.

Meanwhile the first gap in the famous Cambridge triumvirate was made by the death of Lightfoot, the youngest of the three: the eldest, Westcott, now left Cambridge to succeed him at Durham. An article on Lightfoot for the *Dictionary of National Biography*, and a sermon for Westcott's consecration, two efforts which proved very costly, were among the last things which occupied Hort as his own health failed. The sermon, a noble application to the modern world of St. Paul's teaching on church-membership in the *Epistle to the Ephesians,* is printed with the lectures called 'The Christian Ecclesia.'

For the last two years of his life Hort lived under semi-invalid conditions, though a year before the end he was lecturing, and almost up to the end he was constantly at work: when unable to write, he read omnivorously as ever. In the summer of 1892 he tried once more the tonic effects of Alpine air: at first he picked up strength, but eventually he became very ill, and was with difficulty conveyed home. Once more he rallied, and finished his article on Lightfoot. But the effect was too much for his failing strength, and on November 30th he passed away in sleep.

As I have said, it is impossible for me to attempt anything but a record. One would dearly like to know, but it is futile to ask, what he would say of the movements of thought which we have seen since his time, and of books which we are inclined to regard as epoch-making. One thing however stands out surely as the message of his life to all who are pressing forward on new ways—the duty of extreme caution, of tireless industry, of scrupulous accuracy, of the sinking of all personal conceit and ambition in the quest of Truth.

Let me end with two of his aphorisms:

'Smooth ways of thought are like smooth ways of action: truth is never reached or held fast without friction and grappling.'

'Beliefs worth calling beliefs must be purchased with the sweat of the brow. The easy conclusions which are accepted on borrowed grounds in evasion of the labour and responsibility of thought may or may not be coincident with truth: in either case they have little or no share in its power.'